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Summary  
Better market linkages and higher farm benefits for smallholder farmers in emerging and 
developing economies have received remarkable attention worldwide (Minot and Roy, 2007; 
Kumar et al., 2011). In this regard, contract farming (CF) is proposed as a better solution to 
the fact that smallholders are otherwise potentially dropped out of the modern marketing 
channels because of small-scale production and farmers from emerging and developing 
countries are to earn more farm benefit by getting closely linked to modern, in many cases 
global food value chains markets (Bacon, 2005; Mangala and Chengappa, 2008; Minten et 
al., 2009; Rao et al., 2012; Jia and Bijman, 2013). Furthermore it is expected that the 
challenges of a sharply increasing world population, the overuse of natural resources, and the 
reduction of overall agricultural land size can be met by contracting smallholder farmers 
(Sartorius, 2013). However, the circumstances of farmers’ decision in contracting and its 
influences on farm performances have remained uncertain so far for many specific countries 
and products (Rao et al., 2012).  
Among the major rice farming countries in Southeast Asia, i.e. Cambodia, Laos, the 
Philippines, and Thailand, Vietnam is characterized by very favorable natural and social 
conditions for irrigated rice production in bulk. Irrigated rice production in the country is 
based on high soil quality, tropical monsoon weather, numerous water-flows and a large 
share of the population working in the agricultural sector (more than 66%) (Ya’kub et al., 
2012). However, low quality and  a lack of professionalism are dramatic problems of the 
Vietnamese rice export sector (Reardon et al., 2014). Vietnam is still known as a low-quality 
rice supplier; as a result the Vietnamese rice price is 20% to 30% lower than the Thai rice 
price (Kubo, 2013). The Vietnamese rice has also lately entered the world export market 
while the prices were already steadily declining (Nielsen, 2003; Dechachete, 2011; Ramberg, 
2011). Currently, the Vietnamese rice sector is characterized by a lack of information with 
short technical assistances, and low input qualities. It is assumed that there is still a large 
potential to increase the ability of smallholders to improve production and increase rice 
yields, overcome existing market barriers, access export markets and increase farm benefits 
and improve the livelihood of farmers’ families. By further promoting the CF scheme in 
2002, the Vietnamese government proposed a better frame for the agricultural sector, 
especially, for the rice sector in the country (Kompas, 2002; Hoang and Yabe, 2012; Vu, 
2012).  
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By farmers’ participation in the CF scheme, the production of high-quality products due to 
improved farmer training and better quality of input factors is a possible solution for 
Vietnamese rice to more successfully compete on the world market (Dawe, 2004). 
Furthermore, farmers can expect a price differential due to improved quality and 
competitiveness. Thus, this scheme is assumed to support smallholders to increase farm 
benefits. In addition, the CF scheme has been implemented to improve farmers’ bargaining 
power and to create an official ground for smallholders to directly deal with private sectors 
in the Vietnamese economy. In terms of firm benefits, these decisions also clarify the 
government’s efforts to support the private sector in supplying agricultural inputs to farmers 
such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, credit, and extension services (Ya’kub et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, this step is also an important procedure to secure national food demand, 
improve international competitiveness, and upgrade the position of export-oriented rice 
farmers (Goletti et al., 1997; ADB, 2005). However, in terms of empirical research, up to 
this date, there are only very few studies that explore the benefits of CF for exporters of rice 
farmers in Vietnam, especially with regard to the Mekong River Delta (MRD) where about 
90% of the national export rice quantity is produced (Loc and Son, 2011). Therefore, there is 
a lack of in-depth quantitative studies analyzing the effects of CF participation with regard to 
farmers’ marketing decisions, farm performance and technical efficiency, especially, in the 
export-oriented rice production segment. Against this background it is the objective of this 
dissertation to close this research gap by providing a better understanding of farmers’ 
decision making with regard to the CF scheme and providing more in-depth insights into the 
effects of contract farming on efficiency and farm performance. 
The conceptual framework of this study is based on the New Institutional Economics 
perspective proposed by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975). The underlying ideas about 
the contract concept explained in the following basically refer back to the three major sub-
strands, i.e. agency theory (Ross, 1973), transaction cost theory (Benjamin et al., 1978; 
Williamson, 1979), and property rights theory (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Grossman and 
Hart, 1986). Thereof, the transaction cost theory is particularly suitable for this study since it 
describes “uncertainty” as a main dimension (together with “asset specificity” and 
“frequency”) influencing the appropriateness of governance mechanisms in (food) supply 
chains (Williamson, 1979). The market imperfections due to a lack of information, a limited 
accessibility of inputs, and a shortage of technical assistance all contribute to “uncertainty” 
and are related to the research topic and objective of this study. In spite of increasing 
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pressure to deliver high quality export products at competitive prices to enter the up-market 
domestic and global value chains, the CF scheme still faces some constraints in emerging 
and developing economies. This can be explained by reference to the poor coordination 
among parties, unfavorable contracts, and specified socio-demographic characteristics (Da 
Silva, 2005; Simmons  et al., 2005; Hongdong, 2007; Wang et al., 2014). Nonetheless, these 
aspects have only been poorly analyzed so far and are not well understood, both from a 
theoretical and an empirical perspective. This dissertation seeks to overcome this weakness 
by building up the conceptual framework and empirical methodology to capture these 
aspects of the export-oriented rice sector in the Mekong River Delta of Vietnam.  
We address these research objectives by using primary data collected in early 2016 in the 
Mekong River Delta (MRD) of Vietnam, where nearly 90% of the country’s export rice is 
produced. The target population of 250.000 households lives in the three main export-
oriented rice production regions namely Kien Giang, Can Tho, and An Giang provinces, in 
the MRD (USDA, 2015). Using a structured questionnaire, 250 households were randomly 
chosen from the aforementioned provinces. To thereby ensure the comparability of contract 
and non-contract farmers, we randomly selected 134 contract farmers from contractor lists 
and 116 non-contract farmers from village official lists of 12 villages. The surveyed 
households had to meet two criteria: Firstly, they had to be located in the same area as the 
contract participants, and secondly, they also had to produce export-oriented rice. These 
selected farmers cumulate rice under written contracts. The contracting company is in charge 
of specifying the production practices, including input supply (seeds, fertilizer, pesticides), 
extension services, and the commitment of buying the products (Simmons et al., 2005; 
Bijman, 2008). In this study, the export-oriented rice farmers were interviewed regarding the 
information about three types of export-oriented rice producing seasons between November 
2014 and October 2015.  
In the first paper, we explore the factors that determine smallholder farmers’ probability in 
developing and emerging economies to participate in CF scheme. We particularly focus on 
the accessibility of market information. A binary probit model is applied to examine the 
probability to participate in the CF scheme. We follow Heckman's (1979) method to 
compare the probit results with the maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) in order to 
control any sample selection bias (Wynand and Bernard, 1981). Results reveal that farmers’ 
contracting decisions are strongly affected by farm characteristics, market information 
access, and household characteristics. Remarkably, the accessibility of world market price 
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information significantly increases smallholders’ likelihood to participate in CF. Moreover, 
the extension service offered by the contractors is considered to be an important motivator 
for rice smallholders to participate in CF. The availability of price information should be 
taken into account by the government to motivate the active participation of smallholders in 
contractual arrangements. 
The second paper provides the evidence about how the CF scheme influences household 
income and rice profit within the export-oriented rice sector in Vietnam. We employ the 
Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) estimation in combination with propensity score matching 
(PSM) procedure to control any sampling bias. The result confirms a positive effect of 
contract participation status on farming households’ performance. Particularly, together with 
“farming size” and “the accessibility of extension services”, “the accessibility of world price 
information” is found as a positive determinant. Moreover, CF participation is considered to 
be an important influencer for rice smallholders to increase their income and rice profit. In 
addition, it becomes evident that not only larger-scale farmers but also small-scale farmers 
can benefit from contract participation. In this connection, the OLS regression in 
combination with PSM gives noticeable evidence for the role of CF in improving household 
income of smallholders by 20.87% and rice profit by 30.54% in Vietnam. 
In the third paper, we investigate how CF improves the technical efficiency of farming and 
the technical inefficiency determinants of export-oriented rice production in the country. The 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is applied to measure the production frontier and the 
farming technical inefficiency determinants, and PSM is again applied to control for self-
selection bias. The results show that the average technical efficiency is of 87.33% with a 
range between 56.48% and 96.47%. The results suggest convincible opportunities for 
farmers to increase the productivity of export-oriented rice production in the country by 
nearly 13% without raising the current resource levels. Land, seed, fertilizer, machine, and 
labor are identified as the major inputs of the production frontier. Moreover, the socio-
demographic characteristics of the sample also slightly influence the TE of rice farming, 
however their influence is non-significant. Based on the findings, “educational level”, “rice 
farming experience” and “off-farm income” are found as determinants positively influencing 
rice farming TE. In contrast, there is a low negative effect of credit accessibility. In addition, 
CF participation is considered to have an influence (even though not a significant one) for 
rice smallholders to increase their farm TE. In this connection, contract participation could 
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support not only larger-scale farmers but also small-scale farmers from developing and 
emerging economies in improving their production patterns. 
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Definitions of key terminologies 
Smallholder (small-scale farmer) 
Smallholder or small-scale farmer is frequently defined base on the landholding size of 
farmers refer to a certain hectare (ha) number. Some organizations such as World Bank, 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) or and the Asia Development Bank (ADB), 
generally define smallholder as a farmer cultivating with up to 2 ha of land. Also, the 
African Development Bank (AfDB) identifies 2 ha landholding for smallholders. In 
Malaysia, the government defines general farmer with a landholding size below 46 ha as 
smallholder and rubber farmer with landholdings up to 100 ha smallholder. In Indonesia, 
farmer with less than 25 ha landholding is defined as smallholder while in India, smallholder 
is defined as occupying less than 5 ha. Oxfam International (2011) developed a report based 
on the current situation that African smallholders are the people that have up to 10 ha of 
farming land. In this dissertation, smallholder is defined as the farmer has landholding size 
from 0.5 to 5 ha (FAO, 1992). 
Export-oriented rice grade 
In the international rice market, there is a wide range of more than 40,000 different varieties 
of rice (Khush, 1997). The major types such as sticky rice, non-sticky rice, brown rice, white 
rice, aromatic rice, flavored rice, Sharbati rice, Basmati, Jasmine, glutinous long rice, 
glutinous short rice are especially traded worldwide (Gibson and Kim, 2013). Most of the 
high-quality (grains) fragrant (mainly Basmati and Jasmine) rice is exported to rich/ 
developed countries, whereas fragrant-broken grain is often exported to Africa. The most 
popular export-oriented rice variety from Southeast Asia is Jasmine, which is shown to be 
more profitable and efficient in comparison with ordinary rice (WB, 2013). Jasmine (Hom 
Mali or KDML 105) accounts for 15% to 18% of Thai rice export volume (Liese et al., 
2014). In Vietnam, there are many varieties of rice grade such as Jasmine, glutinous, 
ordinary or authentic export-oriented rice and rice grade based on the broken percentage 
(mainly 5%, 10%, 15%, 25% and 100%) (see Appendix 2). Under the CF terms, currently, in 
Vietnam, there are some new types of seed developed by the firms are applied such as 
OM6976, OM5451, AGPPS103, OM4900. 
The Mekong River Delta (MRD) 
The Mekong River Delta (MRD) is dominant in Vietnam with regard to the rice quantity 
produced for export (VIETTRADE, 2008; Giraud, 2013). The MRD region includes 12 
xii 
 
provinces with a total population of 17.4 million people. Most of the GDP contribution in 
this region stems from agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (about 41%) (Smith, 2013). Rice 
production is one of the major farm activities in the MRD accounting for about 2.1 million 
ha of rice farming area of the total 4 million ha of agricultural land. On this area, about 38 
million tons of rice are produced during three cropping seasons per year. The production 
contributes approximately 51-55% of quantity to the national rice outputs and 90% of rice 
export quantity of the country (Loc and Son, 2011; Liese et al., 2014). The MRD has a 
tropical climate with dry and rainy season around the year, which is suitable for three 
harvests of rice with the main rice season from November to March. An Giang, Can Tho, 
Dong Thap, and Kien Giang are the major rice producing provinces recording very high 
yields in the MRD region. 
Contract farming (CF) 
CF is defined as an economical institution including the engagement between a firm and a 
grower through a document called “contract” fixing that the firm handles the processing 
stage of the commodity supplied by the grower (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Minot and 
Sawyer, 2016). This arrangement does not only count for farmers’ business relationships to 
processors but it could also be the arrangement between farmers and marketing firms, 
supermarkets, farmer organizations (“collective action“) or any other entities. Frequently, the 
obligation of parties needs to be specified in a written document, in which the price-setting, 
quantity and attributes of the products and the timing of delivery are defined (market-
specifying contract- MC) (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Will, 2013; Minot and Sawyer, 2016). 
CF can also include terms on the provision of agricultural inputs, such as seed and fertilizer, 
and/or technical assistance financed on credit-type prepayment (resource-providing contract- 
RC) (Prowse, 2012, Minot and Sawyer, 2016). Additionally, terms on the concrete 
production-process-management can be fixed in the contract, such as timing and amount of 
pesticide use, seed rates on the plots and the concrete timing of harvest (production-
management contract- PC) (Minot and Sawyer, 2016).  
Most of the contract participants in this study are resource-providing contract (RC) farmers 
who purchase their inputs from the contractors at the beginning of the cropping season. The 
input cost is deducted from payments at harvesting time. Contracted farmers also receive 
technical advisory during their production, have agreements with contractors on specified 
producing practices, inputs (seed, fertilizer, pesticide), and extension service advisory. 
Farmers can also store their product at the contractor’s warehouse for up to one month if 
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they want to wait for higher market selling prices (for negotiable-price term contracts). 
Contractors commit to purchase the products and pay for the collection and transportation of 
the final product at the harvesting period. Other CF arrangements only supply the inputs 
without purchasing outputs. Several firms purchase products without providing the inputs. 
For those cases, the contractors are willing to pay a premium price over the market price at 
harvest time to ensure their market supply. 
  
xiv 
 
Table of contents 
Summary………………………………………………………………………………………...i 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... vi 
List of abbreviations .................................................................................................................. viii 
List of tables ................................................................................................................................. ix 
List of figures ................................................................................................................................ x 
Definitions of key terminologies ................................................................................................. xi 
Table of contents ........................................................................................................................ xiv 
1. General introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Research objectives and dissertation outline .......................................................................... 4 
2. The role of market information access for contract farming participation of 
smallholder farmers in developing and emerging economies: The case of rice farmers in 
the Mekong River Delta.............................................................................................................. 7 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 8 
2.2 Contract farming in developing countries’ modern marketing channels ................................ 8 
2.3 Contract farming within the Vietnamese export-oriented rice sector ................................... 12 
2.4 Research design .................................................................................................................... 15 
2.4.1 Conceptual framework ....................................................................................................... 16 
2.4.2 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 18 
2.4.3 Data collection ................................................................................................................... 19 
2.5. Results 21 
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics .......................................................................................................... 21 
2.5.2 Determinants of CF participation ....................................................................................... 27 
2.5.3 Potential sample selection bias .......................................................................................... 27 
2.6 Conclusions and policy recommendations............................................................................ 28 
3. Do smallholders in emerging economies benefit from contract farming? Empirical 
evidence from the Vietnamese export rice sector ................................................................... 31 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 32 
3.2 Literature review ................................................................................................................... 34 
3.3 Background ........................................................................................................................... 36 
3.4 Data collection ...................................................................................................................... 38 
3.5 Economic approach ............................................................................................................... 39 
3.5.1 Farm performance .............................................................................................................. 39 
xv 
 
3.5.2 Ordinary Least Square (OLS) ............................................................................................ 40 
3.5.3 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) .................................................................................... 40 
3.6 Results and Discussion ......................................................................................................... 42 
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics .......................................................................................................... 42 
3.6.2 Effects of CF participation on household income and rice profit ...................................... 44 
3.6.3 Propensity score matching ................................................................................................. 46 
3.6.4 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations ....................................................................... 48 
4. Contract farming effects on technical efficiency of the export-oriented rice production 
sector in Vietnam ...................................................................................................................... 51 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 52 
4.2. Background .......................................................................................................................... 52 
4.2.1 Economical characteristics of the export-oriented Vietnamese rice production sector ..... 54 
4.2.2 Contract farming in the Vietnamese agricultural sector .................................................... 55 
4.2.3 The effect of contract farming on farm technical efficiency in emerging and developing 
economies ................................................................................................................................... 56 
4.3. Data and methodology ......................................................................................................... 57 
4.3.1 Study design and data collection........................................................................................ 58 
4.3.2 Method.. ............................................................................................................................. 58 
4.3.2.1 Stochastic frontier analysis ............................................................................................. 59 
4.3.2.2 Propensity score matching .............................................................................................. 60 
4.3.2.3 Model specification ......................................................................................................... 63 
4.4. Results…. ............................................................................................................................. 64 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics .......................................................................................................... 64 
4.4.2 Parameter Estimations ....................................................................................................... 65 
4.4.3 Propensity score matching ................................................................................................. 69 
4.5. Conclusion and policy recommendation .............................................................................. 70 
5. General Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 73 
5.1 Major findings ....................................................................................................................... 73 
5.2. Policy implications and further research suggestions .......................................................... 76 
Reference…. ............................................................................................................................... 79 
Appendices ……………………………………………………………………………………90 
Appendix 1: Paddy yield (tons per hectare) in Southeast Asia 2005-2015 ................................ 90 
Appendix 2: Vietnam exports of rice by grade 2013-2016 ......................................................... 90 
Appendix 3. Technical efficiency distribution with selection bias controlling .......................... 91 
Appendix 4: Household questionnaire 2016 ............................................................................... 91 
xvi 
 
List of Publications and Presentations ...................................................................................... 107 
Curriculum Vitae ........................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. 
 
  
1 
 
1. General introduction  
1.1 Background  
Under the pressure of globally increasing demand for food, higher agricultural productivity 
and efficiency and sustainability in smallholder agriculture are considered to be very 
important (GIZ, 2013). Against the background of the sharply increasing world population, 
overuse of natural resources, and reduction of overall agricultural land size, improving the 
linkages between smallholder farmers and firms have received remarkable attention 
(Sartorius, 2013). In this context, contract farming (CF) has received growing attention as a 
way to better link smallholder farmers to food value chains. In many cases CF provides 
opportunities for farmers in rural areas of developing and emerging countries to overcome 
market barriers, increase income and improve technical efficiency (TE) in the agricultural 
sector (Ali and Flinn, 1989; Grosh, 1994; Battase and Broca, 1997; Eaton and Shepherd, 
2001; Swain, 2008; Rahman et al., 2009; Saigenji, 2010; Barrett et al., 2012; Rao et al., 
2012; Wollni and Brümmer, 2012; GIZ, 2013; Sartorius, 2013).  
In general, CF has been widely supported by governments, NGOs, and private firms in most 
developing and emerging countries. It is expected that the contract-based vertical integration 
of farmers supports parties to take advantages of economies of scale and supply large-
quantity and high-quality products for processing or exporting firms. However, despite these 
promising characteristics, there are some major reasons leading to the failure of CF 
expansion in emerging and developing countries. In this connection, small-scale farming 
areas, the prevalence of small and medium-sized enterprises, and the complex judicial 
systems are reported as important obstacles (Key and Runsten, 1999; Carpenter and 
Petersen, 2002; Reardon et al., 2009). The negative effects of poor coordination among 
parties and unfavorable terms and conditions of contracts also restrain smallholders from 
extending their contracting status (Da Silva, 2005; Schipmann and Qaim, 2011). 
Additionally, several socio-demographic determinants are found to negatively influence 
farmers’ willingness to participate in CF schemes. There are some major characteristics such 
as small and medium-sized farm size, high age of household head, low education level, a 
lack of farming experience and farm group preferences which prevent smallholder farmers 
from entering CF schemes (Simmons  et al., 2005; Hongdong, 2007; Schulze et al., 2007; 
Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Otter et al., 2014). In this regard, the key drivers affect 
smallholders’ marketing decisions within the groups of contract participants, non-contract 
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participants and farmers who dropped from CF scheme and how smallholders’ performance 
develops within CF schemes have received great concerns.  
Among the developing countries, Vietnam is one of the key agricultural exporters worldwide 
for e.g. coffee, pepper, seafood, tea and rice (Saigenji, 2010). Compared to other major rice 
farming countries in Southeast Asia such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand (Baldwin et al., 2012), Vietnam has more favorable natural and 
social resources for rice production in bulk (Ya’kub et al., 2012). In 2015, the country 
produced more than 28 million tons of milled rice in total with 7.0 million tons for export, 
contributing approximately 5.5% to GDP growth (USDA, 2015). Rice is one of the largest 
export commodities of Vietnam (Ya’kub et al., 2012; FAO, 2013; Ha, 2013) and places the 
country as the second largest rice exporter after Thailand (Goletti et al., 1997, Giraud, 2013, 
USDA, 2015). 
As a key rice exporter, mainly based on small-scale farming, the Vietnamese rice production 
has been facing great challenges to compete in the global rice market, especially with other 
emerging and developing countries regarding production quantities and prices (Nielsen, 
2003; Baldwin et al., 2012; Reardon et al., 2014; USDA, 2015). In terms of agricultural 
structure, the Vietnamese export-oriented rice sector is characterized by small- and medium-
scale production. Nearly 70% of the rice producers in Vietnam have farm sizes of less than 
0.5 hectares (Wang et al., 2014). With regard to rice value chains, there are many 
stakeholders involved along the chain. The involvement of actors such as wholesale-millers 
(w-millers), millers, wholesalers, retailers, and exporters leads to a great gap between export 
and farm-gate prices (Loc, 2011; Ya’kub et al., 2012, Reardon et al., 2014; Demont and 
Rutsaert, 2017). In addition, being over-dependent on traditional marketing channel may 
limit the ability of companies to strictly control the quality of the raw product as well as 
capture high-value export markets (Oliver, 2005; Loc and Son, 2011; Vinh and Dinh, 2014). 
Currently, the Vietnamese rice farming area is expected to decline due to the governmental 
promotion of corn and soybean crops, which is targeting marginal yielding rice land for this 
conversion program (Smith, 2013). Both winter and autumn crops lose approximately 
20,000 hectares each for corn and soybean cultivation from the year 2016 on (USDA, 2015). 
Since rice is the main staple food in Vietnam (USDA, 2015), it plays a key role in the 
economy. In 2002, the decision No 80/2002/QD-TTg dated June 24th was issued by the 
Vietnamese government to officially promote CF scheme between farmers and the private 
sector. A flexible institutional arrangement was developed for diverse economic entities in 
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the national agricultural sectors. As the result, an official ground in a long-term strategy was 
established to improve the bargaining power of farmers in the relationship with private 
sectors. Due to the supportive policy, farmers have started to pay more attention to CF 
forming a basis for Vietnam to further develop its CF scheme in order to enhance the 
agricultural exporting activities in the world market. Nonetheless, up to date, there are quite 
a few successful contractors in Vietnam engaging in this system (Saigenji, 2010; Loc and 
Son, 2011).  
In this regard, earlier research on small-scale CF has highlighted the opportunities of CF 
participation as an institutional arrangement. This engagement bears the potential for farmers 
to more easily access markets and to ensure raw material supplies by contractors resulting in 
reduced production uncertainty and increasing TE (Rawlins, 1985; Eaton and Shepherd, 
2001; Da Silva, 2005; Ramaswami et al., 2005; Swain, 2008; Saigenji and Zeller, 2009; 
Sartorius, 2013; Wang et al., 2014). Moreover, participating in a CF scheme also supports 
farmers to increase their production frontiers (Rawlins, 1985) and to shift risk from 
producers to processors through their supply of most of the inputs such as seed, fertilizer, 
and pesticides (Ramaswami et al., 2005). Thus, CF could offer a solution for dealing with a 
number of constraints of productivity and TE arising from small-scale production including 
risk coverage and accessibility of inputs, capital resources, and information (Miyata et al., 
2009). However, there is a lack of research on the determinants of CF participation and the 
effects of CF on households’ performance and farm TE levels among members of the export-
oriented rice sector in Vietnam. These shortcomings of prior studies are the main motivation 
of this research.  
In general, this study contributes to the existing literature in three aspects. Firstly, it provides 
deeper insights into the determinants of CF participation among small-scale farmers in 
developing countries and an evaluation of how market information access influences 
farmers’ marketing decisions. Both aspects have remained unclear and largely unexplored so 
fare (Schipmann and Qaim, 2011; Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Maina et al., 2015; Minot and 
Sawyer, 2016), even though the lack of market information can be an important reason that 
affects smallholders’ decision (Oliver, 2005; Bijman, 2008; Kersting and Wollni, 2012; 
Abebe et al., 2013). Secondly, the study explores the influence of CF on household income 
and rice profit within the export-oriented rice sector in Vietnam, which is rarely mentioned 
in existing literature (Barrett et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2014), especially for export-oriented 
rice production (Loc and Son, 2011). And, thirdly, the dissertation provides a better 
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understanding of the effects of CF participation on the TE of rice farming by specifying a 
stochastic frontier model for analyzing primary farm level data from Vietnam (Huynh and 
Yabe, 2011; Hoang and Yabe, 2012; Vu, 2012). 
1.2 Research objectives and dissertation outline  
In light of the elaborations mentioned above, this study aims to find the answers on the 
following research questions:  
1. What are the determinants influencing the probability of contract farming participation 
within the export-oriented rice sector in Vietnam? 
2. How does contract farming participation influence farming households’ performance 
in the export-oriented rice sector in Vietnam? 
3. Does contract farming participation support export-oriented rice smallholders in 
Vietnam to get higher farming technical efficiency and what are the technical 
inefficiency determinants? 
To do so, we employ cross-sectional data collected in early 2016 from a sample of 250 
export-oriented rice farmers in the Mekong River Delta of Vietnam using a structured 
questionnaire (see Appendix 4). The underlying ideas about the contract concept are derived 
from the New Institutional Economics perspective (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) which 
resulted in the concepts of agency theory (Ross, 1973), transaction cost theory (Benjamin et 
al., 1978; Williamson, 1979), and property rights theory (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; 
Grossman and Hart, 1986). Thereof, especially the transaction cost theory proposed by 
Williamson (1979) is particularly suitable for this study since it describes “uncertainty” as 
the main dimension (together with “asset specificity” and “frequency”) influencing the 
appropriateness of governance mechanisms. This research refers to some particular aspects 
such as the mechanism, arrangement, improvement of smallholder farmers’ marketing 
decisions and improved production cost management, which supports the increase of 
household income, farming profit as well as farming TE. Several variables regarding socio-
economic characteristics, production inputs and outputs were measured to evaluate these 
aspects using discrete regression models (e.g., Probit, Ordinary Least Square-OLS, 
Propensity Score Matching-PSM, Maximum Likelihood Estimations-MLE, Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis-SFA) as presented in this dissertation.  
The role of CF via export-oriented rice sector in Vietnam is underscored in agricultural 
production participation and determinants of marketing decision and technical inefficiency 
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among smallholder farmers are discovered in this dissertation. Based on the research 
findings, farm characteristics, market information access, and household characteristics are 
proved to have strong influences on smallholders’ contracting decisions. Remarkably, the 
accessibility of world market price information significantly increases smallholder’s 
likelihood to participate in CF. Moreover, the extension service/technical assistant offered by 
the contractors are considered to be an important motivator for rice smallholders to 
participate in CF. Additionally, there is a strong influence of CF participation on household 
income and rice profit. It is interesting that not only “farming size” and “the accessibility of 
extension services” but also “the accessibility of world price information” are found as 
important determinants that significantly influence farming households’ performance. In 
addition, it becomes evident that not only larger-scale farmers but also small-scale farmers 
can benefit from CF participation. In this connection, we find that CF participation plays an 
important role in improving household income of smallholders by 20.87% and rice profit by 
30.54% in Vietnam. The SFA results reveal that about 13% of the potential outputs are lost 
due to technical inefficiency. The TE of export-oriented rice production in the MRD ranges 
between 56.48% and 96.47%. In total, the scale-effect is about 1.026, which reveals that if 
farmers increase 1% of production inputs, the TE score can increase by 1.026%. Thereby, on 
average, contract participants have higher TE (88.46%) in comparison to non-contracting 
farmers (86.02%). In the two-sample t-test of TE-mean values, with a t-value of 3.01, a 
significant difference at the 5% level could be confirmed, indicating higher TEs for contract 
farmers. 
Against the background of the sharply increasing world population, overuse of natural 
resources, and reduction of overall agricultural land size, improving farming TE in emerging 
and developing economies’ agricultural production and upgrading smallholders’ position in 
modern value chains through participating in CF is one of the suitable solutions, 
respectively. This dissertation provides an improved understanding of the potentially 
important role of CF in meeting current challenges of world agriculture. 
Apart from the Introduction part in chapter 1- “General Introduction”, the remainder of the 
dissertation is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 is named “Determinants of Contract Participation”. This section includes the first 
paper entitled “The role of market information access for contract farming participation of 
smallholder farmers in developing and emerging economies: The case of rice farmers in the 
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Mekong River Delta”. In this paper, we employed a Probit model to explore the determinants 
of CF participation and MLE to control sample selection bias. 
Chapter 3 is named “Benefits from Contract Participation”; it presents the second paper 
entitled “Do smallholders in emerging economies benefit from contract farming scheme?: 
empirical evidence from the Vietnamese export rice sector”. We evaluate the effects of CF 
participation on household income and rice farming profit of export-oriented rice farmers 
using OLS; PSM estimations are included to control for a potential self-selection bias.  
Chapter 4 is named “Contract Farming Effects on Technical Efficiency”. It introduces the 
third paper on “Contract farming effects on the technical efficiency of the export-oriented 
rice production sector in Vietnam”. A SFA was used to examine the effect of CF on farm TE 
and to explore the technical inefficiency determinants for export-oriented rice production. 
PSM is again used to control for any sample selection bias. 
The last chapter, “General Conclusions”, includes the summary of major findings, study 
implications, limitations, and further research suggestions.  
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2. The role of market information access for contract farming 
participation of smallholder farmers in developing and emerging 
economies: The case of rice farmers in the Mekong River Delta
1
 
Abstract 
It is the objective of this study to explore the factors that determine smallholder farmers’ 
probability in developing and emerging economies to participate in commodity production 
sectors’ contract farming schemes with particular focus on market information access. Based 
on transaction cost theory a conceptual framework was developed and applied using a probit 
model on quantitative cross-sectional data collected from a sample of 250 export-oriented 
rice farmers in the Mekong River Delta of Vietnam in early 2016. The results highlight the 
positive influence of price information and extension services accessibility, but negative 
effects of rice farming experience and household size on households’ contracting decision. 
This study cannot give evidence of farm performance effects associated with contract 
farming participation in Asian commodity sectors, an aspect that should be the focus of 
future research. In order to increase Asian farmers’ contract farming participation, rice 
export companies should offer constantly favorable price terms with an extension service in 
their contracts. This should be combined with the joint development of appropriate measures 
and strategies to increase farmers’ access to detailed rice market information involving all 
stakeholders of the sector (including contracting companies, farmers association and 
politicians). The improvement of the contract farming scheme in an Asian developing 
country provides opportunities for linking farming households to financially lucrative world 
markets and, consequently, reducing rural poverty in such countries. The study explores the 
role of market information access empirically and thus uncertainty in the light of transaction 
cost theory, as an important driver of contract farming among smallholders in developing 
countries.  
Keywords: Agricultural products, export rice, modern marketing channels, contract 
farming, smallholder farmers, Vietnam. 
  
                                                          
1
 This paper is a joint work with Ludwig Theuvsen and Verena Otter; the Department of Agricultural 
Economics and Rural Development, University of Goettingen, Germany. 
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2.1 Introduction  
Globalization trends in the food sector in recent decades have shaped international food 
marketing channels according to increasing worldwide demand for higher-value products. 
This development goes hand in hand with the transformation and consolidation of the retail 
sector, the expansion of food processing, the growth of the food service industry, structural 
change towards larger farm sizes and the increasing commercialization of agricultural 
production in developing and emerging economies (Minot and Roy, 2007; Kumar et al., 
2011). Smallholders from such countries therefore still tend to be underrepresented in 
international food value chains due to disadvantageous structural market entry barriers: 
diseconomies of scale, scope and density (small farms being located in remote areas) (Phil et 
al., 2005), absolute costs (high production and transaction costs, limited credit access) 
(Markelova et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2014) and a lack of differentiation (low capabilities to 
cope with stricter quality criteria as well as bureaucracy and traceability requirements) 
persisting in food export supply chains (David et al., 2012). In order to respond to this 
development and overcome market barriers, contract farming (CF) is generally considered to 
be a potential solution which allows farmers to participate in, as well as to gain market 
access to modern marketing channels, including export-oriented markets (Bacon, 2005; 
Mangala and Chengappa, 2008; Jia and Bijman, 2013). Consequently, CF is associated with 
lower market uncertainty (Phil et al., 2005; Hongdong Guo, 2007, Minot and Roy, 2007; 
Minten et al., 2009), higher producer prices and, thus, better household livelihoods for 
smallholder farmers (Oliver, 2005; David et al., 2012; Rao et al., 2012). In their specific 
practical implementation, however, the greater level of process sophistication associated 
with CF as well as an unfavorable politico-economic environment had often led to 
polarization in favor of better endowed smallholders with larger production areas being 
included in CF-schemes and, thus, in international food value chains. The poorer, more 
disadvantaged farmers refrain from participation or drop out of the scheme again as a result 
of economic failure (Da Silva, 2005; Oya, 2012; Minten et al., 2013; Otsuka et al., 2016; 
Minot and Sawyer, 2016). 
In this regard, the ability of smallholders to constantly overcome market barriers and access 
export markets through CF in developing and emerging countries is considered to be of high 
interest from a research perspective (Phil et al., 2005; Shiferaw et al., 2016) and has 
therefore been addressed by many earlier studies (Key and Runsten, 1999; Oliver, 2005; 
Phil, 2005; Hongdong, 2007; Wollni and Brümmer, 2012). Previous literature has identified 
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various factors, partially diminishing the likelihood of of smallholders’ CF participation 
when influencing smallholders’ marketing decisions. A number of major socio-demographic 
characteristics such as smaller farm size, high age of household head, low education level, 
less farming experience as well as farm group preference have been proven to affect the 
willingness to participate in CF scheme or adoption negatively (Phil, 2005; Hongdong, 2007; 
Schulze et al., 2007; Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Otter et al., 2014). Market failures due to 
underlying policy and inefficient institutions lead to low market coordination and high 
transaction costs and production cost (Shiferaw, Hellin and Muricho, 2016). The negative 
effects of poor coordination among parties, unfavorable terms and conditions of contracts 
also restrain smallholders in extending their contracting status (Schipmann and Qaim, 2011). 
However, how market information access influences farmers’ participation in contracting 
has remained unclear and largely unexplored so far, even though the accessibility of price 
information fluctuation is considered to be an important reason affecting smallholders’ 
decisions (Oliver, 2005; Bijman, 2008; Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Abebe et al., 2013; 
Shiferaw et al., 2016). 
The aforementioned research gap motivates us to explore the factors determining the 
probability of smallholder farmers in developing and emerging economies to participate in 
CF schemes. The paper extends the existing research literature by focusing on the specific 
influences of market information access as one of the major factors affecting CF adoption 
decisions in commodity markets. The conceptual framework thereby developed and applied 
refers back to assumptions from transaction cost theory as proposed by Williamson (1979). 
The Vietnamese export rice sector was chosen for research due to its representative character 
in supply chains of globally commercialized commodities with great importance for food 
security (Chen et al., 2006) whilst simultaneously suffering from loose linkages between 
smallholder farmers and export companies in a business environment with low value added 
and low product quality leading to relatively low prices (Nielsen, 2003; Baldwin et al., 
2012). Based on the conceptual framework developed, the decision making process with 
regard to farm perspectives is assumed to be influenced by three major categories of 
determinants: farm characteristics, market information accessibility, and household 
characteristics. Survey data of 250 export-oriented rice households in the Mekong River 
Delta of Vietnam is used of which 134 households have participated in CF scheme with two 
companies in the past ten years and 116 non- contract households in the same area. A probit 
model is applied to examine the probability of participating in the CF scheme. Based on this 
empirical study, policy and management implications are derived regarding the development 
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of supporting programs for farmers and agribusiness. The results are specifically interesting 
for firms, producers and the traders of the raw products (commodity) in emerging and 
developing countries.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces general information about the role of 
CF schemes in developing countries as a modern marketing channel to connect smallholder 
farmers with buyers in agricultural value chains. This is followed by Section 3 which refers 
to the CF activities in the Vietnamese export rice sector and the corresponding literatures. In 
Section 4, conceptual framework, methodology, and data collection are presented. Study 
results for the determinants of contracting decision are shown in Section 5 before drawing 
conclusions and policy recommendations in Section 6. 
2.2 Contract farming in developing countries’ modern marketing channels 
Today, as a result of the globalization trend in the food sector, modern marketing channels 
have become an important alternative to traditional marketing channels for farmers and 
smallholders in emerging and developing countries. While traditional channels are 
characterized by local spot market transactions with end-consumers or small traders, modern 
marketing channels are dominated by supermarkets, processors, and exporters which often 
tend to source via CF to ensure consistent supply of sufficient quantities of high quality 
products (Hanink and Owusu, 2000; Secer et al., 2006; Minot and Roy, 2007; Shiferaw et 
al., 2016; Ton et al., 2017), advantages that may potentially go hand in hand with leverage 
effects on the farm level (Jia and Bijman, 2013).  
CF is defined as an economical institution involving engagement between a firm and a 
grower through a document called “contract”. This fixes the firm’s handling of the 
processing stage or other downstream activities (e.g. export) of the commodity supplied by 
the grower (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Minot and Roy, 2007). This arrangement does not 
only account for farmers’ business relationships with processors but could also be the 
arrangement between farmers and marketing firms, supermarkets, farmer organizations 
(“collective action“2)or other entities such as exporters. Frequently, the obligation of such 
parties needs to be specified in a written document in which price-setting, quantity and 
attributes of the products and the timing of delivery are defined (market-specifying contract- 
MC) (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Will, 2013; Minot and Sawyer, 2016). CF can also include 
terms on the provision of agricultural inputs, such as seed and fertilizer, and/or technical 
                                                          
2
 Collective action is a voluntary action taken by a group to achieve common interests (Marshall, 1998).  
Chapter 2: Determinant of Contract Farming Participation 
 
11 
 
assistance financed on credit-type prepayment (resource-providing contract- RC) (Prowse, 
2012, Minot and Sawyer, 2016). Additionally, terms on the concrete production-process 
management can be fixed in the contract, such as timing and amount of pesticide use, seed 
rates on the plots and the specific timing of the harvest (production-management contract- 
PC) (Minot and Sawyer, 2016). Alternatively, two other strategies exist for smallholder 
farmers to access markets, namely, “collective action” and “informal spot market”. 
Collective action includes joint actions by farmers organized, for instance, in a cooperative. 
It is often fostered as an alternative or complementary institution to overcome structural 
market barriers, but in many cases doomed to failure due to the resulting double-burden of 
institutional establishment if combined with CF (Prowse, 2007). Informal spot market 
agreements which cover intermediate traders or directly with large companies such as 
supermarkets (owned by multinational companies), hotels and restaurants, and fast food 
chains, still receive widespread acceptance among smallholder farmers in developing 
countries (David et, al., 2012). 
Due to its higher degree of formalization, the governance mechanism CF aims to ensure 
more planning security for the purchasing entity through exclusive procurement rights based 
on fixed terms and conditions and different levels of control over the production procedure 
and the quality of final commodities depending on the type of contract (Will, 2013). 
Simultaneously, the farmer as the supplying entity might also gain benefits from the decision 
towards modern marketing channels and CF on different levels, corresponding to the 
contract-types (Soe et al., 2015). Access to international markets in particular via modern 
marketing channels with lower sales-related risks (MC) (Minot and Sawyer, 2016), 
additional access to newest production inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides) on credit and 
extension service (RC) (Key and Runsten, 1999; Otsuka et al., 2016) as well as the 
complementary shift of production-related risks to the contractor through the fulfillment of 
process-specifications (PC) could be strong motivators for farmers to enter CF (Abebe et al., 
2013). Even though CF is associated with various potential benefits and assumed to be an 
increasing trend also in emerging and developing countries, it is affected by smallholder 
participation dynamics and failure of schemes (Minot and Sawyer, 2016; Ton, et al., 2017). 
The greater level of process sophistication as well as perceived marketing inflexibility, 
coexisting with uncertainty regarding contract enforcement due to poor legal liability in 
developing countries are considered to diminish its relative attractiveness (Schipmann and 
Qaim, 2011; Maina et al., 2015; Minot and Sawyer, 2016).  
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Overall, whether or not smallholders in developing and emerging countries perceive CF to 
be advantageous in terms of production and transaction costs under consideration of 
potential benefits and constraints and consequently whether they participate in CF greatly 
depends on their individual characteristics and their economic, political and sociological 
environment (Saenger et al., 2014; Rao et al., 2012). Corresponding parameters have been 
used micro-analytically as indicators in previous studies on similar topics, which then have 
submitted arguments on the grounds of the transaction cost theory proposed by Williamson 
(1979) when describing smallholder decisions for or against specific governance 
mechanisms as a continuum of different characteristics of product marketing transactions. 
These studies highlight the price expected or other economic incentives received as obvious 
reasons to decide for one particular marketing channel over another (Schipmann and Qaim, 
2011) which is also congruent with neoclassical price theory (Coase, 1972). Moreover 
different farm and farmer characteristics plus channel attributes were identified as influential 
and exceeding the neoclassical view of transaction-cost-theoretical arguments (Schipmann 
and Qaim, 2011). Such arguments also support observations that poor coordination among 
parties and (perceived) unfavorable terms and conditions listed in contracts may restrict 
farmers from joining CF (Da Silva, 2005). This is a perception that is greatly influenced by 
the availability of comprehensive and correct market information (Williamson, 1979). 
Especially for relatively standardized commodity products (raw products) such as rice, 
which is mainly exported from emerging and developing countries in Southeast Asia such as 
Thailand and Vietnam, information on price level and stability in output markets is 
considered to directly influence marketing preferences of smallholders. This exceeds any 
hedging asset specific investments as it is the case for products with greater degree of 
differentiation and product specialization (Hongdong, 2007). These particularities motivated 
us to investigate in this study, the determination of the contracting decisions made by 
smallholder rice farmers in developing countries’ from a new-institutional-economics 
perspective and with specific focus on the availability and accessibility of market 
information indicating parametric and non-parametric uncertainty.  
2.3 Contract farming within the Vietnamese export-oriented rice sector 
Rice is a globally commercialized commodity and a staple food for nearly half of the world 
population (Chen et al., 2006). Most of the rice traded on the world market comes from 
developing countries (Achmad et al., 2012). In the last five years, about 85% of the export 
rice quantity has been exported by six countries, namely India, Thailand, Vietnam, USA, 
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Pakistan and Myanmar (USDA, 2016). Of these, the Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam, 
Thailand, and Myanmar, export the most (see Figure 2.1). 
  
 Figure 2.1: Export rice quantities from major suppliers worldwide in 2011-2017 
 Source: USDA (2018).  
 
Vietnam has a great potential to become one of the key exporters for rice in addition to many 
other agricultural products such as coffee, pepper and tea as well as seafood (Saigenji, 2010). 
Since the late 1990s, Vietnam has transformed from being a major rice importer to the 
second largest rice exporter from Southeast Asia (Baldwin et al., 2012; Giraud, 2013), 
supplying about 20% of total global rice trade in the year 2015 (USDA, 2015). However, 
currently with more than 66% of the population working in the agricultural production and 
nearly 70% of small and medium-size farming households, the Vietnamese export rice sector 
is facing a great challenge to compete in the global rice market. The same applies to other 
emerging and developing countries (USDA, 2015; Reardon et al., 2014). In addition, 
Vietnamese rice exports are still characterized by low value added, low product quality and 
cost leadership, leading to low competitiveness in comparison to its major competitor, 
Thailand (Nielsen, 2003; Baldwin et al., 2012). Generally in the recent decade, the FOB3 
                                                          
3
 Free On Board (FOB), the term refers to the price of export products at the loading port excluding insurance 
and shipping fees (Ramberg, 2011). 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
India 10.250 10.480 11.588 11.046 8.600 10.800 10.300
Vietnam 7.717 6.700 6.325 6.606 7.000 4.880 6.000
Thailand 6.945 6.722 10.969 9.779 10.000 10.300 10.000
Pakistan 3.399 4.126 3.600 3.700 4.600 4.200 4.000
USA 3.298 3.295 2.998 3.472 3.325 3.300 3.550
Myanmar 1.357 1.163 1.688 1.735 1.800 1.500 1.700
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price for the main export rice varieties, such as “Viet 5% broken” or “Viet 25% broken”, 
from Vietnam has been 20 to 30% lower than for Thai export rice (Thawatchai, 2011; 
Ramberg, 2011).  
Since most rice producers are smallholders, the enforcement of CF in Vietnam has the 
potential to support rice farmers in improving rice quality and access to target markets, 
reducing transaction and production costs, and controlling output quality (Tuan, 2012). In 
this regard, the introduction of CF scheme has been greatly supported by the Vietnamese 
government since the turn of the millennium. Particularly, the decision No 80/2002/QD-TTg 
dated June 24th 2002 named "Policy on the Promotion of Agricultural Produce and Purchase 
through Contracts" and decision 62/2013 QD-TTg established in 2013 have officially 
promoted the implementation of CF in Vietnamese agricultural production. These decisions 
also develop a flexible framework for diverse economic entities in the country. A long-term 
strategy has been implemented to improve farmers’ bargaining power and to create an 
official group for smallholders. These decisions also clarify national policy efforts to support 
the private sector in supplying agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, credit, 
and extension services to farmers (Ya’kub et al., 2012) in order to secure national food 
demand, improve Vietnam’s competitiveness on the world market, and upgrade the 
bargaining power of export-oriented rice farmers (Goletti et al., 1997; ADB, 2005). 
However, while large shares of other major Vietnamese agricultural export products are sold 
under CF (cotton: > 90%; fresh milk: > 90%; tea: > 40%) (UNCTAD, 2009; Prowse, 2012), 
the export rice value chain still involves numerous different actors, namely; collectors, paddy 
millers, millers, middlemen, retailers, and wholesalers. These maintain informal trading 
relations (Loc and Son, 2011; Ngoc and Anh, 2014; Reardon et al., 2014). As presented in 
Figure 2.2, the export rice value chain is dominated by the traditional channel. A large share 
(93.1%) of export-oriented rice is sold to independent paddy collectors and only 2.7% to 
millers directly (Loc and Son, 2011; Ngoc and Anh, 2014). Due to the numerous types of 
potential trading partners involved in the traditional marketing channel, the linkages between 
the farmers and the processing/exporting companies are generally rather loose, thereby 
limiting control over the raw product quality and thus diminishing prices received (Saigenji, 
2010; Loc and Son, 2011). Only a few companies in Vietnam process and export rice via CF 
(Saigenji, 2010), translating into 4.2% of rice quantity sold under contract (Loc and Son, 
2011; Ngoc and Anh, 2014). 
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        Figure 2.2: The marketing channels of export rice sector in the MRD of Vietnam. 
        Source: (Loc and Son, 2011; Ya’kub et al., 2012; Reardon et al., 2014) 
In the past, farmer organizations which had depended on the superiority of socialist forms of 
production called “collectivization” did not play a role in trading products between farmers 
and large food companies in the Vietnamese export rice supply chain; most especially in the 
export rice sector (Pingali and Vo, 1992; Minot and Goletti, 2000). This was in contrast to 
various export products from other emerging and developing countries (Minot and Sawyer, 
2016), Even though such farmer associations do now exist in the export rice sector, their role 
to date is limited to the provision of support services (Naziri et al., 2014). In this regard, 
farmer associations cannot be considered a potential trading option within the modern 
marketing environment of the Vietnamese export rice sector but rather as providers of 
(market) information to their members (Moustier et al., 2010). Nowadays, due to strong 
incentives from the Vietnamese government, “collective action” has been established in the 
country (Frédéric and Dao, 2005, Naziri et al., 2014). In the Vietnamese vegetable sector, for 
instance, this recent collective action scheme has successfully encouraged the participation 
of the private sector, farmer associations and smallholder farmers (Naziri et al., 2014). 
Due to its particular importance, there have been many economic studies focusing on the 
export rice sector in Vietnam. Apart from a few studies focusing on farm productivity and 
efficiency (Pingali and Xuan, 1992; Hoang and Yabe, 2012; Duy, 2012), most of the 
research refers to the influences of governmental policies such as price control (Ghosha, 
2004; Gibson and Kim, 2013); quality control (Ryan, 1999; Nielsen, 2003; Coxhead et al., 
2012), export liberalization and flexibility (Goletti et al., 1997; Pingali et al, 1997; Lutz et al. 
2006; Ya’kub et al., 2012) or the de-collectivization process (Pingali and Xuan, 1992). These 
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are considered not only to offer benefits for farming households but also to encourage 
greater participation from the private sector in the Vietnamese export-oriented rice value 
chain. A noticeable line of research also refers to the influence of programs carried out by 
non-governmental organizations in granting initial support for an enhanced marketing and 
trade policy (J. Ryan, 2002; Jaenicke et al., 2010). Even though the introduction of the CF 
scheme in Vietnam over the past 10 years and more offered greater opportunities for 
smallholder farmers to access modern marketing channels, there have been to date few 
research studies on this institutional arrangement (Reardon et al., 2014). The determinants of 
farmers’ contracting decisions in this sector are therefore still widely unexplored. As a result, 
this study focuses on what determines smallholder farmers’ contracting probability in the 
Vietnamese export rice sector.  
2.4 Research design 
2.4.1 Conceptual framework 
The New Institutional Economics perspective proposed by Coase (1937) and Williamson 
(1975), resulted in the concepts of transaction costs, property rights, and agency theory. The 
underlying ideas about the contract concept explained, basically refer back to the three major 
sub-strands as follow: agency theory (Ross, 1973), transaction cost theory (Benjamin et al., 
1978; Williamson, 1979), and property rights theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Of these, 
the transaction cost theory proposed by Williamson (1979) is particularly suitable for this 
study since it describes “uncertainty” as a main dimension (together with “asset specificity” 
and “frequency”) influencing the appropriateness of governance mechanisms. The 
conceptual framework of this paper was developed based on studies by Netemeyer et al 
(1991), Feder (1985) and Williamson (1975) (see Figure 2.3). This theory was also applied 
in later studies by Fishbein and Ajzen (2011), Simmons et al. (2005), Handschuch et al. 
(2013) and Greiner (2015). 
Based on the conceptual framework presented and the aim of this study as being an 
evaluation of the impact of market information as a key determinant of smallholders’ 
contracting decisions; the decision making process from a farm perspective is assumed to be 
influenced by three major categories of determinants and their respective indicators: (1) farm 
capacities for output generation (farm characteristics); (2) the ability to consider market 
uncertainty (market information accessibility); and (3) managerial capacities (household 
characteristics). First, variables representing farm characteristics such as farming area, 
machine value, other crop income, and off-farm income are included. Referring to 
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Schipmann and Qaim (2011) farmers with larger farming areas or off-farm income may 
show lower contract-aversion due to their higher time opportunity costs. Consequently, 
larger farmers may have greater inducement to reduce search costs through contracting, 
which had resulted from the “uncertainty” and “frequency” of transactions. The variables 
machine value and other crop income also build on ideas from Williamson (1979) by 
reflecting the extent of asset specific investments which might motivate farmers to decide in 
favor of more stable marketing relations and greater payment security through CF. 
Furthermore, farms with more favorable characteristics may have advantages in responding 
to the requirements fixed in these contracts (Simmons et al, 2005).  
The second group of variables includes indicators of market information access (and thus all 
reflect the degree of “uncertainty”), i.e. educational level of the household head (Cai et al., 
2008), access to world market price information, previous season price information, 
telephone ownership, extension service accessibility, distance to the nearest market and 
membership in farmers associations (FAs) which are regularly mentioned in the existing 
literature (Ramaswami et al., 2005; Hongdong et al., 2007; Magesa et al., 2014). This 
literature generally supports education as empowering individuals with greater literacy and 
marketing skills, in turn attributes that may help farmers to assess modern marketing options 
independently without participating in any CF scheme. Better-educated farmers can 
therefore be expected to be less willing to participate in modern marketing channels and the 
corresponding CF scheme. The variable describing the distance to the nearest local market 
indicates the accessibility of up-to-date domestic market information through personal 
contact. Farmers with the advantage of shorter distance may have easier access, thus 
reducing the likelihood of CF-participation in the sense of Williamson (1979). The distance-
eliminating character of farmers’ telephones and the information channels extension service 
as well as farmer associations may have similar effects (Jensen, 2007). Simultaneously, the 
variables world market price information and previous season price information measure the 
extent of direct information availability. Generally, the market price information received 
shows great price volatilities on the global rice market which makes forecasting of future 
farm-gate prices difficult for farmers. In addition, farmers are uncertain about potential 
opportunistic behavior of independent paddy collectors regarding future farm-gate prices. To 
some extent, it is assumed that uncertainties are increasing in the case of Vietnamese rice 
household farmers. Further information about fluctuating rice markets, could be expected to 
lead to higher probabilities of participation in CF schemes. We therefore expect better the 
Chapter 2: Determinant of Contract Farming Participation 
 
18 
 
accessibility to market price information to result in higher probabilities of contract 
participation (Williamson, 1991). 
        
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. The conceptual framework of households’ contracting decision 
Source: adapted from Netemeyer et al., (1991); Fishbein and Ajzen (2011), Greiner (2015). 
Within the third category household characteristics are grouped such as; gender, household 
size, farming experience and age of the household head, which are hypothesized to affect the 
decision making process of smallholders and have indirect influences on the accessibility of 
their productive resources (Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Greiner, 2015). Firstly, regarding 
gender characteristic, Maina et al. (2015) state that males have larger marketing networks 
due to their interactions with more buyers as females, are restricted to household activities. 
Therefore, we expect that being a man has a positive influence on any marketing channel 
choice. For the “household size” variable, we expect a negative sign in the probability of 
choosing modern marketing channels. It is assumed that the larger the number of working 
family members, the lower the probability of CF participation. Additionally, for a country 
with about 66% of the population working in the agricultural sector (WB, 2016), “rice 
farming experience” is a major constraint for any modern marketing strategy (Kulkarni and 
Grethe, 1999). For example, rice farming households with long term farming experience 
Chapter 2: Determinant of Contract Farming Participation 
 
19 
 
may decide not to enter contractual arrangements because the decision makers believe they 
do better on their own and independent from contractors (Barrett et al., 2012). Continuing 
with the same argument, we also expect that older farmers (“age of household head” 
variable) are more likely to choose traditional marketing channels (Handschuch et al., 2013). 
We expect these indicators to affect the probabilities of the CF scheme participation 
negatively. From the farmers’ perspective participation in CF may offer better marketing 
options but it may also lead to a reduction in freedom of choice in farming practices, farming 
quantity, seed variety, and farm-gate prices (Bijman, 2008; Tuan, 2012; GIZ, 2013). All 
three major categories are assumed to directly or indirectly lead to Vietnamese rice farmers’ 
decisions to participate in CF or to refrain from participation (Kersting and Wollni, 2012; 
Greiner, 2015). 
2.4.2 Methodology  
We have followed the methodologies which were applied in earlier studies to analyze the 
impact of CF programs in Senegal by Warning and Key (2002), standard adoption by 
Kersting and Wollni (2012), and GlobalGAP certification by Holzapfel and Wollni (2014). 
Thus, we choose a probit model to explore the factors that influence the probability of 
contract participation. In order to control the sample for selection bias, we followed 
Heckman's (1979) method to compare the probit results with the maximum-likelihood 
estimation (MLE) (Wynand and Van De, 1981).  
Based on the conceptual framework, the probit model is applied with the assumption that 
selected variables representing farm characteristic, market information access, and 
household characteristic determine the households’ contracting decisions. Household income 
and rice profit are not included in the probit model as indicators, since these variables highly 
correlate with rice farming area and farm size (Greene, 2002; Vanslembrouck et al., 2002). 
The probit model is applied to explain a dichotomous dependent variable 𝑦∗; 𝑦∗ stands for 
the probability of CF participation and is interpreted as follows: 
𝑦𝑖
∗= β0 + ∑ β𝑘𝑖
𝐾
𝑘= 1 𝑥𝑘𝑖 +  ε𝑖 (1); 
given i representing each respondent, 𝑥𝑘 describes the vector of k independent variables; β𝑘 
are the parameters for the effects of 𝑥𝑘 on 𝑦
∗; β0 is the intercept for the expected value of 𝑦
∗ 
when all 𝑥𝑘 are equal to zero; 𝜀𝑖 represents the error term for respondent i; 𝑦𝑖
∗ is continuous, 
unobserved and ranges from (-∞ to +∞). We define the relationship between the latent 
dummy variable 𝑦𝑖
∗ and the observations as: 
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𝑦𝑖 =  {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑
0          𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
    (2) 
The decision to participate in CF is interpreted as follows: 
𝑦𝑖 =  {
1                          𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑠
0          𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑠
     
As a result, the probabilities to participate in CF are estimated through the following 
equation:  
P(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖 , 𝛽) = 𝜇(𝐹𝑗𝑖) and P(𝑦𝑖 = 0|𝑥𝑖, 𝛽) = 1 - 𝜇(𝐹𝑗𝑖)   (3); 
with Fji = ln xi where j = 1 for contract participation and j = 0 for non-contract participation. 
By maximizing the corresponding log likelihood function the parameter  β𝑗𝑘 can be 
estimated (Greene, 2002). When the log-likelihood function is not sharply peaking but 
relatively flat at its maximum, the particular parameter is covered by limited information in 
the data. In this case the MLE will be an imprecise estimator (Heckman, 1979; Greene, 
2002). With the assumption that the error term ε𝑖 in (1) is not following a normal 
distribution, the probit result should be considered as an approximation since the correction 
term is included. Thus, we compare these probit estimation results to those from the MLE 
with sample selection by controlling for correlations between errors (Heckman, 1979; van de 
Ven and van Praaag, 1981). We assume that there are underlying relationships between the 
unobserved, latent variables and their observed outcome. If error terms are significantly 
correlated, it means that a self-selection bias is existent. The error term equation adapted 
from Greene (2002) is estimated as follows: 
 ε𝑖 ~ Prob(0,1, 𝜌), Var[ ε𝑖]= 1; Cov [ε𝑖]= 𝜌  (4). 
Thereby the error term ε𝑖 from equation (1) has a normal distribution with zero mean, unit 
variance and correlation 𝜌. 
2.4.3 Data collection  
Primary data was collected in early 2016 in the Mekong River Delta (MRD) of Vietnam 
where nearly 90% of the country’s export rice is produced. The target population of 250,000 
households is located in the three main export rice production regions, namely the Kien 
Giang, Can Tho, and An Giang provinces in the MRD (USDA, 2015). Using a structured 
questionnaire, 250 households were chosen from the aforementioned provinces. To ensure 
the comparability of contract and non-contract farmers and simultaneously assure 
representativeness of the subsamples, we randomly selected 134 contract farmers from 
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contractor lists and 116 non-contract farmers from official lists of 12 villages’ located in the 
same area as the contract participants. Most of the CF participants in the sample produce 
under resource providing contracts, thus, the contractors are in charge of specifying the 
production practices including input supply (seeds, fertilizer, pesticides) on credit, technical 
assistances, and the purchasing commitment (Phil et al., 2005; Minot and Sawyer, 2016). In 
this paper, the export-oriented rice farmers were interviewed about information on farm and 
household characteristics and market information access referring to the three export rice 
producing seasons in the year from the beginning of November 2014 till the end of October 
2015.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
                    Figure 2.4 Area of study in the Mekong River Delta of Vietnam 
                    Source: Map adopted from (Minot and Golleti, 2000) 
2.5. Results  
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 shows the general statistics for the included variables of the three categories in the 
estimated models. Regarding the farm characteristics, it becomes evident that the total 
farming size of the farms surveyed is on average about 3.39 ha while only 24% of the 
farmers own livestock and 0.236% income comes from additional crops. Simultaneously, a 
mean number of 1.656 machines are used indicating their important role during rice farming 
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activities. The paddy farm-gate price per kilogram is on average about VND5150 (~ 
USD0.23). The off-farm income of the farming households accounts for on average 
VND40.550 million per year (~ USD1843.1). Regarding the second category of variables, 
the household heads went to school for on average 8.12 years. The rate of telephone 
ownership is rather high (91.2%). The smallholder farmers surveyed have an average 
distance of about 2.93 km to the nearest market. Small channels and rivers are a specific 
characteristic of this area, preventing rice household farmers’ access to local markets. 
Additionally, 45% of the respondents stated they had access to world market price 
information, 58.2% to the previous seasons’ price information and about 45.6% to extension 
service. With regard to the household characteristics, we find that the farm households have 
on average 1.79 members (“household size”). The average age of the household head is 
46.67 years, most of them are males (94.40%) with an average rice farming experience of 
23.39 years. Only 37.6% of the farming households can access credit from financial 
organizations.   
Using t-tests, we compare participants in CF to non-contract participants regarding the 
differences in measures of the major categories “farm characteristics”, “market information 
access”, and “household characteristics”. It can be seen from the results that there are strong 
differences between the two groups in some major characteristics such as: farm-gate price 
received, information accessibility, relationship with FAs and farming experience. 
For the category farm characteristics, the results show that there are significant differences in 
mean values of the selected variables “paddy farm-gate price” and “other crops” between the 
contract participant and non-contract participant groups. A higher producer price for paddy 
received by contract farmers (significant at the 1%-level) indicates that those farmers are 
benefiting from fair-price terms offered by the contracting companies in comparison to the 
spot market. This could on the one hand be explained by low bargaining power on the part of 
farmers on the free export-oriented rice market (spot market/traditional channels) or on the 
other hand by the influences of market price information (Williamson, 1991).  
The second category of variables including attributes regarding the ability to access market 
information. Here there are significant differences in particular with respect to the 
accessibility of world market price information, access to extension services, and 
membership status of FAs between contract and non-contract participants. Based on the 
comparison of results, it is interesting that contract participants have better opportunities to 
gain access to market price information than non-contract participants at a 5% level of 
significance.  
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In the last category of variables, the major demographic variables which are expected to 
affect the contracting decisions are tested. Regarding the number of households’ farming 
members, the non-contract group has a higher percentage of household members involved in 
farming activities (significant at p<0.05) in comparison to the contract group even though 
the total farm size does not differ significantly among the groups. This result can be 
explained with the support of extension services and access to high quality inputs the CF 
farmers receive, which then lowers family labor demand in comparison to non-contract 
farmers (Phil, 2005). The significant negative effects of the “rice farming experience” 
variable could be interpreted as  farmers, especially smallholders in rural and less developed 
areas, having more experience in rice farming and being less willing to change their farming 
habit from conventional to a modern marketing strategy (Cai et al., 2008; Kleemann et al., 
2014). 
With regard to the contract type status, nearly 80% of the farmers sampled producing export 
rice under contract in the MRD of Vietnam have production contracts. Thus, the majority of 
these farmers retains control over strategical farm-producing management decisions such as 
input purchase and production process planning, while the contractors’ role is rather 
supportive in nature (Bijman, 2008; WB, 2013). Simultaneously, PC may provide 
advantages regarding transaction costs (e.g. acquisition of market information, price risks) 
and transportation costs (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). Even though farmers producing under 
RC may face higher production costs than those producing under marketing and production 
contracts, these aspects may, according to the distribution of contract-types, not be of 
decisive relevance for farmers in the export-oriented rice sector of Vietnam. This 
interpretation is also supported by farmers’ perceptions of costs and benefits under their 
contracts. Most of the farmers surveyed find that CF is helpful for them accessing the most 
convenient market instead of relying on traditional market channels either through 
middlemen or other spot market transactions. Moreover, RC allows farmers to control their 
farming practice and maintain control over their production process (see Table 2.2). 
Among Vietnamese export rice farmers only a minority agrees on a fixed price at the time of 
contracting (8.2%), while the majority determines prices later, at delivery time (48.2%) or 
flexibly at any time in between (43.3%) (see Table 2.3). Delivery and flexible prices help 
firms to hedge against price fluctuation on the world market that would otherwise negatively 
affect their export activities (Grosh, 1994). However, such price terms may diminish the 
possibility of risk reduction through contracting and consequently, farmers’ willingness to 
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produce under contracts since the “price term” is one of the most important criteria in 
farming households’ contracting decisions (Phil, 2005). However, the farmers in this sample 
perceive their contracts and corresponding price-terms to be risk reducing with regard to 
market price fluctuations (mean: 4.11) Table 2.4).  
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Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the estimations 
        
          
Total sample  
(N= 250)   
Non-contract farmers 
(N= 134)   
  Contract 
farmers (N=116)   T-test 
Variable Description     Mean    Std deviation   Mean 
    Std 
deviation   Mean 
    Std 
deviation   
 Farm characteristics                      
Farming machinery (number) 
 
1.656 1.302 
 
1.69 1.296 
 
1.63 1.312 
 
-0.282 
Paddy farm-gate price  (1000VND) 
 
5.15 0.56 
 
4.96 0.49 
 
5.31 0.04 
 
5.127*** 
Other crops (1= yes) 
   
0.236 0.425 
 
0.302 0.461 
 
0.179 0.38 
 
-2.29** 
Off-farm income (1000VND) 
  
40.550 68.329 
 
34.617 64.303 
 
45.690 71.473 
 
1.031 
Livestock ownership (1=yes) 
 
0.24 0.427 
 
0.302 0.461 
 
0.187 0.391 
 
-1.197 
Market information access                       
Schooling years of HH head (1-15 years) 
 
8.128 2.956 
 
7.93 2.90 
 
8.3 3.00 
 
0.989 
Telephone ownership (1= yes) 
 
0.912 0.2896 
 
0.89 0.30 
 
0.91 0.28 
 
-0.221 
The world market  price information access (1= yes) 0.45 0.4990 
 
0.38 0.045 
 
0.50 0.043 
 
3.891** 
The previous seasons’ price information (1= yes) 
 
0.582 0.500 
 
0.49 0.502 
 
0.56 0.498 
 
1077 
Membership in a FA (1= yes) 
  
0.152 0.3597 
 
0.103 0.30 
 
0.186 0.39 
 
1.9997** 
The extension service access (1= yes) 0.456 0.4990 
 
0.39 0.489 
 
0.51 0.502 
 
2.019** 
Distance to the nearest market (km) 
 
2.93 2.1 
 
3.05 2.18 
 
2.83 2.05 
 
-0.8 
Household characteristics                         
Age of household head (years) 
  
46.676 10.58 
 
46.6 11.04 
 
46.74 11.04 
 
0.101 
Rice farming experience (years) 
 
23.39 10.24 
 
24.67 10.90 
 
22.29 9.52 
 
-1.843* 
Number of dependents (number) 
 
1.744 1.367 
 
1.298 1.427 
 
1.69 1.427 
 
-0.713 
Household size (number) 
 
1.79 0.697 
 
1.9 0.71 
 
1.7 0.67 
 
-2.22** 
Farmer access to the credit (1= yes) 
 
0.376 0.4853 
 
0.37 0.485 
 
0.38 0.488 
 
0.207 
Household head is male (1= yes) 
  
0.944 0.2303  0.93 0.254  0.96 0.208  0.827 
Note: * p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01     
           1USD = 22.000VND (average of currency exchange rate is applied at the time of data collection Nov-2015 to January 2016) 
    Source: authors’ owned calculations   
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Table 2.2. Distribution of contract-types in the sample  
    RC   MC   PC      Total 
 Households     106 
 
26 
 
2 
 
        134 
 Percentages     79.1   19.4   1.5          100 
 Source: authors’ owned calculations 
     Table 2.3. The terms of outputs price listed in the contract  
Price term Fixed price Delivery price Flexible price Total  
Households 11 65 58 134 
Percentages 8.2 48.2 43.3 100 
 
 
      Source: authors’ owned calculations 
              Table 2.4. Farmers perception of contract farming benefits 
        
                
      Frequency of farmers  perception  Mean 
score 
Descending   
order 
Production  
      
1 2 3 4 5 
   Increase the average paddy farm-gate price 
     
35 (26.1) 34 (25.4) 59 (44) 6 (4.5) 3.26 
 
10 
Reduce the production cost due to the contractors' seed supply 
  
21 (15.7) 22 (16.4) 58 (43.3) 33 (24.5) 3.76 
 
7 
Reduce the production cost due to the contractors' technical assistance 
 
14 (10.4) 21 (15.7) 68 (50.7) 31 (23.1) 3.86
a
 
 
6 
Reduce transportation cost 
      
1 (0.7) 24 (17.9) 73 (54.5) 36 (26.9) 4.01
b
 
 
5 
Reduce using chemicals  
      
17 (11.3) 32 (21.3) 62 (41.3) 23 (15.3) 3.69
c
 
 
8 
Reduce the risk of  product in comparison with spot market 
 
1 (0.7) 2 (1.5) 6 (4.5) 47 (35.1) 78 (58.2) 3.86
a
 
 
6 
Reduce risk for market price fluctuation 
     
4 (3.0) 23 (17.2) 60 (44.8) 47 (35.1) 4.11 
 
3 
Reduce the risk of storing the paddy after harvesting 
    
4 (3.0) 28 (20.9) 63 (47.0) 39 (29.1) 4.02
b
 
 
4 
Other terms 
               Learn new farming method through CF scheme 
 
1 (0.7) 6 (4.5) 12 (9.0) 86 (64.2) 29 (21.6) 3.86
a
 
 
6 
Easily estimate the farming profit 
     
4 (3.0) 34 (25.4) 72 (53.7) 24 (17.9) 3.86
a
 
 
6 
Acceptable contract price 
      
19 (14.2) 28 (20.9) 67 (50.0) 20 (14.9) 3.65
c
 
 
9 
Make finding buyers easier 
     
1 (0.7) 2(1.5) 6 (4.5) 47 (35.1) 78 (58.2) 4.48
d
 
 
1 
Enhance bargaining power        1 (0.7) 11 (8.2) 80 (59.7) 42 (31.4) 4.32
d
  2 
Number of observations (Percentages): 134  (100%)             
Likert scale: 1. Strongly disagree; 2. Disagree; 3. Neutral; 4. Agree; 5. Strongly agree; Bracket value is Percentage  
Mean scores indicated with the same letter are not significantly different from each other at the 5% level on the basis of a Wilcoxon sign-rank test 
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Table 2.5. Probit model estimations on the contract farming participation 
       
Variable         Coefficient   Robust std.err. 
Marginal 
effects   
Robust 
std.err. Means   
Farm characteristics                       
Farming machinery using (number) 
 
0.0633 
 
0.0756 
 
0.0250 
 
0.0295 
 
1.656 
 Paddy selling price  (1000VND) 
 
0.695*** 
 
0.161 
 
0.275*** 
 
0.0797 
 
5.15 
 Other crop (1= yes) 
   
-2,684 
 
147.7 
 
-1.062*** 
 
0.204 
 
0.236 
 Off-farm income (1= yes) 
  
0.113 
 
0.181 
 
0.0449 
 
0.0687 
 
0.492 
 Livestock ownership (1= yes) 
 
2,249 
 
147.7 
 
0.890*** 
 
0.191 
 
0.24 
 Market information accessibility                 
Schooling years of HH head (1-15 years) 
 
-0.00736 
 
0.0339 
 
-0.00291 
 
0.0132 
 
8.12 
 Telephone ownership (1= yes) 
  
-0.206 
 
0.316 
 
-0.0817 
 
0.127 
 
0.912 
 The world market  price information access (1= yes) 0.615*** 
 
0.188 
 
0.244*** 
 
0.0729 
 
0.45 
 Previous seasons' price information access (1= yes) -0.0102 
 
0.233 
 
-0.00405 
 
0.0954 
 
0.528 
 Membership in a FA (1= yes) 
  
0.358 
 
0.262 
 
0.142 
 
0.103 
 
0.152 
 The extension service access (1= yes) 0.485** 
 
0.235 
 
0.192** 
 
0.0942 
 
0.456 
 Distance to the nearest market (km) 
 
0.0127 
 
0.0434 
 
0.00502 
 
0.0173 
 
2.93 
 Household characteristics                 
Age of household head (years) 
  
0.0258** 
 
0.0119 
 
0.0102** 
 
0.00453 
 
46.67 
 Rice farming experience (years) 
 
-0.0310*** 
 
0.0111 
 
-0.0123*** 
 
0.00403 
 
23.39 
 Number of dependants (number) 
 
-0.0486 
 
0.0697 
 
-0.0192 
 
0.0264 
 
1.744 
 Household size (number) 
  
-0.277* 
 
0.142 
 
-0.109** 
 
0.0547 
 
1.792 
 Credit access (1= yes) 
  
0.0636 
 
0.203 
 
0.0252 
 
0.0776 
 
0.376 
 Household head is male (1= yes) 
 
0.161 
 
0.406 
 
0.0639 
 
0.145 
 
0.944 
 _cons 
    
-3.933*** 
 
1.114 
       The probability of contract participation with the rest variable are at mean values: 
 
0.551*** 
 
0.033 
   Number of observation: 250 
            Wald chi2(18) = 62.63 
            Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
            Correctly classified: 71.60% 
            Pseudo R2 = 0.1814 
             The marginal effects (dy/dx) are calculated at the means of the variables. For dummy variables, the marginal effect is calculated for a discrete change from 0 to1. 
Statistical significant level: * p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
        Source: authors owned calculations 
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2.5.2 Determinants of CF participation  
The probit model estimation illustrated in Table 2.5 shows an R
2
 value of 0.1814 for the 
variables employed in the model which is acceptable for a cross-sectional data analysis. 
There is no auto-correlation among the independent variables with a correctly classified level 
of 71.60%. In addition, the probability to participate in CF is significantly influenced by 
three major groups of indicators, namely farm characteristics, household characteristics, and 
accessibility of market information as expected in our hypotheses.  
Among the indicators for farm characteristics, the probability of contracting participation is 
strongly affected by “average paddy farm-gate price” (β=0.695***) received. This result also 
confirms the finding of previous literature that the farm-gate price is one of the most 
important factors influencing farmer’s contracting decision (Key and Runsten, 1999; 
Hongdong, 2007; Huh et al., 2012; Schipmann and Qaim, 2011). Concerning the descriptive 
statistics with regard to the differences in paddy prices between the two groups, the 
perception of paddy price slightly increases.   
Regarding the variables representing market information accessibility, we find significantly 
positive effects of the accessibility of extension services (β=0.485**) and world market price 
information (β=0.615***) on households’ contracting decision. The 5% significance level of 
the extension service variable once again is in line with previous studies (Da Silva, 2005; 
Phil et al., 2005; Christensen et al., 2011; David and Spencer, 2012). The extension service 
support, in particular technical assistances, advisory services, transportation services, 
financing, quality monitoring and other services positively affect households’ contracting 
decision (Da Silva, 2005). These services could be offered from FAs, firms, and other third 
parties giving multiple opportunities to farmers. Thus, the more extension services a farmer 
works with, the higher the probability of joining CF. Remarkably, the accessibility of world 
market price information is found to have a great influence on households’ contracting 
decisions (p<0.01, β=0.615). Additionally, the producer price received for the paddy 
strongly influences the households’ contracting decision. This result supports our research 
hypothesis insofar that price information positively influences the decisions of households to 
participate in CF. Even membership in FAs between both groups is significantly different in 
t-test (see Table 2.1) but there is no effect on the probit estimations (see Table 2.5). This can 
be interpreted as contract- farmers participating more actively in FAs but being a member of 
FAs or not does not cause any influence on households’ decision to participate in CF 
scheme.  
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Thirdly, demographic characteristics including “age of household head” and “rice farming 
experience”, and “household size” are illustrated as major determinants of farmers’ 
contracting decisions. While there are many studies showing negative effects of age on the 
probability of households’ contracting decisions (Simmons et al., 2005; Bellemare, 2012), in 
our research, the “age of household head” variable (β=0.025**) shows a positive effect, 
indicating that a higher age of the household head increases the probability of households’ 
contract participation. That can be interpreted as when farmers get older, they are afraid of 
increasing uncertainties in rice production and trading activities. Participating in a CF 
scheme is a step towards securing their activities and reducing risk. Concerning the 
“household size” or the number of household members involved in farming, Phil et al., 
(2005) proved that household size does not affect the households’ contracting decisions. 
However, our results indicate that a higher number of family members living in a rice 
farming household corresponds to a lower willingness to participate in CF (β=-0.27**). 
Since exporting and processing firms prefer to sign contracts with better performers 
(Briones, 2015), most of the contracting companies expect households with more farming 
experience to be willing to participate in CF (Miyata et al., 2009). However, the negative 
effect of “rice farming experience” (β= -0.31) in our analysis confirms results from previous 
literature showing that the probability of CF participation decreases with higher numbers of 
years of farming experience (Ramaswami et al., 2005; Cai et al., 2008; Kleemann et al., 
2014). Consequently, long experience of rice farming and corresponding marketing habits 
discourage smallholders to change marketing strategies. Experienced smallholders are 
confident enough with their farming and marketing skills (Elepu, 2009) and perceive 
themselves as capable of dealing with spot marketing (Kulkarni and Grethe, 1999). 
2.5.3 Marginal effect estimation  
According to Heckman (1979), in order to control for error term correlation, we employ 
marginal effects estimation by treating the rest variables at a mean value and consider the 
contract participation status as the treatment effect. As a result, the marginal effect level 
which is 0.551 at 1% significance level is acceptable, indicating that there is no evidence for 
error correlation in our model. There is not much deviation from the result of the probit 
model and the MLE with sample selection which supports the robustness of our estimation 
results (Table 2.5). We find that “age of the household head” (β=0.01**), “accessibility of 
extension service” (β=0.192**), average paddy farm-gate price (β=0.275***), and 
“accessibility of world market price information” (β=0.244***) are the most important 
determinants of CF participation, which is in line with the probit model estimation. 
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Additionally, “rice farming experience” (β=-0.123**) and “household size” (β=-0.109**) in 
the MLE are still found to negatively influence the probability of contracting decisions.  
2.6 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
For the governance mechanism CF in emerging and developing economies, the case of the 
Vietnamese export-oriented rice sector under research in this study gives interesting insights 
at the farm level. From a new institutional economics perspective, the contracting decisions 
of smallholder farmers in the Vietnamese export rice sector are analyzed based on three 
major categories of influencing variables: farm characteristics, market information access, 
and household characteristics. Based on data from 250 Vietnamese rice farmers a probit 
model estimation granted deeper knowledge about farmers’ probability to participate in a CF 
scheme and determinants that influence the corresponding decisions in emerging economies.  
The paddy farm gate-price received, which is observed to be higher for contract farmers, is 
found to be an especially important determinant. Contractors offering constantly higher 
prices in comparison to middlemen in traditional channels might encourage farmers’ 
contracting decisions. Such price terms, in combination with extension service provision as 
part of the contract is considered to be an important motivator for rice smallholders to 
participate in CF due to the improvement of farming practices.  
With regard to the accessibility of market price information, the more farmers have 
information about the fluctuation of rice prices, the more they are willing to participate in a 
CF scheme to reduce risk due to rising market uncertainties. Farmers’ should therefore also 
be encouraged and trained specifically on demanding and using such information for 
managerial decisions. This especially holds true for farmers who still compensate search 
costs with habits stemming from long-lasting experience in the rice business plus a greater 
number of household members and thus family labor. 
Overall, to take advantage of the new agri-food trend opportunities, and to upgrade current 
Vietnamese rice-marketing channels, policies aiming to improve the export-oriented rice 
sector to avoid the opportunistic behavior by intermediaries should be considered. These 
should focus on the implementation of institutions that set the rules of the game and link  
small-scale farmers with high-end markets. As a result, farmers can avoid assets constraints 
and levels when otherwise depending on traditional spot markets. Therefore, based on these 
results, we suggest that the availability of the price information should be taken into account 
by the Government during the development and enhancement of the Vietnamese CF scheme 
proposed in the decision No. 80/2002/QD-TTg "Policy on the Promotion of Agricultural 
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Produce and Purchase through Contracts" and decision No. 62/2013 QD-TTg to motivate the 
active participation of smallholders in contractual arrangements. Furthermore, processing 
and exporting companies’ extension services and their adaption to smallholders’ needs are of 
particular importance for encouraging farmers to participate in CF.  
This study is also characterized by some limitations which provide starting points for future 
research. It only allows for conclusions on the relevance of the pure availability of market 
information as a determinant of smallholder farmers’ contracting decisions without 
distinguishing between different types of such information. Thus, future research could take 
different types of information into account to gain deeper insights into the relevance of 
information access for smallholders’ decision making. Additionally, the study does not allow 
for conclusions on the real advantageousness of CF for export rice farmers in Vietnam. This 
limitation also implies further research on the actual effects of CF participation.   
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3. Do smallholders in emerging economies benefit from contract 
farming? Empirical evidence from the Vietnamese export rice sector
4
 
 
Abstract 
Contract farming participation is proposed as a better solution for smallholder farmers from 
emerging and developing economics to earn higher farming benefits from global aspects. 
Whether this is also true for the case of contract farming scheme in Vietnam has rarely been 
examined before. This study addresses the influences of contract farming participation on 
farming households’ performance in the Vietnamese export-oriented rice sector using 
quantitative cross-sectional data from a sample of 250 rice farmers. Results from OLS-
regression and Propensity Score Matching confirm the positive effects of contract farming 
on improving household income and rice farming profit.  
Keywords: Contract farming, farming households’ performance, Propensity Score Matching, 
Vietnam, export rice sector. 
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3.1 Introduction  
Rural poverty reduction in emerging and developing economies through improving farming 
productivity, profitability and sustainability has received great attention from politicians, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and researchers in recent years. However, the 
development of global food supply chains with the strengthen of modern marketing channels 
and the arising role of large-scale farmers still puts smallholders from emerging and 
developing countries, such as Vietnam, under the scenario of under-representation in global 
food value chains (Simmons et al., 2005; Sartorius, 2013, Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014). 
Institutional innovations are considered to play an important role in supporting smallholder 
farmers to overcome market failures and improve their livelihoods (Hazell et al., 2010; 
Vandeplas et al., 2013). In this connection, contract farming (CF) is considered to be an 
potential solution to  link small-scale farmers to modern marketing channels, support them in 
increasing household welfare and, consequently reduce rural poverty (Simmons et al., 2005; 
Minot and Roy, 2007; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Barrett et al., 2012; Rao et al., 2012; 
Sartorius, 2013, Gatto et al., 2017).  
In this regard, CF scheme has been addressed by many earlier studies on smallholder farmers 
livelihood improvement and poverty reduction (Key and Runsten, 1999; Oliver, 2005; 
Simmons, 2005; Hongdong, 2007; Maerten and Swinnen, 2009; Miyata et al., 20009; 
Bellemare, 2012, Wollni and Brümmer, 2012, Rao et al., 2012, Shiferaw et al., 2016). 
Thereby, previous literature has confirmed such positive contributions of CF schemes 
through increases in farm performance livelihood (Maerten and Swinnen, 2009; Miyata et 
al., 20009; Bellemare, 2012, Wollni and Brümmer, 2012, Rao et al., 2012; Maertens and 
Vande Velde, 2017) besides the influence of different structural farm and socio-demographic 
farmer characteristics such as rice farming size, educational level of household head as well 
as rice farming experience (Simmon, 2005; Hongdong, 2007; Schulze et al., 2007; Kersting 
and Wollni, 2012; Miwambi et al., 2014). The effectiveness of agricultural CF scheme in 
improving overall farm performance, farm technical efficiency and household livelihood has 
been approached in several contexts (Schipmann and Qaim, 2011: Rao et al., 2012, Shiferaw 
et al., 2016). However, how CF scheme influences farmers’ performance in emerging and 
developing economies staple food cropping sectors, especially rice, still remains 
underexplored in existing literature, even though CF is considered a promising institutional 
arrangement for smallholder to overcome under-representation in global food value chains 
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and improve smallholders’ performance (Oliver, 2005; Bijman, 2008; Kersting and Wollni, 
2012; Abebe et al., 2013; Shiferaw et al., 2016, Maerten and Vande Velde, 2017).  
Transforming from a major rice importer to one of the worldwide biggest exporters since the 
late 1990s, Vietnam has become one of the major rice export countries in Southeast Asia 
(Baldwin et al., 2012; Giraud, 2013, FAO, 2017). However, about 70% of the rice farmers in 
Vietnam are small and medium-sized farming households (less than 0.5 ha) with low income 
of approximately 1USD per day per person (Reardon et al., 2014; USDA, 2015). Thereby the 
generally relatively low shares of rice quantity traded under contract at the production stage 
are even decreasing since the turn of the millennium, from about 10% in 2004 (ADB, 2005), 
about 4.2% in 2010 (Loc and Son, 2011) down to 2.12% in 2013 (Smith, 2013). Since the 
traditional rice marketing channel involves numerous types of trading partners and is 
dominated by middlemen and other entities, rice farmers suffer from low bargaining power, 
low farm-gate prices, and, thus, lower farm income and greater poverty (Saigenji, 2010; Loc 
and Son, 2011; Wang et al., 2014). Therefor the CF scheme in agricultural production has 
been officially promoted by the Vietnamese government with the aim to improve farm 
performance and farmers’ livelihood. The Vietnamese export rice sector is relevant due to its 
representative character for supply chains of globally commercialized commodities with 
great importance for food security (Chen et al., 2006) simultaneously suffering from loose 
linkages between smallholder farmers and export companies in a business environment with 
low value added and low product quality leading to relatively low prices (Nielsen, 2003; 
Baldwin et al., 2012). It , thus, represents an interesting case under research to obtain further 
insights on whether CF schemes in developing and emerging economies export-oriented 
commodity sectors could support to improve smallholder farm performance and livelihood 
rural household income, as this is the aim of this study. 
The paper extends the existing research literature by focusing on the specific influences of 
CF affects in commodity markets. Thereby, we look at the CF status among export-oriented 
rice farmers production and evaluate the impact of this status on household income and rice 
profit. We employ ordinary least square (OLS) regression in combination with propensity 
score matching technique (PSM) to estimate treatment effects of CF scheme on household 
income and rice profit. We then analyze how the estimated treatment effect varies over 
various farm and household characteristics and over the propensity score matching level. 
Survey data of 250 export-oriented rice households in the Mekong River Delta of Vietnam is 
used of which 134 households have participated in CF scheme with two companies in the 
recent ten years and 116 non-contract households in the same area. The results reveal that 
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contract participation has significantly benefited smallholder rice farmers but that the effect 
varies with farming size, extension service access, and household size. Based on the results, 
policy and management implications are derived regarding the development of supporting 
programs for farmers and agribusiness. The results are specifically interesting for firms, 
producers and the traders of the raw products (commodity) in emerging and developing 
countries.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 3.2 introduces the literature review of 
the related research on CF topic, especially focusing on searching for research gap among 
the latest literatures about farm performance in emerging and developing economics. Section 
3.3 refers to general information about CF schemes within agricultural production and 
export-oriented rice sector in Vietnam. This is followed by section 3.4 which refers to data 
collection and section 3.5 is about econometric approach including methodology and 
hypothesis explanation. Study results for the farming households’ performances regarding 
two criteria: household income and rice profit are shown in section 3.6 together with 
conclusions and policy recommendations. 
3.2 Literature review 
In the academic literature, modern marketing channels and CF are associated with various 
benefits for smallholders in developing countries corresponding to different contract-types 
existing (Soe et al., 2015). For marketing contracts (MC) particularly access to international 
markets via modern marketing channels at lower sales-related risks (Minot and Sawyer, 
2016) are highlighted in the literature. The MC is appropriated when both the producer and 
the buyer gain from having the terms of sale arranged in advance to respond to price risk or 
price enhancement (Minot, 2009). MC targets the specifications of quantity and quality of 
the delivered commodity at a future date, either at a predetermined price or a pricing formula 
(Gyau et al., 2008). For resource-providing contracts (RC), additional access to newest 
production inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides) on credit and extension service (RC) is 
described to be advantageous (Key and Runsten, 1999; Reardon et al., 2009; Otsuka et al., 
2016). Resource-providing contracts can only focus on providing inputs and an output 
market (Bijman, 2008). The producer has full autonomy regarding production decisions 
(Minot, 2009). This type of contract is considered advantageous when the buyer owns key-
information about production methods or wants to ensure a certain level of quality or food 
safety required by export markets. Dries and Swinnen (2004) find that a number of dairy 
companies in Poland used resource-providing contracts with small-scale farmers which 
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motivate dairy farmers to increase land size and machinery inventory. The resource-
providing contract can secure farmers’ access to and reduce the costs of obtaining credit, 
inputs and extension services, including the cost of screening and selecting these services.  In 
the case of production-management contracts (PC) the complementary shift of production-
related risks to the contractor through the fulfillment of concrete process-specifications 
might increase smallholder welfare (Abebe et al., 2013). Such PCs include terms on the 
particular manner in which the commodity is grown such as the planting density, use of 
pesticides and fertilizer, timing of harvest (Minot, 2009). The PC exists where the buyer 
supplies and manages all the inputs on the farm and the farmer usually becomes just a 
supplier of land and labour (Singh, 2000). The production-management contract specifies 
cultivation practices to achieve quality, timing and low-cost production and thereby supports 
skills development of the producer, and thereby reduce future transaction costs. 
Weatherspoon and Reardon (2003) find that farmers in Kenya prefer acquiring PC for export 
products and MC for domestic supermarkets since quality and safety requirements on export 
markets are more stringent.  
There is a growing body of studies evidencing contracting activities as beneficial for farmers 
in developing and emerging countries through resolving several market failures (Simmons et 
al., 2005; Minot and Roy, 2007;  Maertens and Swinnen 2009; Barrett et al., 2012; Rao et 
al., 2012; Sartorius, 2013; Bellemare and Novak 2017; Gatto et al., 2017). The study by 
Maerten and Vande Velde (2017) confirms the positive contribution of CF on rice quality, 
higher farm-gate prices and household income of rice farmers in Benin. Another study about 
the vegetable export chain in Senegal also finds CF as a scheme to enabling to fulfill high-
standards persisting in international trade, which directly contributes to rural incomes and 
poverty reduction (Maertens  and Swinnen, 2009). In addition, there is evidence that CF 
participation leads to sharing risk for the case of poultry farmers in India which leads to 
higher profits for contract participants than for non-contract participants due to less variation 
in yield and lower price volatility (Ramaswami et al., 2005). Warning and Key (2002) 
evaluate the impact of CF in the Senegalese peanut production sector, finding an increase in 
gross margin which is significantly associated to the CF status. Simmons et al (2005) also 
conclude with a positive contribution of CF in increasing household income and welfare, 
reducing absolute poverty for poultry and maize seed contractors in Indonesia.  
However, the implementation of CF in developing countries still also faces constraints (Rao 
et al., 2012; Saenger et al., 2014). Thus, earlier research has shown that in developing 
countries, certain farm and farmer characteristics may advantages some farmers over others 
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regarding the participation in CF schemes (Simmons, 2005; Hongdong, 2007). Although 
agricultural production in those countries is overall based on small and medium-sized farms 
and most of the farmers are low educated with less farming experience ( Schulze et al., 2007; 
Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Otter et al., 2014) it’s mostly the farm and household 
characteristics that apart from the CF status also directly positively influence household 
income, such as farming size, age, household head educational level and rice farming 
experience that increase the livelihood of CF participation (Bernard and Spielman, 2009; 
Fischer and Qaim 2012). In this regard, comprehensive research on the inclusiveness of CF 
schemes simultaneously to its contribution to the improvement of rice farming households’ 
performance in emerging and developing countries is necessary (Barrett et al., 2012; 
Abebe  et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014; Maerten and Vande Velde, 2017). 
3.3 Background 
As a country based on agricultural production, annually, the Vietnamese agricultural 
accounts for about 21.8% of the gross domestic product (GDP), creates about 66% of the 
jobs to the population (WB, 2016). Thereby, the rice sector contributes about 20.4% in total 
of agricultural value in the year 2016 (WB, 2016). There are two major rice production areas 
in the county, being the Red River Delta and the Mekong River Delta (MRD) (Linh, 2012). 
Annually, the MRD accounts for about 55% of the total rice production quantity, and nearly 
90% of the export rice production quantity (Loc and Son, 2011, Demont and Rutsaert, 2017). 
In the international rice market, there is a wide range of more than 40,000 different varieties 
of rice (Gibson and Kim, 2013). The major types are: sticky rice, non-sticky rice, brown rice, 
white rice, aromatic rice, flavored rice, Sharbati rice, Basmati, Jasmine, glutinous long rice 
and glutinous short rice. Due to the large number of rice varieties traded internationally, 
normally, rice exporters decide the export variety, quality and price based on the percentage 
of broken rice (5%, 10%, 15% or 25%), which is also common for Vietnamese rice (Demont 
and Rutsaert, 2017).  
Compared the other major competing countries in Southeast Asia, mainly Thailand, on the 
international rice market the Vietnamese rice exporters perceive competitive advantages  due 
to relative large quantities supplied (Baldwin et al., 2012; Ya’kub et al., 2012). However, 
Vietnam, as a country which entered the rice world market as an exporter lately at times 
when the rice price was steadily declining, is also still known as low quality rice supplier 
receiving 20 to 30% lower prices than suppliers from Thailand and, thus, caught in the cost 
leadership position  (Reardon et al., 2014;  Kubo, 2013). A better differentiation through 
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higher product qualities of the rice supplied by Vietnamese exporters to the world market 
might support them to escape the pure price competition and also lead to better performances 
among farmers and exporters (Demont and Rutsaert, 2017). Even though, there is overall a 
large number of rice exporters in Vietnam (more than 100 private enterprises and two stated-
owned companies) in practice, the Vietnamese rice export sector is dominated by the two 
state-owned companies, Vinafood I and Vinafood II accounting for 15% and 41% of the 
country’s total rice exports respectively (Demont and Rutsaert, 2017). In 2001, the 
government set targets for the national export volume to control the rice export market, 
thereby removing of the previous quota allocation for rice exports and fertilizer imports 
fixed in the so called Doi Moi (renovation) policy reform program from 1986, to strengthen 
the role of private companies with the goal to transform Vietnam into one of the biggest rice 
exporters worldwide, thereby upgrading the position of export-oriented rice farmers and 
contributing to national food security (Loc and Son, 2011; Kubo, 2013; Demont and 
Rutsaert, 2017). A price control regime applied later on also serve to insulate domestic and 
export markets from external fluctuations and to reduce transactions costs (Ghosha and 
Whalley, 2004). As part of the overall reforming of Vietnamese agricultural policy, in 2002 
also the decision No 80/2002/QD-TTg dated June 24
th
 named "Policy on the promotion of 
agricultural produce and purchase through contracts" to promote contractual arrangements 
between farmers and processors/traders was implemented. This decision included a flexible 
framework for diverse economic entities of the country, particularly, established a long-term 
strategy to improve farmers’ bargaining power and an official ground for smallholders 
directly dealing with private sectors. Additionally, the decision No. 80 also clarifies 
government efforts to support the private sector in supplying agricultural inputs to farmers, 
such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, credit, and extension services (Ya’kub et al., 2012). In 
order to support the wider implementation of the CF scheme, the circulars 05/2002/TT-
NHNN by the State Bank and 04/2003/TT-BTC by the Ministry of Finance guiding credit 
access and financial support were issued. In 2008, the Directive 25/2008/CT-TTg signed by 
the Prime Minister also serves to enhance the implementation of contract farming. The 
announcement of other law on associate, cooperative, partnership activities and a large 
number of supportive programs issued for specific commodities have created a legal frame 
for CF empowerment. Later on, the decision 62/2013 QD-TTg announced in 2013 for 
officially promoting the implementation of CF in agricultural production once again 
confirms the governmental support for a greater enforcement of this program in long term.  
Chapter 3: Benefits from Contract Farming Participation 
38 
 
Accordingly, the report by ADB (2005) also recommends several agricultural supply-chains 
in Vietnam that would perceive institutional advantages from a wider adoption of the CF 
frame such as those of “vegetables, jute and cotton, tobacco, roses, pineapple, and pork”. 
This is supported by Catelo and Costales (2008) who describe the possibility for 
smallholders in Vietnam to overcome barriers of credit access through CF participation. 
Accordingly, within a short time, over 90% of cotton, over 90% fresh milk and over 40% of 
tea produced for export was commercialized under CF in the year of 2012 (Prowse, 2012; 
Ngoc and Anh, 2014). In the Vietnamese export rice sector, there are currently only few 
companies processing and exporting rice procured via contractual arrangements (Saigenji, 
2010). Still the major share of the export rice quantities is traded over middlemen and millers 
(Loc and Son, 2011) and only a small proportion of rice quantity is produced and directly 
purchased under contract (Smith, 2013) to export and processing companies via CF which 
leads to the persistence of rather loose linkages between farmers and those companies and, 
thus, to limited control over the raw product quality (Loc and Son, 2011; Reardon et al., 
2014; Key and Runsten, 1999). This sobering observation motivates us to focus on the 
export rice sector in our study when aiming to find out about the benfits of the Vietnamese 
CF scheme and how CF schemes improve farm performance during the time on the farm 
level. 
3.4 Data collection  
Primary data has been collected in early 2016 in the Mekong River Delta (MRD) of Vietnam 
where nearly 90% of the country’s export rice is produced. The target population of 250.000 
households is located in the three main export rice production regions, namely the Kien 
Giang, Can Tho, and An Giang provinces in the MRD (USDA, 2015).Using a structured 
questionnaire, 250 households were chosen from the aforementioned provinces. To thereby 
ensure the comparability of contract and non-contract farmers and simultaneously asure 
representativeness of the subsamples, we randomly selected 134 contract farmers from 
contractor lists and 116 non-contract farmers from official lists of 12 villages’ located in the 
same area as the contract participants. Most of CF participants in the sample produce under  
resource providing contracts, thus, the contractors are in charge of specifying the production 
practices including input supply (seeds, fertilizer, pesticides) on credit, technical assistances, 
and the purchasing commitment (Simmons, 2005; Minot and Sawyer, 2016). In this paper, 
the export-oriented rice farmers were interviewed about information on farm and household 
characteristics, agricultural production, off-farm income, household income, rice production, 
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credit referring to the three export rice producing seasons in the year from the beginning of 
November 2014 till the end of October 2015.  
3.5 Economic approach  
3.5.1 Farm performance 
Based on the previous literature review, farming households’ performance (household 
income and rice profit) is assumed to be influenced by two major categories of determinants. 
First, determinants representing farm characteristics such as farming area, machine value, 
other crop assets, and off-farm income are included. These variables are hypothesized to 
support farm households in responding to the requirements fixed in the contracts (Simmons 
et al., 2005; Minot and Roy, 2007; Barrett et al., 2012; Sartorius, 2013). The second group of 
determinants are attributes of household characteristics including household size, gender and 
age of the household head educational level, information access, telephone ownership, and 
the membership in farmers associations (FAs) (Wollni and Zeller, 2007; Kersting and 
Wollni, 2012) which support farmer to do better within CF activities. We expect these 
indicators to positively support contract participants in increasing household income and rice 
profit. The two major categories are assumed to directly or indirectly influence farming 
households’ performance (Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Mwambi et al., 2014; Greiner, 2015).  
Approaching the “household income” as a dependent variable in our concept is considered to 
be more appropriate in comparison to “farm income” (Simmons et al., 2005; Minot and Roy, 
2007; Bellemare, 2012). This is due to the assumption that contracting households are 
supplied with modern inputs and, thus, needs less family labor for their farming activities. 
Since family members who are not involved into rice farming may receive income from 
other business activities, the household income, in contrast to farm income, reflects also 
these spillover effects (Simmons et al. 2005; Wollni and Andersson, 2014). The annual 
household income is defined as the total value generated from farm income (sales of farm 
crops, livestock products, and poultry) and off-farm income/non-farm income (paid work, 
small business, and income from gifts, grants, and pension or retirement benefits) deducted 
by input costs except for the costs of family labor in a period of time (a year) (Mwambi et 
al., 2014). Additionally, it is necessary to differentiate the rice profit from household income 
to evaluate the role of contractors for reductions in production costs (Sartorius, 2013). Rice 
profit is generated from rice production exclusively which is determined by input costs 
(hired land, hired labor, seeds, fertilizers, pesticides etc.) excluding family labor cost and 
output benefits (yield, price). 
Chapter 3: Benefits from Contract Farming Participation 
40 
 
3.5.2 Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
OLS regression is applied to estimate the impacts of contract participation on household 
income and rice profit. If it is true that farming households’ performance is not a fixed 
constant but influenced by observed and unobserved variables, then, OLS regression is 
suitable to measure the concrete effect of the treatment T (contract participation or not) on 
outcome Yi. In our analysis two different OLS-regressions are estimated separately: first, Yi 
is represented by household income and secondly, Yi is represented by rice profit (Aakvik, 
2001). Ti is measured as a dummy variable with i = 1 for contract participation and i = 0 for 
non-contract participation. The impacts of CF participation, thus, can be estimated as one of 
the independent variables in the OLS regression (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). The OLS 
regression is estimated as follows:  
𝑌𝑖=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖     (1) 
Given 𝑋 as the vector of farm characteristics and household characteristics; 𝜀𝑖 represent the 
error term for respondent i. In this regression, the variables presented in the conceptual 
framework are employed to estimate the influences of contracting status and other indicators 
on household income and rice profit.  
In order to control for unobserved variables as well as sample selection bias, the Durbin and 
Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity is employed with the hypothesis that the dummy variable 
for contract participation is exogenous from household income and rice profit (Simmons et 
al., 2005). Furthermore, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test is applied to control for 
autocorrelation (Greene, 2002). 
3.5.3 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
Since normal OLS regression applied for impact evaluation is very sensitive with regard to 
the differences in covariates, propensity score matching (PSM) is adequate for correcting 
potential sample selection bias during the analyses (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Imbens 
and Rubin, 2015). Thus, farming households’ performance should in principle allow for 
computing the average treatment effect of CF participation (Li et al., 2008; Bellemare, 
2012). PSM is used in our analysis to estimate whether there is the difference in mean value 
of outcome indicators between contract participants and non-contract participants (Rao et al., 
2012). The similar outcome indicators (socio-demographic variables) from both groups 
except for contract participation status are considered (Huber et al., 2013). Since 
unobservable indicators which are not included in the model may influence the household 
outcomes, PSM results in a less biased estimation (Imbens and Rubin, 2015). Thereby, the 
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ATE is estimated based on bootstrapping technique as follows in order to make the 
estimation for the larger population less sensitive (Austin and Small, 2014) : 
ATE = E(∆|𝐷 = 1) = E(𝑌1|𝐷 = 1) − E(𝑌0|𝐷 = 0)  (2) 
Where, E(𝑌1|𝐷 = 1) represents the outcome for the contract farmers and E(𝑌0|𝐷 = 0) 
represents the outcome for the non-contract farmers. Technically, we take into consideration 
the variables that significantly influence household income and rice profit in the OLS 
regressions. In combination with the binary model (probit model), we follow Marco and 
Kopeinig (2008) in employing three methods of estimating PSM to estimate the fundamental 
lack of comparability between the groups, namely nearest-neighbor matching, Radius 
matching, and Kernel matching, due to the differences in the propensity score of the 
outcomes. 
Based on the ATE results, we continue to estimate the ATET to evaluate PSM results and to 
measure how reliable ATE results are, which is required to adjust for the differences in 
covariate distribution within the two samples (Abadie and Imbens, 2009). The evaluation 
framework of ATET is based on the potential outcomes (household income and rice profit) 
of the individual rice farmer and the treatment indicator (contract participation). Given Di as 
the binary variable represented for the treatment indicator, then D = 1 indicates contract 
participation and D = 0 non- participation. The potential outcome is defined as Yi(D) for 
each individual contract participant. If we could observe household i in both situations of 
contract participation and non-contract participation, then the changes in the outcomes 
(household income and rice profit) of household i should be: 
∆𝑌𝑖 = 𝑌𝑖(1) - 𝑌(0)𝑖   (3) 
However, the question is how an individual household i would have performed without 
contract participation. Thus, for a contract participant, we observe Yi(1), while Yi(0) is the 
unobserved outcome (counterfactual outcome) which can be considered as the missing data 
problem. ATET estimation can account for this problem and allows to estimate the missing 
data of a set of random conditional covariates (Wooldridge, 2007). The corresponding 
equation is interpreted in the followings: 
ATET = E(𝑌(1) − 𝑌(0)|𝐷 = 1) = E(𝑌(1)|𝐷 = 1) − E(𝑌(0)|𝐷 = 1)  (4) 
Thus, E[Y(0)| D = 1] represents the unobserved outcomes for the contract participants (Duy 
and Flaaten, 2016). 
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3.6 Results and Discussion 
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 shows the general statistics for the included variables in the estimated models. For 
the first criteria regarding to farm characteristics, it can be seen from the table that the total 
rice farming area is about 3.36 ha. While the average live-stock ownership is rare, machinery 
plays an important role during rice farming activities. The paddy farm-gate price per kilo 
gram is about VND5150 VND (about USD0.23). The income from other crops and off-farm 
activities contribute about VND14.086 million (around USD640.2) and VND40.550 million 
(around USD1843.1) per year, respectively. For the second category of variables, the 
average educational level of household head is about 8.12 years, the rate of telephone 
ownership is rather high (91.2%) and the distance to the nearest market is about 2.93 km on 
average. In the second category of variables, the number of household members is 1.79 on 
average. The mean age of the household head is 46.67 years. Rice farmers in the area have 
an average of 23.39 years rice farming experience. Remarkably, the number of households 
having access to credit is with 37.6% rather low in comparison with the other area of the 
country. In addition, 94.40% of the export rice farming households is headed by males.  
Using t-tests, we compare participants in CF to non-contract participants regarding the 
differences in major categories including farm characteristics and household characteristics. 
It can be seen from the results that there is strong difference between the two groups in some 
major characteristics such as: household income, rice profit, output price, information 
accessibility and farming experience. For the category farm characteristics, the results show 
that there is significant difference in mean values of the selected variables such as: rice 
farming profit, household income, and producer price for paddy between the contract 
participant and non-contract participant groups. Higher producer price for paddy received by 
contract farmers (significant at p<0.01) indicates that those farmers are benefiting from fair-
price frames offered by the contracting companies in comparison to the spot market. This 
could on the one hand be explained by low bargaining power of farmers on the free export-
oriented rice market (spot market/traditional channels) and on the other hand by missing 
market information (Jia and Bijman, 2013).  
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the estimations 
        
            Total sample (N= 250)   
Non-contract  farmers   
(N = 116)   
Contract farmers     (N 
= 134)   T-test 
Variable Description       Mean 
Std. 
deviation   Mean 
Std. 
deviation   Mean 
Std. 
deviation     
  Farm characteristics                         
Agarea Total farm size (ha) 
   
3.390 2.460 
 
3.301 2.254 
 
3.467 2.563 
 
-0.532 
Ricefarm Rice farming area (ha) 
  
3.361 2.460 
 
3.297 2.256 
 
3.417 2.563 
 
-0.391 
Machine Farming machinery using (number) 
 
1.656 1.302 
 
1.69 1.296 
 
1.63 1.312 
 
-0.180 
Nonrice Non-rice income (million VND) 
  
14.086 63.498 
 
19.315 64.118 
 
9.665 63.082 
 
1.197 
Rice profit Rice farming profit (million VND) 
 
169.295 138.714 
 
140.993 114.216 
 
193.795 153.102 
 
3.051*** 
Income Household income (million VND) 
 
230.819 158.960 
 
201.947 133.022 
 
255.813 175.073 
 
2.706** 
Avpadprice Average paddy farm-gate price  (1000VND/kg) 
 
5.15 0.681 
 
4.99 0.639 
 
5.35 0.75 
 
4.304*** 
Offarm Off-farm income (millionVND) 
  
40.550 68.329 
 
34.617 64.303 
 
45.690 71.473 
 
-1.280 
Livestock Livestock ownership (number) 
 
16.184 103.878 
 
23.87 144.301 
 
9.52 45.849 
 
-1.197 
  Household characteristics                        
Edulevel Schooling years of HH head (1-15 years) 
 
8.128 2.956 
 
7.93 2.90 
 
8.3 3.00 
 
-0.980 
Tele Ownership of a telephone (1= yes) 
 
0.908 0.2896 
 
0.89 0.30 
 
0.91 0.28 
 
-0.221 
Wprice Accessibility of world market  price information (1= yes) 0.456 0.4990 
 
0.38 0.045 
 
0.50 0.043 
 
3.891** 
Lastprice Accessibility of last price information (1= yes) 
 
0.582 0.500 
 
0.49 0.502 
 
0.56 0.498 
 
1.077 
Orghhmb Membership in Farmer Associations (1= yes) 
  
0.152 0.3597 
 
0.103 0.30 
 
0.186 0.39 
 
1.9997** 
Extservice Accessibility of extension services (1= yes) 0.456 0.4990 
 
0.39 0.489 
 
0.51 0.502 
 
2.019** 
Distance Distance to the nearest market (km) 
 
2.9 2.1 
 
3.05 2.18 
 
2.83 2.05 
 
0.80 
Age Age of household head (years) 
 
46.676 10.58 
 
46.6 11.04 
 
46.74 11.04 
 
-0.101 
Ricexper Rice farming experience (years) 
 
23.396 10.24 
 
24.67 10.90 
 
22.29 9.52 
 
1.843* 
Hhsize Number of farming members 
  
1.79 0.697 
 
1.9 0.71 
 
1.7 0.67 
 
2.019** 
Credit Accessibility of credit (1= yes) 
 
0.376 0.4853 
 
0.37 0.485 
 
0.38 0.488 
 
-0.207 
Gen Household head is male 
  
0.944 0.2303   0.93 0.254   0.96 0.208   -0.827 
Note: * p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, *** p< 0.0     
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Also the second category of variables including the major demographic variables which are 
expected to affect the contracting decision is tested. Regarding the number of households’ 
farming members, the non-contract group has higher percentage of household members 
involved in farming activities (significant at p<0.05) in comparison to the contract group 
even though the total farm size does not differ significantly among the groups. This result 
can be explained with the support of extension services and the access to high quality inputs 
CF farmers perceive which leads to lower family labor demand in comparison to non-
contract farmers and confirm the existing study results (Simmons et al., 2005). The 
significantly negative effects of “rice farming experience” variable could be interpreted 
insofar that farmers, especially, smallholder in rural and low developed areas, who have 
more experience in rice farming are less willing to change their farming habit from 
conventional to modern marketing strategy. 
3.6.2 Effects of CF participation on household income and rice profit 
Based on the OLS regression results, we find that there are many factors significantly 
affecting both household income and rice profit of farmers involved in the export-oriented 
rice production (see table 3.2). Indicators such as “contract participation”, “rice farming 
area”, “accessibility of extension services”, and “accessibility of world market price 
information” are reported as the most important determinants influencing farming 
households’ performance. Firstly, there can be observed a strong influence of CF 
participation on household income (β=2.63*), and rice profit (β=3.28**), as hypothesized. 
These results reconfirm the statements from previous literature that participating in CF helps 
smallholders to increase household income and rice profit, respectively (Simmons et al., 
2005; Minot and Roy, 2007; Bellemare, 2012). Particularly, in comparing with the mean 
values of variables and the calculation in table 3.2 and table 3.5, the results illustrates that 
“contract participation” supports rice farmers to increase their household income by 20.87% 
and rice profit by 30.54%. Secondly, the OLS results confirm the positive and significant 
influence of the “rice farming area” on household income (β=0.43***), and rice profit 
(β=0.45***) (Simmons et al., 2005; Reardon et al., 2014). This also proves the existence of 
economies of scale due to cost optimization in production processes. The OLS regression 
also confirms the influence of extension services on household income (β=6.25***) and rice 
profit (β=6.04***). The 1% significance level of the extension service variable once again is 
in line with previous studies (Da Silva, 2005; Simmons et al., 2005; Mwambi et al., 2014). 
Extension service support, in particular, technical assistances, advisory services, 
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transportation services, financing, quality monitoring and other services are found to 
positively affect farming households’ performance in this study. Surprisingly, the 
membership in FAs only influences household income (β=6.65***), but not the rice profit 
(β=0.44). This can be interpreted insofar that households preferred to get access to the 
market information, extension services and other technical assistances conducted by 
contractors within the CF scheme than by FAs. Finally, the educational level also 
significantly influences household income (β=0.65*) but not rice profit (β=0.25) which can 
be explained by off-farm employment of higher educated household members contributing 
to the household income, but not through rice production. 
Table 3.2. Regression results on household income and rice  profit   
 Variables     Household Income (I)   Rice Profit (P) 
       coef. t   coef. T 
 Contract (1=yes)  
 
2.63 1.81* 
 
3.28 3.07** 
 Agarea (m2) 
 
0.43 14.78***    
 
0.45 21.39*** 
 Distance (km) 
 
0.53 1.50 
 
0.27 0.99 
 Edulevel (1 to 15) 
 
0.65 2.54** 
 
0.25 1.35 
 Extservice (1= yes) 
 
6.25 2.73** 
 
6.04 4.11*** 
 Ricexper  (years) 
 
0.087 1.11 
 
0.017 0.26 
 Hhsize (persons) 
 
-0.2608 -0.31 
 
-0.45 -0.64 
 Orghhmb (1= yes) 
 
6.65 3.45*** 
 
0.44 0.32 
 Wprice (1= yes) 
 
3.70 2.36** 
 
2.38 2.1** 
 Lastprice (1= yes) 1.88 1.03 7.40 0.55 
N 
 
  250   250 
 F(10, 240) 
 
  30.10   52.56 
 R2   0.5574   0.6874 
Adjusted R2    0.5389   0.6743  
Prob>  Chi2     0.1388   0.0144  
Prob> F    0.0000   0.0000  
VIF    1.24   1.24  
Note: * p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01, Unit: million VND 
Source: authors owned calculations. 
  Regarding the endogeneity of contract participation status on household income and rice 
profit, the Durbin and Wu-Hausman test results (see table 3.3) show the significant level of 
the estimations. For the hypothesis that the instrument variables are exogenous, the Durbins 
score (17.244***) and Wu-Hausman (18.3***) for household income and Durbins score 
(7.93***) and Wu-Hausman (8.09***) for rice profit indicators are acceptable for the 
endogenous test and in line with the OLS results. These tests once again confirm the positive 
influence of CF participation on household income and rice profit within export-oriented rice 
farmers.  
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Table 3.3. The Durbin and Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity of contract participation 
      Durbin score Chi
2
 Wu-Hausman F(1,247) 
HH income 
    
   
17.244 
 
18.3 
p- value 
  
0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 
n  
 
250 
   Coef. 
 
317.212 
   Z 
 
3.66*** 
   Prob> Chi
2
 0.0003 
   Wald Chi
2
 13.36 
   Rice profit         
   
7.93 
 
8.09 
p- value 
  
0.0048*** 0.0048*** 
n  
 
250 
   Coef. 
 
208.080 
   Z 
 
3.13*** 
   Prob> Chi
2
 0.0017 
   Wald Chi
2
 9.8 
   Note: * p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01, Unit: million VND 
Source: authors owned calculations. 
 
3.6.3 Propensity score matching  
The ATE results calculated for both groups of farmers with similar characteristics except of 
contract participation significantly fit with our hypothesis. By selecting nearest-neighbor 
matching algorithm in the PSM estimation, the ATE results confirm that the differences in 
household income and rice profit among contract participants and non-contract participants 
are significant at the 1% level and the results perfectly fit and satisfy the requirement of 1:1 
level of comparison (min: 1, max: 1) (see table 3.4). 
Table 3.4. Average Treatment Effects (ATE) estimations 
  Contrice                 Coef. 
 
  AI Robust   z     P>|z|  
      Std.Err        
HH income 53.390 
 
14.091 
 
3.79 
 
0.000*** 
Rice profit 59.194 
 
10.049 
 
5.89 
 
0.000*** 
n 
  
250 
 
  
   min 1 
 
  
   max 1 
 
  
  
 
Note: * p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01; Unit: million VND 
 Source: authors own calculations. 
     Given the similar socio-demographic characteristics of both groups, the propensity score of 
the comparison before and after matching shows that the differences in both household 
income and rice profit are resulting from the CF participation. These figures also confirm the 
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OLS regression results insofar that CF participation strongly supports smallholders farm 
benefits represented by the two attributes: household income and rice profit (Mwambi et al., 
2014). Table 3.5 illustrates the positive contribution of the CF program on households’ 
income and rice profit (at 1% level of significance). In particular, the contracting status helps 
them to increase the average household income by USD2.519,3/year and to contribute with 
USD2.793,06/year to the average rice profit (see table 3.4). In comparison the mean value of 
household income and rice profit of both groups (see table 3.1) with the ATE results in 3. 4, 
it becomes evident that contract participation supports households to increase their income 
by 20.87% and rice profit by 30.54% higher than non-contract farmers. This result once 
again confirms the previous literature about the positive impacts of contractual arrangement 
on household welfare is convincible. 
Based on the ATET syntax, the balancing property is satisfied (see table 3.5). Regarding the 
results of nearest-neighbor matching, Radius matching, and Kernel matching, the average 
treatment effects on treated are positively satisfied. The number of block is higher than 5 (the 
minimum acceptable score). The significant levels in the three procedures also confirm the 
differences in mean values of both groups.  
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Table 3.5. Average Treatment Effects on Treated and PSM by matching algorithm  
        NN matching   Radius Matching   Kernel Matching 
        ATT t-stat   ATT t-stat   ATT t-stat 
HH 
income 
 
51.526 (16.357) 3.150*** 
 
54.385(11.052) 4.921*** 
 
 51.830(20.705) 2.503** 
Rice profit 55.487 (20.499) 
   
2.707** 
 
    
49.940(8.420)          5.931*** 
 
53.891 (21.947) 2.455** 
The final number of blocks is 
6 
       The region of common support is [.26560052, .86424676] 
    
The balancing property is satisfied 
      
Note: * p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
     The bracket values are standard errors 
     Source: authors owned calculations. 
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3.6.4 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
It was the aim of this study to analyze the effect of CF participation on rice farming profits 
and household incomes of smallholder farmers in the Mekong River Delta of Vietnam. We 
employed data from a sample of 250 households living in the three main export rice 
production regions namely the Kien Giang, Can Tho, and An Giang provinces using OLS 
regression and PSM. The results reveal that contracts have significantly benefited 
smallholder farmers that participated in the contract schemes. Furthermore, the OLS and 
PSM address a strong influence of CF participation on household income and rice profit. It is 
also interesting that not only larger-scale farmers but also small-scale farmers can benefit 
from contract participation. In this connection, the findings give noticeable evidence for the 
role of CF in improving household income by 20.87% and rice profit by 30.54% of 
smallholders and contribute to reduce the rural poverty in the country. 
In addition, we found some major socio-economic characteristics that strongly effect 
households’ performances. Among the groups, we found that the non-contract group has 
higher percentage of household members involved in farming activities in comparison to the 
contract group even though the total farm size does not differ significantly among the 
groups. This result can be explained so far that with the technical support and high quality 
inputs from contractors, perceived by CF participants perceived lead to lower family labor 
demand in comparison to non-contract farmers (Simmons et al., 2005). In addition, the 
significantly negative effects of “rice farming experience” variable also revealed that 
smallholders in rural and low developed areas, who have more rice farming experiences, are 
less willing to change their farming habit from conventional to contract schemes. 
Educational levels, in contrast, do not play any role in this contracting process. Furthermore, 
not only “contract farming participation” status play an important role in improving rice 
profit and household income but also “farming size”, “the accessibility of extension 
services” and “the accessibility of world price information” are found as the important 
determinants that significantly influence on farming households’ performance.  
The positive contribution of contract farming scheme on smallholders’ performance found in 
this study is in line with recent research about contract farming among export-oriented rice 
sector in Vietnam (Tuan, 2012) and existing literature on the positive contribution of 
contract farming in general (Simmons et al., 2005; Minot and Roy, 2007; Barrett et al., 2012; 
Rao et al., 2012; Sartorius, 2013; Gatto et al., 2017). Due to the economic benefits resulting 
from CF scheme in the Vietnamese export rice production sector, a further development and 
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enhancement of the Vietnamese CF scheme fixed in the decision No. 80/2002/QD-TTg 
named "Policy on the Promotion of Agricultural Produce and Purchase through Contracts" 
and decision 62/2013 QD-TTg is greatly suggested.  
Findings in this paper are based on cross-sectional data that has been collected for rice 
production during one year since CF is in a very early stage of implementation in Vietnam 
currently preventing the accessibility of panel data. However, a long term observation with 
panel data over three or five years would offer deeper insights into Vietnam’s CF scheme in 
the export rice sector. Thus, future research based on farm level data is needed to compare 
long-term and short-term effects of CF on rice production among smallholders. In this 
regard, there should be follow up studies on the influence of CF duration on households’ 
performance within Vietnamese export-oriented rice sector which captures the households’ 
behaviors during a certain time to observe how CF empowers, respectively. 
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4. Contract farming effects on technical efficiency of the export-oriented 
rice production sector in Vietnam
5
 
 
Abstract 
Measures to increase technical efficiency in emerging and developing economies’ 
agriculture have received great attention from governments, NGOs, private firms and 
researchers in times of urgent need for poverty reduction, globally increasing demand for 
food and growing resource rivalry in the world. A cross sectional sample of 250 Vietnamese 
export-oriented rice households is employed to investigate if contract farming improves 
farming technical efficiency in the country. Stochastic Frontier Analysis was applied to 
estimate the production frontier and technical inefficiency determinants and Propensity 
Score Matching is used to control self-selection bias. The results show an average technical 
efficiency score of 87.33% and suggest there are convincing opportunities for farmers to 
increase productivity of export-oriented rice in the country by nearly 13%. Expenditures on 
seed, land, and fertilizer are the key determinants of the technical efficiency level in this 
region. The results reveal the positive relationship between contract farming participation 
and technical efficiency improvement. 
 
Keyword: export-oriented rice sector, contract farming, stochastic frontier analysis, 
technical efficiency, Vietnam. 
  
                                                          
5 
This paper is a joint work with Ludwig Theuvsen, Caetano Luiz Beber and Verena Otter; the Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, University of Goettingen, Germany. 
*The own contribution to this paper is 70%. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Under the pressure of increasing global demand for food, growing resource rivalry and the 
need for poverty reduction, the improvement of agricultural productivity, gains in efficiency, 
and more sustainable production methods in smallholder agriculture are considered to be of 
great importance for the rural poor in developing and emerging economies in order to 
generate higher incomes (GIZ, 2013). Simultaneously, improving agricultural efficiency and 
productivity in developing countries might counter overuse of natural resources as a result of 
the sharp increase in world population and changing consumer patterns (Demont, 2017; 
Zulfiquar et al., 2017). In this regard, there have been a large number of research studies 
analyzing the determinants of technical efficiency (TE) in agricultural production. Some of 
these studies focus on the role of contract farming (CF) participation as an important 
facilitator of TE (Battase and Broca, 1997; Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Swain, 2008; Rahman 
et al., 2009; Rao et al., 2012; Wollni and Brümmer, 2012; Sartorius, 2013). In general, CF 
has been greatly encouraged by governments, NGOs, and private firms from developing and 
emerging economies to achieve higher productivity and efficiency through provision of 
agricultural extension services, higher quality inputs and credit access in a process of vertical 
integration in modern supply chains (Hernandez et al., 2006; Reardon et al., 2009). 
Rice, which is a worldwide, commercialized commodity and a vital food for about a half of 
the world population. In addition, 22% of caloric intake by the global population mostly 
comes from small-scale farming households in emerging and developing countries (Chen et 
al., 2006; Giraud, 2013). Even though increasing rice TE in emerging and developing 
economies therefore receives great attention by governments, NGOs, private firms from 
developing and emerging economies and researchers (Coelli; Ramaswami et al, 2005; 
Kolawole, 2006; Duy and Flaaten, 2012; Otsuka, 2016; Demont, 2017), only few studies 
focus on rice farming TE in developing countries and even fewer investigate the effects of 
CF schemes in this connection (Tana et al., 2010; Bellenare, 2015; Ochieng et al., 2017; 
Shifera et al., 2016). These studies come to the conclusion that participating in a CF scheme 
has significant effects on farming TE among rice farming households, however they do not 
cover countries in South-East Asia which represent a large share of the worlds’ rice 
production (Baldwin, 2012, Demont, 2017).  
Among the major rice farming countries in Southeast Asia - Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam - especially Vietnam is characterized by very 
favorable natural and social conditions for irrigated rice production in bulk such as; high soil 
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quality, tropical monsoon weather, numerous water-flows and a large share of more than 
70% of the population working in the agricultural sector (Reardon et al., 2014; USDA, 
2016). Due to the lack of information, the shortage of technical assistance and low input 
qualities, it is assumed that there is still high potential to improve the country’s rice yields, 
e.g. by further promoting the CF scheme introduced by the Vietnamese government in 2002 
(Kompas, 2002; Huynh and Yabe, 2011; Hoang and Yabe, 2012; Vu, 2012). Even though, 
existing empirical literature has investigated TE in the Vietnamese rice production sector 
from various perspectives such as by analyzing environmental effects on profit efficiency 
(Hoang and Yabe, 2012), vocational training effects on TE (Ulimwengu and Badiane, 2010), 
rice farming TE determinants (Khai and Yabe, 2011; Linh, 2012), and market reform effects 
on TE (Kompas, 2002), the effects of CF on the TE in this sector have still been neglected. 
To close this research gap, this study aims at evaluating the influence of CF participation on 
farming technical efficiency and assessing the technical inefficiency determinants in the 
export-oriented rice sector in the country. In line with the existing literature, the conceptual 
framework was developed based on a Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) including a 
production frontier and technical inefficiency determinant analysis. Propensity score 
matching (PSM) has been included to control for self-selection bias. The empirical study is 
based on a sample including 250 export-oriented rice households in the Mekong River Delta 
of Vietnam of which 134 are CF-participants over past 10 years or more and 116 are non-
CF-participants in the same area. The research contributes the first analysis on TE in the 
Vietnamese rice exporting farming sector with special focus on the influences of CF-
participation in the body of previous studies. Finally, based on the empirical findings, policy 
implications are derived regarding the development of supporting programs for farmers and 
agribusiness to improve rice farming TE level.  
This paper is structured as follows: after the introduction, Section 2 introduces a general 
background of existing studies about rice production in Vietnam and the role of CF for 
improving farm TE in emerging and developing countries and the economical characteristics 
of the export-oriented Vietnamese rice production. In Section 3, study design and 
methodology are presented. Section 4 describes the results and discussion. Finally, the last 
section draws up the major findings, conclusions, and policy recommendations of the paper. 
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4.2. Background 
4.2.1 Economical characteristics of the export-oriented Vietnamese rice production sector 
Since the late 1990s, Vietnam has developed from being a larger importer of rice to the 
second largest rice exporter from Southeast Asia, supplying about 20% of total quantity of 
rice traded globally in 2015 (Baldwin et al., 2012; Giraud, 2013; USDA, 2015). Since 
Vietnamese rice is exported to nearly 100 countries and territories around the world, rice is 
nowadays one of the countries’ largest export commodities by quantity (Ya’kub et al., 2012; 
FAO, 2013; Ha, 2013). The Vietnamese rice farming area covers about 7.7 million hectares 
on which rice is planted in three different irrigated seasons per year (Tran, 2016). In 2015, 
the country produced more than 28.07 million tons of milled rice in total with an average 
rice yield of about 5.77 tons per ha (see Table 1). Thereof, roughly 7.0 million tons were 
exported, contributing approximately 5.5% to national GDP growth (USDA, 2015). Due to 
its vital role, rice production contributes a great deal to rural livelihoods of which, 80% of 
the 11 million farming households participate in rice production (Tran, 2016).  
As presented in Appendix 1, Vietnam stands at the highest position among the Southeast 
Asian exporters regarding average rice yield and records twice as high yields per ha (134%) 
as the country with the lowest yield, Cambodia. Since 1993, Vietnam has experienced annual 
increases in rice production quantities averaging about 0.8 million tons and resulting in an 
overall doubling of annual paddy production by 2016. This may be caused by the fact that 
Vietnamese rice production is also associated with intensive cultivation methods including 
high input levels of fertilizer and seed in comparison to other Asian countries (Liese et al., 
2014; Tran, 2016). 
In Vietnam, the Mekong River Delta (MRD) and Red River Delta (RRD) are the two leading 
rice farming regions of the country. The MRD is dominant in Vietnam with regard to the 
quantity of rice produced for export, in contrast to the RRD in which rice is mainly produced 
for domestic markets (VIETTRADE, 2008). The MRD region includes 12 provinces with a 
total population of 17.4 million people. A large share of the GDP contribution in this region 
stems from agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (about 41%) (Smith, 2013). Rice production is 
one of the major farm activities in the MRD accounting for about 2.1 million ha of the total 4 
million ha of agricultural land. Over this paddy area about 38 million tons of rice are 
produced during three cropping seasons per year contributing approximately 51-55% of 
quantity to national rice production and 90% of the country’s rice exports by quantity (Loc 
and Son, 2011; Liese et al., 2014). The MRD has a tropical climate with dry and rainy 
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seasons around the year, which is suitable for three harvests of rice with the main rice season 
from November to March. Together with rice farming, households in the area also produce 
different green vegetables, livestock, and aquaculture, but most of these outputs are for self-
consumption. Apart from farming, they also participate in small scale local trading and other 
off-farm activities. 
An Giang, Can Tho, Dong Thap, and Kien Giang are the major rice producing provinces 
recording very high yields in the MRD region (see Table 4.1). For instance, in 2015, with 
6.33 tons per hectare on average, An Giang province reached the highest yield of paddy in 
the country. In the winter-spring cropping season, which provides the best rice production 
conditions, most of the leading rice production provinces achieve even higher average yields 
of more than 7.2 tons per hectares (Smith, 2013; Nguyen, 2016).  
Table 4.1 Vietnamese rice yields by different regions (ton/hectare)  
   Region  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Prel. 
The country 
   
5.34 5.54 5.64 5.57 5.75 5.77 
1. Mekong River Delta 
  
5.47 5.68 5.81 5.76 5.94 5.96 
An Giang 
    
6.23 6.31 6.31 6.27 6.43 6.33 
Kien Giang 
   
5.44 6.35 5.91 5.80 6.01 6.06 
Can Tho 
    
5.71 5.80 5.78 5.79 5.89 5.91 
2. Red River Delta 
   
5.92 6.09 6.04 5.89 6.02 6.06 
3. Northern midlands and mountain areas 4.63 4.77 4.82 4.74 4.85 4.87 
4. North Central and Central coastal areas 5.07 5.32 5.44 5.36 5.66 5.62 
5. Central Highlands 
   
4.78 5.76 4.96 4.95 5.24 5.1 
6. South East       4.48 4.64 4.75 4.80 4.94 5.03 
Sources: (GSO, 2016) 
        However, the Vietnamese export rice sector is nowadays facing great challenges in 
competing on the global rice market especially from other emerging and developing 
countries regarding production quantities and prices (Nielsen, 2003; Baldwin et al., 2012; 
Reardon et al., 2014; USDA, 2015). About 40% to 50% of the cost of exportable rice are 
related to fertilizer and agro-chemical expenditure so the high pressure of increasing 
production cost in the Vietnamese export rice sector means it can no longer rely on low cost 
competitiveness (Demont and Rutsaert, 2017). Additionally, under the recent government 
program, the Vietnamese rice farming area is expected to decline due to the promotion of 
corn and soybean crops (Smith, 2013). The government is targeting marginal yielding rice 
land for this conversion program. Both winter and autumn crops have lost approximately 
20,000 hectares each for corn and soybean cultivation since 2016 (USDA, 2015). In order to 
deal with these issues, increases in TE and productivity are necessary to maintain rice 
production and export quantities (Young et al., 2002; USDA, 2015).        
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4.2.2 Contract farming in the Vietnamese agricultural sector 
As a consequence of the renovation policy reform program established in the year 1986 and 
the removal of rice fertilizer export and import quota allocation in 2001, Vietnam has 
transformed into one of the largest rice exporters worldwide (Pohl and Nielsen, 2002; Loc 
and Son, 2011). Additionally, a price control regime and export quotas applied from the mid-
1990 served to protect domestic and export markets from external fluctuations (Ghosha and 
Whalley, 2004). In 2002, the decision No 80/2002/QD-TTg dated June 24
th
 was issued by 
the Vietnamese government to officially promote contractual arrangements between farmers 
and private sector actors including processors, traders, retailers and exporters. A flexible 
institutional arrangement was developed for diverse economic entities in the national 
agricultural sector. As a result, an official long term strategy was established to improve the 
bargaining power of farmers in the relationship with the private sector. With regard to firm 
benefits, this policy also formulated the government intentions to support the private sector 
by selling key agricultural inputs to farmers directly (Ya’kub et al., 2012). Additionally, 
those policies aim to support secure national food demand and achieve competitive 
advantages on the world markets (Goletti et al., 1997; ADB, 2005).  
Due to supportive policies, farmers in various agricultural sectors of Vietnam have paid 
more attention to the CF scheme forming a basis for Vietnam’s agriculture. Consequently in 
2005, about 90% of fresh milk and cotton and 50% of tea were sold under contracts (Da 
Silva, 2005; Tuan, 2012; Demont, 2017). However, up to now only a small and even 
declining share of rice quantity is purchased under contract; about 10% in 2004 (ADB, 
2005), about 4.2% in 2010 (Loc and Son, 2011), and 2.12% in 2013 (Smith, 2013) as several 
reports reveal. In the year 2014, from more than 100 rice exporting enterprises, including 
two state-owned companies, there were only 15 companies offering contract arrangements to 
rice farming households (Vinh and Dinh, 2014). Currently, being over-dependent on 
traditional marketing channels could be one of the reasons for the companies’ limited control 
over raw product quality as well as their problems in capturing high-value export markets 
(Oliver, 2005; Hernandez et al., 2006; Dries et al., 2009; Loc and Son, 2011; Vinh and Dinh, 
2014). In the study area, i.e. the MRD, there are two major contractors namely LocTroi 
Group (An Giang Plant Protection Joint-Stock Company- AGPPS) and Gentraco providing 
written CF arrangements to rice farmers. In 2015, Gentraco implemented the GlobalGAP 
standard and branded products in the area to promote higher quality rice production. Other 
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firms such as AFIEX, Angimex, etc, supply different type of contracts which offer particular 
terms and conditions for purchasing rice in the region (Demont and Rutsaert, 2017). 
4.2.3 The effect of contract farming on farm technical efficiency in emerging and developing 
economies 
In agricultural production, farming TE is used to measure how production inputs, such as 
land, labor, seeds, pesticides, fertilizers, etc. are spent to produce an optimal level of output 
(Krugman, 1994; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). In principle, CF is not only an institutional 
arrangement supporting farmers by reducing production uncertainty but also can play a 
major role in improving TE and the production frontier (Rawlins, 1985; Eaton and Shepherd, 
2001; Da Silva, 2005; Ramaswami et al., 2005; Swain, 2008; Saigenji and Zeller, 2009; 
Sartorius, 2013; Wang et al., 2014). CF schemes also support the shift of risk from growers 
to processors as the buyers supply most of the inputs such as seed, fertilizer, and pesticides 
(Ramaswami, Birthal, and Joshi, 2005). Thus, CF could offer a solution for dealing with a 
number of productivity and technical efficiency constraints arising from small-scale 
production including risk coverage and accessibility of inputs, capital resources, and 
information (Miyata et al., 2009).  
CF and its positive impact on agricultural TE is generally well-established in scientific 
research with special attention to emerging and developing economies (Coelli and Battese, 
1996; Binam et al., 2004; Ramaswami et al, 2005; Kolawole, 2006; Duy, Flaaten, et al., 
2012). By considering CF as a tool for rural development and livelihood sustainability, there 
is evidence that smallholders could improve their farm profitability, productivity, TE, and 
household welfare by participating in such schemes (Ali and Flinn, 1989; Battase and Broca, 
1997; Ramaswami et al, 2005; Cai et al., 2008; Rahman et al., 2009; Rao et al., 2012; Wollni 
and Brümmer, 2012). Ramaswami et al. (2005) refer to the production efficiency of CF by 
taking into account the costs of both poultry farming contract and non-contract participants 
in India and reveal that contract producers achieve higher efficiency than independent 
producers. Moreover, the evidence from the study of tea production by Saigenji and Zeller 
(2009) also confirms that participating in CF arrangements supports tea farmers in Vietnam 
to increase TE and household income by VND 8.000 (about USD 0.4) per capital and day.  
Generally, TE analysis for the Vietnamese rice sector has been conducted by earlier studies. 
A study by Khai and Yabe (2011) reveals that the rice farming TE score in Vietnam is 
around 81.6% compared to about 75% of rice profitability on average (Hoang and Yabe, 
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2012). In addition, the average rice farming TE score in MRD is about 90% (Vo and 
Nguyen, 2016) and the most important factors influencing the TE ratio are intensive labor, 
irrigation and educational levels (Khai and Yabe, 2011). Generally, since the current TE 
score of the Vietnamese rice farming varies between 70% and 90%, farmers could increase 
their efficiency up to 30% without changing their inputs. Therefore farm and socio-economic 
characteristics such as rice farming size, expenditure on pesticides (Duy, 2012), years of 
education (Khai and Yabe, 2011) and credit access (Hoang and Yabe, 2012; Duy, 2012) are 
identified as having especially positive influences on rice farming TE in the Vietnamese 
MRD region. However, the participation of Vietnamese rice farmers, as a prime-example 
from South-East Asia, in CF schemes has not been taken into account in any empirical 
quantitative study on farm TE as yet, even though it can be assumed to improve the TE. 
Thus, there is a gap for further research about CF-effects on TE in the export rice sector of 
Vietnam, a prime-example for other rice exporting countries in Southeast Asia. This study 
aims to close that gap by conducting a SFA of a quantitative data set from this sector as 
explained in the following sections. 
4.3. Data and methodology 
4.3.1 Study design and data collection 
The data set consists of farm level data collected in 2015/2016 from smallholder rice farmers 
in the Mekong River Delta (MRD). MRD is the dominant export-oriented rice producing 
region in Vietnam (Young et al., 2002; Demont and Rutsaert, 2017). The target population of 
250,000 households in the three main export rice production regions of the area, namely the 
Kien Giang, Can Tho, and An Giang provinces were selected (Duy, 2012; USDA, 2015). 
Together with rice farming, households have some other income sources which come from 
green vegetables, livestock, and aquaculture, but most of these outputs are for self-
consumption. Apart from farming, they also participate in small scale local trading and other 
off-farm activities. Using a structured questionnaire, 250 households from the 
aforementioned provinces were randomly chosen. To ensure the comparability of contract 
and non-contract farmers, 134 contract farmers from five different contractors’ lists and 116 
non-contract farmers from the village official lists of 12 villages were randomly selected. All 
the respondents had to be located in the same area and produce rice for export. Most of the 
contract participants in this study purchase their inputs from the contractor at the beginning 
of the cropping season and the cost is deducted from payments at harvesting time. 
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Contracted farmers also receive technical advice during production, have agreements with 
contractors on specified production practices, inputs (seed, fertilizer, pesticide), and other 
services. Farmers can also store their products at the contractor’s warehouse for up to one 
month if they want to wait for higher market selling prices (this applies to negotiable-price 
term contracts). Contractors guarantee to purchase the products, and pay for collection and 
transportation of the final product during the harvesting period. Other CF arrangements only 
supply the inputs without purchasing outputs. Some firms only purchase products without 
providing the inputs. In those cases, some contractors are willing to pay a premium over the 
market price at harvest time to ensure their market supply. 
4.3.2 Method 
4.3.2.1 Stochastic frontier analysis 
In order to observe the influences of CF on farm TE, we followed the approach proposed by 
Meeusenand (1977) and Lovell et al. (1977) on efficiency measurement of a firm with a 
given level of output at the lowest expenditure of inputs. In this paper, SFA is applied to 
estimate the production function of export-oriented rice farming in Vietnam (Kumbhakar et 
al., 2000) since the SFA serves to correct for controlling errors and other noise measurement 
in the data set which tends to occur in primary farm level data in developing countries like 
Vietnam (Kolawole, 2006).  
             
Figure 4.1. Conceptual framework for technical efficiency analysis 
      Sources: adapted from Hoang (2013) 
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The conceptual framework of our empirical analysis was developed based on the study by 
Hoang (2013) (see Figure 4.1). This conceptual framework describes the inputs and socio-
economic characteristics influencing the output-level in the export-oriented rice production 
sector. We thereby analyze the production frontier of contract and non-contract participants 
to compare the TE levels as well as to evaluate the effects of technical inefficiency 
determinants on rice production in particular. Since we specifically pay attention to the 
hypothesis that contract participants have higher TE, CF participation status is treated as a 
dummy variable. Because this treatment variable could be endogenous due to self-selection 
bias, a stochastic frontier approach is necessary.  
Following Battese and Coelli (1993) and Coelli and Battese (1996), we used the maximum 
likelihood method in order to estimate the production frontier with the assumption that all 
the farmers apply the same technology. Additionally, variables representing household 
characteristics are hypothesized to influence technical inefficiency (Wollni and Brümmer, 
2009; Mayen et al., 2010) namely; rice farming experience, educational level, contract 
participation status (yes or no), accessibility to credit and off-farm income. These are 
included to check possible determinants of TE.  
Therefore, the TE score is evaluated by Ya  divided by Y
∗ (TE= 
Ya 
Y∗
) where Y  is the observed 
current output and Y∗ is the optimal output (maximum) level (Battese and Coelli, 1993; 
Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000) . The stochastic frontier model is employed as follows: 
yi = f(xi; α) exp(εi) (1) 
Where Yi is the scalar output quantity of export rice household i; Xi is representing the 
vector of input quantities; α is the vector of unknown parameters referring to production 
technology, and εi is a two-sided error component including two independent components 
which can be described as εi = vi − ui. The vi is the noise error, which is assumed as 
independent and identically normal distributed as N (0,σv
2). The ui is the inefficiency 
component, which is assumed to be half-normally distributed with zero modes 
( ui ˜ 𝑁
+  (0, σ𝑢
2 )) and variance parameter σ𝑢
2 . The ui  vector is a function of non-negative 
unobservable variables related to the technical inefficiency of production (Battese and Broca, 
1997; Battese and Broca, 1997). The stochastic terms vi and ui are assumed to be 
uncorrelated. The variation of ui is specified by:  
VAR(ui) =
π − 2
π
σ𝑢
2    =    
VAR(ui)
VAR(ui) + σ𝑣2
  (2) 
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Based on Battese (1992), the farmer-specific technical inefficiency is the ratio of the 
observed output and the farmer-specific stochastic frontier output. In this sense, the TE of 
rice farmer i can be estimated as:  
TEi = exp(−ui; ) =
𝑞𝑖
exp (𝑥𝑖
´𝛽 +  vi)
=  
exp (𝑥𝑖
´ + vi − ui)
exp (𝑥𝑖
´ + vi)
(3) 
Where TEi is the scalar vector of TE of farmer i. We calculate a trans-log model to estimate 
the relationship between y and 𝑥𝑖 in equation (1) as follows: 
yi = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (β0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛 + 
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑚
𝑁
𝑚=1
𝑁
𝑛=1 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑚) (4) 
Regarding the trans-log model for the 𝛽𝑛 parameter, the logarithms of the equation (3) in 
both sides are calculated as follows: 
Lnyi= β0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛 +  
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑚
𝑁
𝑚=1
𝑁
𝑛=1 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑚 + vi −  ui (5) 
The variation in production (γ) (Coelli and Battese, 1996) is estimated  as follows: 
γ =  
σu
2
σ² 
              With σ2 = σu
2  + σv
2  (6) 
The value of γ must range between zero and one; γ represents the deviations from the 
frontier due to noise, and values of 1 refers to the technical inefficiencies (Aigner et al., 
1977). 
4.3.2.2 Propensity score matching 
Among the efficiency studies to date, controlling for self-selection bias has been neglected 
when estimating divergent technology sets using production frontiers (Tzouvelekas et al., 
2001; Latruffe et al., 2005; Wollni and Brümmer, 2012). Yet, if households decide to 
participate in contractual arrangements (or not) based on their expectations, the two groups 
will be systematically different in social-economic characteristics (Heckman, 1979). In this 
paper, the production frontier is estimated with the assumption that all farmers in the sample 
have access to the same technology and they are free to join the CF scheme.  
For the observed variables, with regard to the contract group, some contract participants 
would have higher TE levels before participating in contract scheme, consequently 
increasing the self-selection bias. The decision to participate in the CF scheme is assumed to 
depend on observed socio-demographic characteristics specified as follows: 
𝜕𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝛼 + 𝑒𝑖   (7) 
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where 𝛼 is a vector of parameters and 𝑒𝑖 is a random error. If any of the determinants of 
technology choice (in this case CF), 𝑤𝑖, also affects rice production but is not included 
explicitly in the equation (1), then the contract participation variable in (1) is correlated with 
the error term εi. In this case, estimations of 𝛽𝑛 in the equation (5), which do not account for 
the endogeneity of the technology choice, are biased. For those observed variables, we 
employ the PSM technique proposed by Mayen et al. (2010) which is appropriate for 
productivity and TE analysis to control for any self-selection bias. The matching approach 
allows us to measure the effects of adopting CF on TE score of contract participants based 
on a three-step procedure.  
First, a probability of CF participation is estimated (probit estimation) and used to calculate 
the probability or propensity score of being contract participant rather than non-participant 
for each observation. It can be estimated as: 
ATT = E(∆|𝑍, 𝐷 = 1) = E(𝑌1|𝑍, 𝐷 = 1) − E(𝑌0|𝑍, 𝐷 = 1)  (8) 
Where, 𝑌1 represents the TE score of contract participant (D=1) and 𝑌0 represents the TE 
score of non-contract participant (D=0). Z represents for conditioning variables including xi  
input variables (see equation (1)) and other observed variables from socio-demographic 
characteristics or technical inefficiency determinants (see equation (7)). The mean value 
E(𝑌1|𝑍, 𝐷 = 1) can be promptly identified through the contract group data. But for the 
counterfactual mean E(𝑌0|𝑍, 𝐷 = 1) the assumption has to be done regarding the TE of CF 
participants if they had not adopted CF. The self-selection bias can be identified through the 
differences in outcomes of self-selected non-contract participation E(𝑌0| Z, D = 0) and 
approximate E(𝑌0| Z, D = 1). The self-selection bias results are illustrated as follows: 
B(Z) = E(𝑌0| Z, D = 1) – E(𝑌0| Z, D = 0)  (9) 
Secondly, every single contract household is continuously matched to a non-contract 
household with the similar propensity score. During the step, the nearest-neighbor matching 
is employed in which each contract participant is paired with the non-contract participant 
that has the closest propensity score. All other non-contract households are ignored for this 
step (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). The matching procedure serves to find an alternative result 
for E(𝑌0| Z, D = 1) “based on the statistical independence of (𝑌0, 𝑌1) and D conditional on Z 
(technology is exogenous after conditioning on Z)”. This condition is also referred to as 
“selection on observables” (Imbens, 2004, P.7-8). By conditioning on a propensity score 
P(Z), the independence condition is also satisfied (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). For this 
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method, there is no need to match dimensionally on Z, then E(𝑌0| P(Z), D = 1) = E(𝑌0| P(Z), 
D = 0) = E(𝑌0| P(Z), allowing unbiased estimates of E(𝑌1  – 𝑌0 | Z, D = 1). 
Finally, we estimate the SFA on the contract participant group and match non-contract 
participant group to test the hypothesis that these farms employ a homogeneous technology 
and we compare their TE levels. 
 4.3.2.3 Model specification  
Table 4.2 presents the detailed information of the variables used in the TE estimation. In this 
study, the rice production information refers to up to three harvests (at least 2) per year in the 
MRD. The exported rice in total volume per year is the single output. The inputs include 
labor, fertilizer, seeds, machinery, land, and pesticides. For the labor variable, the total costs 
for labor are calculated by the expenditure for hired labor per man per day and estimated 
family labor (by permanent hired labor paid). The rice farming area for land is in hectares. 
Total costs of fertilizer, seeds, and pesticides are calculated. Machinery costs such as 
irrigation, machine purchasing, and tools are also included in the total expenditure. A 
household that produces at the production frontier is assumed to have a TE level of 100%. 
The CF participation status is treated as a dummy variable as suggested by Coelli and 
Battese (1996). Derived from the literature review, the four major socio-economic 
characteristics, namely off-farm income, educational level (year of schooling), rice farming 
experience and credit accessibility are included in the technical inefficiency estimations. We 
expect that those variables would support rice farming households in the MRD to optimize 
their rice production (Khai and Yabe, 2011; Duy, 2012). 
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Table 4.2: Description of included variables 
    Variable Description           
Production model 
      Seed Expenditure on seed per year (ton) 
   Fertilizer Expenditure on fertilizer year/ton 
   Pesticide Expenditure on  pesticide and chemical per year (1000VND) 
Machine Expenditure on machine (1000VND per year) 
  Labor Expenditure on labor per year (1000VND) 
  Land Total land use for rice production per year (ha) 
  Output Total output of export rice household (ton per year ) 
 Technical inefficiency model 
     Off-farm Off-farm income (1000.VND) 
  Contrice Dummy for contract farming participation (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
Edulevel Schooling years of HH head (1-15 years) 
 Riceexper Rice farming experience (years) 
   Credit Dummy for the accessibility of credit (1= yes)   
PSM- Probit estimates     
Landhh Total agricultural land size for rice farming of HH   
Agmem Total family member work in agricultural   
Gender Gender of household  head   
Age Age of household head   
1USD = 22.000VND (average of currency exchange rate is applied at the time of data collection) 
4.4. Results  
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 4.3 presents the mean values and standard deviations of the variables included in the 
estimations. Additionally, using t-test, CF participants are compared to non-contract 
participants and the sub-matched sample regarding the differences in production inputs and 
socio-demographic characteristics. For the input variables, the results reveal no significant 
differences in mean values. The average output of the total sample is about 63.705 tons per 
year. The rice farmers in the sample use about 4.394 tons of fertilizer per year on average. 
The average expenditure on pesticides and chemicals is nearly equal to labor expenditure 
representing VND43.44 million (USD1,975) and VND43.759 million (USD1,989), 
respectively. The mean values and standard deviation of the expenditure on fertilizer, 
pesticide, and labor are higher for contract participants even though there is no significant 
difference among the groups. However, the differences in expenditure on seed and the total 
output per year are slightly below the threshold of significance and, thus, allow the 
hypotheses of their appropriateness as part of the production frontier and inefficiency 
estimations. Regarding the variables representing socio-economic characteristics which are 
expected also to affect farmers’ ability to achieve higher TE, most of the variables do not 
show any significant difference between the groups. 
Chapter 4: Contract Farming Effects on Technical Efficiency  
 
65 
 
Table 4.3  Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the estimations 
          Total sample     Non-contract       Contract    Sub-sample 
  
Variable     Mean Std. dev.   Mean 
Std. 
dev.   Mean 
Std. 
de.   Mean Std.de   
Production model                       
  
Seed 
  
1.534 2.147 
 
1.71 2.95 
 
1.38 1.001 
 
1.77 0.45 
 
  
Fertilizer 
  
4.394 4.448 
 
4.133 4.302 
 
4.619 4.574 
 
4.40 0.67 
 
  
Pesticide 
  
43.442 41.193 
 
41.937 40.720 
 
45.556 41.805 
 
45.87 4.808 
 
  
Machine 33.608 93.732 
 
36.920 104.486 
 
30.740 83.611 
 
45.693 16.802 
 
  
Labor 
  
43.759 41.193 
 
42.479 37.046 
 
44.867 33.709 
 
44.473 5.123 
 
  
Land 
  
10.297 7.978 
 
10.281 8.296 
 
10.309 7.722 
 
9.49 0.88 
 
  
Output 
  
63.705 3.26 
 
61.99 5.04 
 
65.18 4.27 
 
58.678 5.59 
 
  
Techincal inefficiency model                 
Off-farm 
  
40.550 68.329 
 
34.617 64.303 
 
45.690 71.473 
 
35.287 8.161 
 
  
Edulevel 
  
8.128 2.956 
 
7.93 2.90 
 
8.3 3.00 
 
8.29 0.36 
 
  
Riceexper 
 
22.992 9.08 
 
23.76 10.03 
 
22.32 9.58 
 
22.230 1.11 
 
  
Credit 
  
0.376 0.4853   0.37 0.485   0.38 0.488   0.41 0.061 
  
Source: authors owned calculations 
           4.4.2 Parameter Estimations  
4.4.2.1 Determinants of rice production technical efficiency in the MRD 
The coefficients of the production frontier estimation conducted with total sample data are 
illustrated in Table 4.4. For the log-normalized values, the input coefficients represent the 
production elasticity at the mean value. The partial production elasticity of expenditures for 
most of the inputs is significantly positive at the 1.5, and 10% level. In particularly, if a 
farmer increases expenditures on seeds and fertilizer by 1% each the output increases by 
0.259 and 0.172% (significant at the 1% level for both). With regard to the expenditures on 
labor, it becomes evident that an increase by 1% leads to output increase of 0.1% (significant 
at the 5% level). Noticeably, land size is found to affect the output (0.49%) at the 1% 
significance level. Expenditure on machinery is also found to positively influence farm 
output, however only by 0.0028% at the 10% level of significance. Still, this result for 
expenditure on machines confirms the particular importance of investments in machine 
inventory for the rice production in a developing country such as Vietnam (Pingali et al., 
1997). However, as it is typical for developing countries in contrast to developed ones, the 
effect of labor intensity on the output still exceeds those of machines (Khai and Yabe, 2011), 
most likely because of the small plot sizes. Of even higher values are the coefficients of land 
use and seed expenditure confirming the importance of these inputs for rice production in the 
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MRD (Duy, 2012). Only the (very low) positive result for expenditure on pesticides 
(0.009%) does not show any significance. 
Table 4.4  Stochastic translog estimation for export-oriented rice in the Mekong River Delta 
Variable Full sample (250)   Sub-matched group (199) 
  Coeff. Std.error   Coeff. Std.error 
Lnseed 0.25986*** 0.04307 
 
0.310401*** 0.0519671  
Lnpesticide 0.00917 0.02460 
 
0.0023999 0.0298567  
Lnfertilizer 0.17266*** 0.03415 
 
0.1369919 *** 0.043012  
Lnlabor 0.10017** 0.04430 
 
0.1141643*** 0.0537549 
Lnland 0.49204*** 0.04632 
 
0.4735377*** 0.0507841 
Lnmachine 0.00279* 0.00169 
 
-0.0015767  0.0062302 
Lnseed x lnseed -0.25315*** 0.05786 
 
-0.5112465 *** 0.1269272 
lnpesticide x lnpesticide 0.02068 0.03405 
 
0.035153  0.0413255 
lnfertilizer x lnfertilizer -0.19891** 0.09788 
 
-0.0248053  0.1334538 
lnlabor x lnlabor -0.20408 0.15830 
 
-0.0356796 0.18888 
lnland x lnland 0.40716*** 0.13637 
 
-0.3729227 *** 0.2243556 
lnmachine x lnmachine -0.0014089  0.0012329  
 
-0.0007494  0.001243  
Lnseed x lnpesticide -0.05792 0.06118 
 
-0.0208557 0.0723636 
Lnseed x lnfertilizer 0.09578 0.12611 
 
0.0859865  0.1443597 
Lnseed x lnlabor 0.21412 0.14206 
 
0.1022833  0.2047012  
Lnseed x lnland 0.01010 0.12553 
 
0.4395752*** 0.2002246 
Lnseed x lnmachine 0.00094 0.00664 
 
0.0008259  0.0067744 
Lnpesticide x lnfertilizer -0.04789 0.05234 
 
-0.0205589  0.0590875   
Lnpesticide x lnlabor 0.00368 0.07421 
 
-0.0551594  0.0842733  
Lnpesticide x lnland 0.09554 0.07788 
 
 0.0580271 0.0904588  
Lnpesticide x lnmachine 0.00419 0.00329 
 
0.0029647 0.004323  
Lnfertilizer x lnlabor 0.19923* 0.11746 
 
0.0260494  0.1439669 
Lnfertilizer x lnland -0.04780 0.10025 
 
 -0.0775044  0.1009701 
Lnfertilizer x lnmachine 0.00307 0.00556 
 
-0.0030802 0 .0062466  
Lnlabor x lnland -0.36491*** 0.13282 
 
-0.0980056  0.1692907 
Lnlabor x lnmachine -0.01244* 0.00693 
 
 -0.0047026  0.0074467  
Constant  0.16148*** 0.04751 
 
0.202*** 0 .0707063 
Number of observation: 250 
   
199 
 Prob>chi2: 0.0000 
   
0.0000 
 Log-likelihood: 97.147427       86.535.502   
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
     Sources: authors‘ own calculations 
     Table 4.5 illustrates the results for the determinants of inefficiency. It can be seen that there 
is no strong significant effect of the major variables on TE. However the near significance 
and the signs of the coefficients of contract participation status (β=-0.410, z= 1.25), non-
farm income (β=-4.10e, z= 1.29) and credit accessibility (β=-0.404, z= 1.22) may indicate a 
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positive influence of CF on TE. These results are explainable with the circumstance that the 
CF scheme in Vietnam is still at an early stage. Thus, some effects potentially involve time 
lags and may become visible in following years. Off-farm activities and the resulting income 
may support farm TE through increases in knowledge about and affordability of inputs. 
Additionally, higher educational levels and longer rice farming experience may represent 
better managerial and production skills, so reflecting better farm TE than observed in earlier 
analyses (Khai and Yabe, 2011). Exactly the opposite is true for the accessibility of credits. 
Here there is evidence of a negative effect (insignificant) on TE. This could be explained in 
three ways: first interest rates of loans in the region are high, second, many credits are still 
not measurable in the initial years as long-term effects, third, since control is missing in 
many credit schemes, farmers use their loans for other urgent expenses unrelated to farming 
activities (Duy, 2012). 
Table 4.5  Inefficiency estimations for export-oriented rice production in the MRD 
 Variable         Full sample   Sub matched group 
          Coeff. z   Coeff. z 
Contract participation (1= yes) 
  
-0.4108349 -1.25 
 
-0.5264824  -1.35 
Household income from non-farm 
activities  -4.10e-06 -1.29 
 
-3.63e-06  -1.16 
The accessibility of credit (1=yes) 
 
0.4042186  1.22 
 
0.399199 1.04 
Schooling year of household head 
(number) -0.0316746  -0.63 
 
-0.0372751 -0.73 
Rice farming experience (years)  -0.003418 -0.24 
 
-0.0122209  -0.74 
Constant 
    
-2.936974 *** -4.09 
 
 -2.469596***    - 4.05 
Observation       250         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: authors‘ own calculations 
       
4.4.2.2 Effects of contract farming participation on technical efficiency 
The levels of production performance for export-oriented rice farmers represented by TE 
scores are shown in Table 4.6 and the frequency distribution of predicted TE is visualized in 
Figure 4.2. The mean of the TE score for the full sample equals 0.8702, implying that on 
average, the export-oriented rice farmers in the MRD produce 87.33% of the maximum 
possible output. This result is in line with findings from earlier studies about the TE score of 
rice production in Vietnam and other developing countries (Khai and Yabe, 2011; Vo and 
Nguyen, 2016). Vice versa, about 13% of the potential output is lost due to technical 
inefficiency. The TE of export-oriented rice production in the MRD ranges between 56.48% 
and 96.47% (see Table 4.6) also confirming the range observed in the comparative study 
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(Khai and Yabe, 2011; Vo and Nguyen, 2016). In total, the scale-effect is about 1.026 which 
reveals that farmers are operating under increasing returns of scale (see Table 4.3). Therefore 
contract participants have a higher average TE (88.46%) in comparison to non-contract 
participants (86.02%) (see Figure 4.2 and Appendix 2). In the two-sample t-test of TE-mean 
values, there is a significant difference at the 5% level with a t-value of 3.01, indicating 
higher TEs for contract farmers. 
Table 4.6  Technical efficiency score for export-oriented rice production in the MRD 
 
  Observation Mean Std. Dev. 
Std. 
Err. Min Max 
TE (full sample, N=250) 
      Full sample 250 .8733 .064 .0040 .5648 .9647 
Non-contract farmers 116 .8602 .074 .0068 
  Contract farmers 134 .8846 .053 .0045 
  Degrees of freedom: 248 t =  -3.01*** 
     TE (Sub-matched sample, N=199) 
     Full sample 199 .8668 .074 .0052 .5397 .9698 
Non-contract farmers 65 .8460 .0928 .8230 
  Contract farmers 134 .8769 .0611 .8664 
  Degrees of freedom: 197 t =  -2.79***           
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     Sources: author owned calculations 
     
 
 
Figure 4.2: Technical efficiency distribution for export-oriented rice in the MRD 
Sources: authors’ own calculations 
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4.4.3 Propensity score matching 
The propensity of CF participation based on the probit estimations is presented in Table 4.7. 
There are some significant variables associated with the probability of CF scheme 
participation. Regarding the “rice farming experience” variables, it can be seen that the more 
farming experience households have, the less willingness they show to participate in CF (β=-
0.023, z= 2.26). There is a strong propensity in the rice farming household participating in 
CF of expecting to reduce the expenditure on hired labor since the more household farming 
members they have, the more the propensity to engage in CF (β=-0.2935, z= 2.30). In 
addition, older farmers have higher propensity to join CF in comparison to younger farmers 
which is convincing evidence for the case of Vietnamese rice production in which young 
farmers perceive independency from arrangements with contractors to be more beneficial 
(β=0.02, z=1.91). Nevertheless, educational level is not strongly associated with farmers’ 
marketing decisions.  
We then apply the probit estimations to generate a PSM in which the balancing property is 
satisfied. Given the similar socio-demographic characteristics of both groups, the propensity 
score of the comparison before and after matching shows that the significant differences in 
TE scores are resulting from the CF participation.  
 
Table 4.7: Probit estimates of the contract farming propensity  
Variable Coef.    Std. Err.         Z   
Riceexper -0.0231188 0.0102184  -2.26* 
 Edulevel 0 .0266692 0.0291315  -0.92 
 Credit 0 .050614  0.1770455 0.29 
 Offfarm 1.37e-06   1.29e-06   1.06 
 Hhland -1.60e-07   5.83e-06  -0.03 
 Labor 1.48e-06  3.98e-06  0.37 
 Machine  -3.96e-07  9.27e-07   -0.43 
 Age 0.0200568 0.0105241  1.91* 
 Hhmember -0.2935064 0.1277223  -2.30** 
 Gender 0.4277729  0.3674826  1.16 
 _cons  -0.5170229  0.6041934 -0.86 
 N 250 
   Log likelihood 
 
-16.516.629 
Correctly classified         60.80% 
Note: * p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
 
Sources: authors’ own calculations 
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Table 4.8. Mean and Standard Deviation of Technical Efficiency in PSM estimation 
     Contract     Non-contract   Difference T-test 
    Mean     Mean     in Means   
TE- Probit model (n= 
250) 
        Unmatched .8846 
  
.8602 
  
0.024 3.02*** 
ATT 
 
.8846   .8569   0.027 2.05** 
Note: * p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
       Based on nearest-neighbor matching estimations, the average treatment effects on the treated 
results are positively significant. Table 4.8 presents a strongly positive contribution of the 
CF participation on TE scores (at 1% level of significance). In more detail, participating in 
the CF scheme helps Vietnamese export rice farmers to increase TE score levels from 
85.69% to 88.46% in comparison to the case of non-participation in the CF scheme. This 
result supports, on the one hand the rejection of the hypothesis that there is self-selection 
bias for the sample and on the other hand the previous literature about the positive impacts of 
CF scheme on household welfare and agricultural productivity from emerging and 
developing economies (Ramaswami et al., 2005; Rahman et al., 2009; Rao et al., 2012). 
After matching estimation, we have the result of a sample of 199 observations including 134 
contract households and 65 non-contract household with the same socio-economic 
characteristics. Table 4.5 presents the TE score value of the matched sub sample which is at 
1% significant difference (t= 2.79), confirming the t-test of the full sample of 250 
observations and prove that there is no sample selection bias in our estimations  (see 
Appendix 3). 
4.5. Conclusion and policy recommendation  
Export-oriented rice farming under CF frame in Vietnam is an important topic when 
considering global poverty reduction and resource rivalry. Correspondingly, it was the aim 
of this study to analyze the CF effects on TE in Vietnams’ export rice production sector 
based on the cost-frontier approach for the efficiency measurement of a firm, given a level of 
output at the lowest expenditure of inputs. Using survey data from 250 rice farmers located 
in three major rice farming areas in the MRD of Vietnam, a SFA was applied to evaluate the 
effects of CF scheme on farming TE levels and estimate the production function. Overall, the 
results highlight the influence of CF participation on TE at the farm level. Although there 
was no strong effect of CF status on inefficiency determinants for the whole sample, we still 
found that there is significant difference in TE levels between the two groups (CF-
participants and -non-participants). CF is found to greatly support export-oriented farmers in 
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increasing their TE levels. In this regard, contract participation could support not only larger-
scale farmers but also small-scale farmers in developing and emerging economies by 
improving their production patterns which, in turn, is associated with increases in household 
incomes. Thus, CF bears the potential to contribute to poverty reduction in the rural areas of 
developing countries, such as Vietnam. 
The research findings are in line with previous research about CF effects on TE (Ali and 
Flinn, 1989; Battase and Broca, 1997; Ramaswami et al, 2005; Cai et al., 2008; Rahman et 
al., 2009; Rao et al., 2012; Wollni and Brümmer, 2012; Ramaswami et al, 2005), as well as 
about TE in the Vietnamese rice sector (Khai and Yabe, 2011; Duy, 2012; Hoang and Yabe, 
2012; Vo and Nguyen, 2016). In more detail, the results from the SFA reveal that the 
average TE of export-oriented rice production in Vietnam is 87.33% implying that TE levels 
could be increased by nearly 13% at the current input level and socio-economic conditions 
which confirms previous findings by Duy (2012) and Hoang and Yabe (2012). Furthermore, 
participating in CF schemes helps farmers to increase TE score level from 85.69% to 88.46% 
in comparison to the case of non-participations. Land, seeds, fertilizer, machinery, and labor 
are identified as the major inputs determining the production frontier. Remarkably, in our 
study “educational level”, “rice farming experience” and “off-farm income” are found as 
positive determinants influencing rice farming TE in contrast to the low negative effect of 
credit accessibility.  
CF has been proved to be a promising institutional arrangement for small-scale farmers in 
the Vietnamese export rice sector, and potentially also for other countries and similar cases 
by creating additional farm benefits from improving rice farming TE levels. Consequently, 
further development and enhancement of the CF scheme raised in the 80/2002/QD-TTg 
decision named "Policy on the Promotion of Agricultural Produce and Purchase through 
Contracts" and the 62/2013 QD-TTg decision is highly recommended. In addition, based on 
the empirical results, the availability of credits with lower interest rates and the improvement 
of control systems should be considered by the government in order to increase TE effects. 
Furthermore, contracting companies should also carefully consider the role of input supply 
when drawing up their contract conditions since price, quantity and appropriate training for 
seed and fertilizer usage are especially important drivers of farm TE.  
This paper’s findings are based on cross-sectional primary data gained in the MRD of 
Vietnam for rice production under the CF scheme over a period of one year (three rice 
cropping seasons). Since the CF scheme was at a very early stage of implementation in the 
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country during the year of analysis, future research with panel data is required to explore the 
households’ performance over a long term of observation. In this regard, further research 
should take into consideration the influence of CF implementation on households’ 
performance and CF empowerment within the Vietnamese export-oriented rice sector, 
particularly. With regard to the effects of the agricultural credit system derived from this 
paper, there should be a more specific evaluation to identify pitfalls which diminish its 
success at the farm level. Further research should also propose a comparison of production 
frontiers between the two groups surveyed. A detailed cost analysis based on production 
functions could reveal more detailed insights into the hypothesis that inputs supplied by 
contractors through CF schemes would be more expensive than the free market but with 
higher quality and more efficient use. The results would be very interesting for policy 
makers, firms and farms as well.  
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5. General Conclusions  
The objectives of the dissertation have been achieved as presented in the three papers. This 
study contributes to the current literature in several aspects. Firstly, we explore the driver of 
information accessibility and other demographic and social-economic characteristics of 
household marketing behavior and the determinants of CF participation. Secondly, we 
analyze the effects of CF scheme on households’ performances within the export-oriented 
rice production sector from developing countries that have limitedly been explored in the 
body of existing literature. We find that the CF scheme supports export-oriented rice 
producers in Vietnam to improve their household farming performance through two criteria: 
household income and rice profit. Finally, we evaluate the farming TE levels and the 
technical inefficiency determinants to estimate how CF scheme support household to 
improve their rice farming TE. 
5.1 Major findings  
The introduction chapter of this thesis presents an overview of the existing literature and the 
characteristics of the Vietnamese export-oriented rice sector. Especially, chapter 1 
emphasizes the importance of improving smallholders’ market linkages to modern value 
chains. Based on this point of view, we addressed the following research objectives. Firstly, 
we explored the determinants influencing smallholders’ contracting decisions within the 
export-oriented rice sector in Vietnam. Secondly, we analyzed the effects of CF participation 
on farming households’ performance based on two categories: household income and rice 
profit. Thirdly, we evaluated the influences of CF participation in farming TE levels. We 
also explored the determinants of technical inefficiency in export-oriented rice production. 
The study employed Probit, OLS, MLE, PSM and SFA on a cross-sectional data set from a 
sample of 250 export-oriented rice smallholder farmers in the MRD of Vietnam to address 
the research objectives. Based on the research findings, farm characteristics, market 
information access, and household characteristics are proved to have strong influence on 
smallholders’ contracting decisions. Additionally, there is a significant influence of CF 
participation on household income and rice profit. It is interesting that CF participation plays 
an important role in improving household income by 20.87%, rice profit by 30.54% and TE 
level by 2.44% in Vietnam. The SFA results also reveal that about 13% of the potential 
output is lost due to technical inefficiency determinants. In total, the scale-effect is about 
1.026, which reveals that if farmers increase 1% of production inputs, the TE score can 
increase by 1.026%.  
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In chapter two, the study contributes to the existing research about CF scheme with regard to 
the determinants of contracting decisions. The accessibility of world market price 
information is found to play a key role in smallholder farmers’ marketing decision. The 
variables “the accessibility of world market price information” significantly increases the 
probability of CF participation, which is found as a contribution to the existing literature. 
The results highlight the influence of various categories on smallholder farmers’ contracting 
decisions. Although farmers with long-term farming experience and sufficient family 
members have greater priority to join traditional marketing channels based on their own 
experiences, it cannot be denied that participating in the CF scheme offers farmers higher 
benefits based on fair-price frames in comparison to the more volatile spot markets. CF is 
also helpful for smallholder farmers to more conveniently access the market instead of 
relying on the traditional market through middlemen and other spot transactions. Several 
characteristics are found to influence smallholders’ marketing decisions. Firstly, we find that 
low percentage of credit accessibility could be one of the reasons that lead to the current 
situation that a vast majority of farmers prefer dealing with middlemen in spot markets to get 
more flexible credit inputs. Secondly, more extension service accessibility could offer better 
farming practices and more farming experience. Family labors play an important role in 
smallholders’ marketing decisions. Thirdly, gender and education do not influence the 
contracting decision. Finally, it is also interesting to learn from the case that for farmers who 
have greater access to market information are more willing to participate in modern 
marketing channels.  
In chapter three, we evaluate the influences of CF participation on households’ performance 
based on two criteria: household income and rice profit. The finding contributes to the 
existing literature that not only larger-scale rice farmers but also small-scale rice farmers can 
get benefits from contract participation. We find that there is a positive and significant 
influence of CF participation status on household income and rice profit. It becomes evident 
that CF participation supports smallholder farmers to increase their income by 20.87% and 
rice profit by 30.54% in comparison with the non-contract group. In addition, we discover 
some major socio-economic characteristics that strongly affect households’ performance. 
Apart from the positive significant sign of “the accessibility of world price information” (i) 
variable, we also find that “farming size” (ii) and “the accessibility of extension services” 
(iii) are key determinants of improving farming households’ performance. Results on the 
effects of farm size and extension services once again confirm previous research results, 
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whereas our insights into the role of access to information on world market prices is 
considered to fill an existing research gap. As a result, it is very important to take into 
consideration the availability of market price information to encourage CF participation. Due 
to the economic benefits resulting from the CF scheme in the Vietnamese export rice 
production sector, a further development and enhancement of the CF scheme is strongly 
suggested. Thus, more favorable CF terms and conditions and more availability of market 
information and extension services offered by contractors could be helpful to attract more 
participants. 
Chapter four includes the analysis of the mechanism on how CF participation influences 
farming TE levels and the technical inefficiency determinants. The study contributes to the 
body of previous literature by exploring the determinants of CF participation and the effects 
of CF on farm TE levels among the export-oriented rice sector in Vietnam. These aspects 
have never been thoroughly analyzed before. The SFA results reveal that about 13% of the 
potential output is lost due to technical inefficiency. The TE of export-oriented rice 
production in the MRD ranges between 56.48% and 96.47%. In total, the scale-effect is 
about 1.026, which reveals that if farmers increase 1% of production inputs, the TE score can 
increase by 1.026%. Thereby, on average, contract participants have higher TE (88.46%) in 
comparison to non-contract participants (86.02%). In the two-sample t-test of TE-mean 
values, the significant differences at the 5% level with a t-value of 3.01indicate the higher 
TEs for contract farmers. Land, seed, fertilizer, machine, and labor are identified as the 
major inputs of the production frontier. Moreover, the farm and household characteristics in 
the sample also show influences on the TE of rice farming, however non-significantly. 
Remarkably, in our study, not only “educational level” and “rice farming experience”, but 
also “off-farm income” is found as positive determinants influencing rice farming TE in 
contrast to the low negative effect of credit accessibility. By participating in CF scheme, not 
only larger-scale but also small-scale farmers in developing and emerging economies can 
improve their production patterns. 
Overall, based on the study, the development and enhancement of the Vietnamese CF 
scheme proposed in the decision No. 80/2002/QD-TTg named "Policy on the Promotion of 
Agricultural Produce and Purchase through Contracts" and decision 62/2013 QD-TTg are 
highly recommended. Simultaneously, also the availability of market price information and 
extension services are very important to encourage farmers’ contracting participation. 
Additionally, the CF scheme is also a tool to support improving household livelihoods and 
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the TE level of agricultural production in the rural areas of Vietnam, especially, with regard 
to export-oriented rice production. The findings are in line with the existing literature about 
marketing preferences, contract farming, productivity, and TE in emerging and developing 
countries (Mayer and Zignago, 2005; Wollni and Zeller, 2007; Khai and Yabe, 2011; Wollni 
and Brümmer, 2012). As suggested by Demont and Rutsaert (2017) to differentiate the price 
and improve Vietnamese rice quality, CF would be a potential method to deal with the issue. 
Derived from the research findings, we have proposed some policy recommendations for 
different stakeholders in the export-rice value chain such as the government, local 
authorities, processing and exporting companies, and farmers to improve the national rice 
sector.  
5.2. Policy implications and further research suggestions  
The research findings suggest some necessary policy recommendations regarding CF 
participation in the country. These are greatly proposed in the decision No. 80/2002/QD-TTg 
named "Policy on the Promotion of Agricultural Produce and Purchase through Contracts" 
and decision 62/2013 QD-TTg of the Vietnamese government. This is also in line with the 
restructuring strategy for converting about 20.000 ha the marginal yielding rice land into 
corn and soybean crops from the year 2016 on (Smith, 2013; USDA, 2015). Thus, we 
consider that the CF scheme offered by the firms will have a crucial relevance to increase the 
overall performance and can be an incentive for more farmers to be linked to vertically 
integrated value chains in the country. 
The results of the first paper draw the government’s attention to the accessibility of world 
market price information to encourage more CF participation. The information could be 
supplied through firms, third party and public information channels via TV, radio where the 
information is available and secured for farmers. Additionally, the extension service 
assistance offered by the contractors is considered to be an important factor to improve 
production quantity and quality. Furthermore, contractors should also take socio-economic 
characteristics such as farming experience, household size, and rice farming area as 
important criteria into account before offering the contract; especially they should pay 
attention to the price term.  
The second paper highlights the importance of farming size as one of the key factors to 
improve household income and rice profit. It is important to remain the current rice farming 
size to secure rice production. Moreover, the accessibility of extension services and the 
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accessibility of world price information are found to strongly influence farming households’ 
performance, which are very important aspects to be paid attention to by the government and 
contractors. Based on the third paper, it becomes obvious that the TE level for export-
oriented rice production is significantly influenced by CF participation. The levels of 
production frontier are determined by the expenditure on land, seed, fertilizer, machine, and 
labor. Yet, CF participation is considered to have an influence on rice smallholders’ increase 
of farm TE. In order to improve the TE levels in the area, further improvement of the CF 
scheme is greatly suggested. More support for contractors should be considered by the 
government to encourage further CF availability in the MRD, as well as in the whole 
country. Moreover, the availability of credits with lower interest rates and the improvement 
of control systems should be considered by the government to increase farm TE-effects. 
We acknowledge some limitations of this study. This empirical research about the 
implementation of the CF scheme in the export-oriented rice sector in the Mekong River 
Delta of Vietnam reveals many valuable findings. However, with a limited sample size of a 
250 export-oriented rice farmers of this quantitative cross-sectional research, there is still a 
need of a larger sample observation to evaluate the CF scheme enforcement in the area. In 
addition, this study is only focusing on the Mekong River Delta of Vietnam with a 250.000 
targeting smallholder farmers. A comparison with regards to the differences in geographic 
characteristics and its influences on smallholders’ performances would reveal more 
interesting insight information about CF schemes in the whole country.   
This study provides manifold starting points for future research. Further studies should 
evaluate the Vietnamese rice farming households’ behavior on and attitudes towards 
different types of contract options and their willingness to participate in group contracts. 
Another research based on farm level data is needed to compare long-term and short-term 
effects of CF on rice production among smallholders. In this regard, there should be follow 
up studies on the influence of CF duration on households’ performance within the 
Vietnamese export-oriented rice sector. These studies should also capture the households’ 
behavior during a certain time to observe CF empowerment, respectively. Group contract 
with the FAs participation as the third party in the CF cooperation would also be interesting 
to conduct a further research. With regard to the agricultural credit system, there should be 
more in-depth research to identify concrete pitfalls diminishing its success on the farm level. 
Another research should propose a comparison on production frontiers between the two 
groups of CF participants and non-participants. A detailed cost analysis based on farmers’ 
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production functions will reveal more detailed insights into the hypothesis that inputs 
supplied by contractors through the CF scheme would be more expensive than inputs 
purchased on the free market but with high quality and, thus, are more efficient in farming 
practices. The following study could explore more valuable information for policymakers, 
agribusiness activities and farmers. Overall, this dissertation conceptualizes the importance 
of CF scheme and its contribution to rice farming households, not only with regard to large-
scale but also small-scale households.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Paddy yield (tons per hectare) in Southeast Asia 2005-2015 
   
             
 
Source: USDA (2015) 
Appendix 2: Vietnam exports of rice by grade 2013-2016 
 
 
          Source: USDA (2017) 
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Appendix 3. Technical efficiency distribution with selection bias controlling 
 
 
Sources: authors’onwed calculations  
 
 
Appendix 4: Household questionnaire 2016 
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 HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 11.2015- 3.2016  
CONTRACT FARMING FOR EXPORT-ORIENTED RICE SECTOR IN THE MEKONG RIVER DELTA OF VIETNAM 
Introductory statement 
We are PhD-students from Georg-August- University of Goettingen in Germany, who are interested to know about all activities relate to rice production at 
household level. You have been randomly selected to participate in this interview which contains questions connected with farmer characteristics, contract 
farming activities, membership in farmer associations (FAs) and the determinants on farmer performance. Thank you very much for your information. 
We assure that all information provided by you during this interview will be kept confidential and only be used for research purposes. It will take almost 2 
hours to complete this questionnaire. If you volunteer yourself for this interview, may we start? For further inquiries, comments and/or suggestions about this 
survey, please contact Ms. Le Ngoc Huong; Cell phone: 0165.935 7969 or Email: hlengoc@gwdg.de 
 
Enumerator name:   (ENUNAME)             Time of started 
 
Supervisor’s name: 
       Time finished: 
Date of data collection:  (CODATE) 
Module contents 
Module 1: Survey information Page 1 Module 7: Non-contract participant information 
Page 9 
Module 2: Farmer characteristics Page 1-2 Module 8:  Shocks 
Page 9 
Module 3: Tenure and farm production 
Page 2-6 
Module 9: Household asset 
Page10 
Module 4: Contract farming production 
Page 6-7 
Module 10: Non- farm income/off-farm income 
Page 11 
Module 5: The perception of contract farming 
scheme 
Page 7-8 Module11:  Farmer Association and Willingness to pay Page 12 
Module 6: Trust and Commitment 
Page 8- 9   
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MODULE 1. SURVEY INFORMATION            SURINFOR 
1.1. Province (PROV)(1- Can Tho; 2- An Giang; 3:-Kien Giang)   1.2 District (DIST) (1. Thoai Son; 2-Vinh Thanh; 3- Hon Dat) 
1.3. Commune (COMM) 1- Vong The; 2- Tay Phu;3- Thanh An; 4- My Phuoc; 4- My Hiep Son; 6-Vong Dong; 7- Thanh Thang; 8- Thanh Loi; 9- other)  
   
1.4 Village (VILLAG)   
1.5. Do you participate in rice contract farming in 2015?  (CONTRICE)    ([1] Yes [0] No)    
1.5.1. Have you ever dropped out from CF? (DROPOUT)     
1.6. Name of head of HHs (HENAME):       1.7. Sex of the household head ([1] Male  [0] female) (HESEX) 
1.8 Name of respondent (RNAME):         1.9. Relationship to household head  (HRELA) code A 
1.10. Telephone number (PHONE)                                  1.11. HHs head job  (JOB) code C 
1.12. Distance to central market (DISTANCE) (km)  
1.13. Which year did your household start farming in this village? (RICEEXPER)
*
 
Code A: [1] Head; [2] Wife/Husband; [3] Son/Daughter; [4] Son/Daughter in law; [5] Father/Mother; [6] Father/Mother in law; [7] Sister/Brother; [8] Grandchild; [9] Other relatives; [10] No answer; [99] Not applicable. 
Code C:   [1] Farmers      [2] office staff      [3] hired worker      [4] teacher      [5] owned business      [6] student/pupil       [7] retired official      [8] unemployed      [9] others (specify); 99] Not applicable. 
 
 
(* )As an independent household 
Code A: [1] Head; [2] Wife/Husband; [3] Son/Daughter; [4] Son/Daughter in law; [5] Father/Mother; [6] Father/Mother in law; [7] Sister/Brother; [8] Grandchild; [9] Other relatives; [10] No answer; [99] Not applicable. 
  
Note:  - Ref. Period from 1st December 2014 to 30 November 2015;  - Unit: 1 cong = 1000 m2;       - VND: the currency of Vietnam;   1EUR= 25.000 VND  (date: 12, Nov, 2015) 
              - Focused on rice for export production, read out loud and explain the code if necessary! 
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MODULE 2. DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE HOUSEHOLD                                                   DEMOS   
           
2.1 Name of major farmer (FULLNAME):                    2.2 Gender (GEN) ([1] Male  [0] female)):   
2.3 Age (AGE):                                                                      2.4 Number of schooling years (EDULEVEL): 
2.5 Marriage satus (MARIED) code B:                                                                   2.6 Relationship to HH head (RELATION) code A:    
2.7 Do you participate in any farmer associations?  (ORGHHMB) ([1] Yes [0] No) 
2.8 Number of hh member  (NUMEM):              2.9 Number of agricultural member (AGMEM):  
2.10 Number of dependent member  (DEPMEM):                                      
 Code B:   [1]Single [2] Married  [3] Others   
 MODULE3. TENURE AND FARM PRODUCTION 
3.1. Total farm size? (TOAREA)          
3.2. Total rice farming size (AGAREA)                         
3.3. Hired land size               (CULTAREA)                                            Hired price: (PHIRE):   
       Please specify the land characteristics:  
Slot of rice farming land 1 2 3 4 5 
Size (m2)      
Land quality (Code M)      
Distance from hh place to farming land (km)      
           Code M: [1] low quality, [2] Normal quality ,[3] high quality, [4] other (specify) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
m2   
m2   
              m2        
M2 
     .000 VND 
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3.4. Rice production                             ALLRICE 
       Please list all plots that produced rice during the last 12 months (december 12. 2014 – November.2015), starting with the plot planted export-oriented 
rice varieties: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Season 
 
Land 
(code 
part  3.3) 
What was the 
variety planted in 
the plot each 
season? 
 
Code E 
Seed sources 
[1] 
company/contractors 
[2] self-service 
[3] agency 
 
Total of 
quantity of 
crop 
harvested 
 (kg) 
Rice for 
home 
consumptio
n 
 
(kg) 
Do you sell? 
[1] Có 
[0] Không 
Quantity 
 
 
(kg) 
Price 
1000VND 
RICESEA NAMEVAR  PADSOURCE  PROMAIN HOCONSU SOLD QSOLD PRICESOLD 
   
Đ
X
  
2
0
1
4
-
2
0
1
5
 
 
1        
2        
3        
   
H
T
 
2
0
1
5
 
 
1        
2        
3        
3
rd
 
se
a
so
n
  
 
1        
2        
            Code E: [1] Jasmine; [2] OM6976;    [3] OM5451;   [4] AGPPS103;  [5]  OM4900;                 [5] others (specify)………………….   
            Code F: [1] contractor  [2] FAs  [3] Middleman/Collector/ Exporter [4] Wholeseller           [5] Processors   6] others (specify) [10] no answer [99] Not applicable 
 
1 2 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Seaso
ns 
Land 
code  
part 3.3 
Seed, landing preparation Fertilizers 
Quant
ity  
(kg) 
Sourc
e  
 
Code G 
 
Price  
 kg 
 
(1000 
VND) 
Manure  
[1] Có 
[0] Không 
If yes, 
please 
specify 
Code H 
Animal output fertilizer Ure- 
URE 
Kg 
Pri
ce 
1000 
VN
D 
N 
Kg 
price 
1000 
VND 
Kali 
Kg 
price 
1000  
VND 
DAP 
Kg 
pric
e 
1000 
VND 
NP
K 
Kg 
Giá 
1000 
VND Số 
lượng 
 
Đơn 
vị 
[1] bao 
tải 
[2]kg 
Giá  
 
(1000 
VND) 
RICES
EA 
Q 
SEED 
S 
SEED 
P 
SEED BUFER KUFER 
Q 
MAN 
U 
MAN 
P 
MAN 
Q 
N2 
P 
N2 
Q 
P2O5 
P 
P2O5 
Q 
KALI 
P 
KALI 
Q 
DAP 
P 
DAP 
Q 
NP
K 
P 
NPK 
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Đ
X
  
2
0
1
4
-
2
0
1
5
 
 
1                   
2                   
3                   
H
T
 
2
0
1
5
 
 
1                   
2                   
3                   
3
rd
 
se
as
o
n
 
 
1                   
2                   
3                   
Code G: [1] self-service; [2] FAs;   [3] seed supplier;  [4] Neighbor;  [5] relatives;  [6] gilf;   [7] other (specify);  [10] no answer  [99] not applicable; 
Code H: [1] Organic;   [2] Chemicals;  [3] animal output fertilizers;  [7] other (specify);  [10] no answer  [99] not applicable; 
1 2 25 26 27 28 29 30 
Season  Land 
code  
part 3.3 
Pesticide chemicals Fuel cost 
 
Other costs (security, irrigation 
water management) 
1000VND 
Pesticide  Disease Jugular Other  
RICESEA PESTICIDE DISEASE JUGULAR OTHER FUEL PIRRI 
Đ
X
 
2
0
1
4
-
2
0
1
5
 
 
1       
2       
3       
H
T
 
2
0
1
5
 
 
1       
2       
3       
3
rd
 
se
as
o
n
  
 
1       
2       
3       
Code K: [1] family       [2] contractor [3] hired  [4] borrow     [5] FAs     [6] other (specify);  [7] no answer  [99] not applicable; 
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31. Human cost  
se
as
o
n
 Land 
code 
part 
3.3 
 
Land preparation 
(LAND) 
Seed distribution 
(GROW) 
Fertilizer  
(FERTILIZE) 
Chemical spray 
(SPRAY) 
Water plump 
(PLUMP) 
Harvesting cost 
(HARVEST) 
Fami
ly 
labor 
days 
Hire
d 
labor
days 
Pric
e for 
hire
d 
labo
r/da
y 
1000 
VND 
Fam
ily 
labo
r 
days 
Hire
d 
labo
rdays 
Pric
e for 
hire
d 
labo
r/da
y 
1000 
VND 
Fam
ily 
labo
r 
days 
Hire
d 
labo
rdays 
Pric
e for 
hire
d 
labo
r/da
y 
1000 
VND 
Fam
ily 
labo
r 
days 
Hired 
labord
ays 
Pric
e for 
hire
d 
labo
r/da
y 
1000 
VND 
Family 
labor 
days 
Hired 
labord
ays 
Pric
e for 
hire
d 
labo
r/da
y 
1000 
VND 
Famil
y 
labor 
days 
Hired 
labord
ays 
Price 
for 
hired 
labor
/day 
1000 
VND 
Đ
X
2
0
1
4
-2
0
1
5
 1                                     
2                   
3                   
H
T
 
2
0
1
5
 1                   
2                   
3                   
3
rd
 
se
as
o
n
 1                   
2                   
3                   
3.5 Production and revenue details for the other crops and livestock grown during the last 12 months [tháng 12/2014 – tháng 11/2015]          
OTHERCROPS 
 Apart from rice production, did you plant any other kind of crops during the past 12 months?[1] Yes ,[2] No, go to 3.7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
ID crop 
Code L 
Crop area? 
unit: m2 
quantity (kg) Did you 
sell the 
product?  
[1] Yes 
[2] No 
Selling 
quantity 
(kg) 
Average selling 
price 
1000VND/kg 
Average production cost (1000VND) Total cost 
(1000 VND) 
seeds fertilizers chemicals others 
 
Uni Goettingen  
 
98 
 
IDCROP ACROP QCROP SELLOT CROSOLD CROAPRICE CQUAN1 CPRIC1 CQUAN2 CPRIC2 CROTOT 
           
           
           
Code L: [1] Vegetables;     [2] fruits;        [3] seasame;         [4] other(specify………………………)  
 
3.6. Livestock and aquaculture                   
LIVESTOCKAQUA 
Did you have any livestock and aquaculture production within 12 months? ?[1] Yes ,[2] No, go to part 4  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
C
o
d
e 
o
f 
an
im
al
s 
Did you have such 
livestock? 
 
Total number Did you 
sell? 
[1] Yes 
[0] No 
Selling quantity Total cost(1000 VND) Total 
cost 
 
1000VND 
quantity 
 
unit 
[1] Kg 
[2] per unit 
   [3] others 
quantity Price per unit 
 1000 VND 
seeds foods vaccination others 
ANIMAL 
 
[1] yes 
[0] No, go 
ahead 
TOTLIVE ULIVE SLIVE QLIVE PLIVE CLIVE1 CLIVE2 CLIVE3 CLIVE4 TCOST 
1 Pork (for 
meat) 
           
2 Pork (for 
plant) 
           
3 Fish            
4 Shrimp            
5 Chicken            
6 Beef             
7 Duck             
8 Others (-----)            
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3.7 Where do you sale your product?   [1] Company through contract; [2] Middlemen/processor; [3] Local market  
3. 8 Do you have information about the rice price over the world market before selling?   [1] Yes;  [2] No    
3.9 Do you have information about last year selling price?   [1] Yes; [2] No  
*DO YOU HAVE CONTRACT NOW? [1] Yes; continue   ; [2] No, move to Module 7 
MODULE4. CONTRACT FARMING PRODUCTION                                                                                                                                                           
CFRICE 
4.1 When did you start signing the contract for rice production? (CYEAR) 
4.2   Who gave you the decisive information that motivated you to sign the contract? (CSOUR)   
[1] Contractors     [2] Neighbor;   [3] FAs;     [4] Village officials;    [5] Researcher;    [7] Trader;    [8] Other (specify);    [9] No answer;     [99] Not applicable 
4.3  Did you stop signing contract in between?         [1] Yes ;   [2] No, go to 4.4 
  
4.3.1 In which years did you stop signing the contract?   [years] (YCSTOP)    
4.3.2      Could you tell the reasons why did you stop signing the contract?  (list the most important aspects)   
              [1] Inconvenient    [2] Low income   [3] Non-flexible    [4] Take time    [5]  No idea   [6]  others  (specify) 
4.4     Who decide to sign the contract in your household?          (Code A) (WHOSC)        Gender :[1] Male   ; [2] Female   
    Code A: [1] Head; [2] Wife/Husband; [3] Son/Daughter; [4] Son/Daughter in law; [5] Father/Mother; [6] Father/Mother in law; [7] Sister/Brother; [8] Grandchild; [9] Other relatives; 
[10] No answer; [99] Not applicable. 
4.5 Did you receive the technical supports from contractor?    (EXTENT)                       [1] Yes; [2] No, move to 4.6 
      How many times does expert visit your farm per season? (TECHCROP)   (Number of times) 
 
4.6 Did you get money right after selling the products to contractor?  (PAYMENT)  [1] Yes; [2] No, move to Module 5 
      How long did you wait for getting the money?   (Number of days) (NUWDATE) 
 
4.7 Do you receive the information about inputs (rice seeds) every crop and contract terms and conditions?   [1] Yes; [2] No 
4. 8 Do you have information about the rice price over the world market before signing the contract?              [1] Yes; [2] No 
4.9 Do you have information about the rice price of former contract offered by the company?                          [1] Yes; [2] No 
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MODULE 5. THE PERCEPTION OF CONTRACT                                                                                                                                                     
PERCEPT                                 Do you negotiate the terms and conditions in the contract with contractor before signing? (CNEGO)     [1] Yes; [2] No 
5.2 What  type of contract are you signing?  (CTYPE)(1) Group ; (2) Individual 
5.3 What kind of contract have you signed?  (KINDC) 
(1) Production  (2) Marketing (3) Resource   (4) Other (specify………………….) 
5.4 What kind of price is specified in the contract? (KINDP) 
(1) Fixed price;  (2)  Floating price;  (3) Floor  price;  (4) Flexible price;  (5) Other (specify) 
5.5 Have you ever breached the contract?   (CTBREAK)   [1] Yes,   [2] No, go to 5.7 
What happened when you breached the contract?  (BREKRE) 
[1] The company quit the contract for the next season,        [2] You paid the penalty,    [3] There was nothing happen ,   [4] No answer   ,    [5] Other (Specify……………)                            
5.6 What is the main reason for breaching the contract?    (REABREAK) 
[1] Market price is higher  than contract price ,  [2] the storage and transportation fees from the company are so high , [3] No answer,  [4] Other, 
specify……………………………………………… 
5.7 Why did your household choose to sign the contract farming to produce export-oriented rice? (mark “x” for selection)  
To what extent do you agree with the statement about the reason for contract farming 
participation? 
Answer 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agee 
Improve household income (IMPROVE) 
1. Contact farming helps us to sell the product with a higher price than without contract      
2. Contact farming helps us to save production costs due to priority in receiving credit       
3. Contact farming helps us to save production costs due to low seeds price      
4. Contract farming helps to improve technical skills in export-oriented rice production      
5. We can specify our benefit before producing rice due to advanced price in contract       
6. We always get a higher selling price (mentioned in the contract) than market price at the 
harvesting time. 
     
7. We  find it easy to sell the product to the market      
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8. Contact farming helps us to reduce the risk referring to market price fluctuations      
9. Contact farming helps us to access market easier through convenient transportation  
10. Contact farming helps us to have an easier processing procedure  
     
Export rice contract farming and its impacts on social aspect and environment of region (SOCIAL) 
1.  Contract farming contributes to have a modern farming system       
2. Producing rice at larger scale is better than small scale       
3. We can produce rice which is safe to environment through reducing amount of fertilizer       
4. We can produce rice which is safe to environment through reducing amount of pesticide.      
It is suitable to regional development strategies (REGIONAL) 
1. The Contractor help to improve the infrastructure of the region       
2. Contract Farming improve the living standard of the village       
MODULE  6.TRUST AND COMMITMENT                                                                                                                                                      
 TRUSTNCOM 
6.1. Trust with contractor 
 
Do you agree with these statements below?                                                                                     
(TRUST) 
Answer 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree
  
Neutral Agree  
Strongly 
agree  
1. Company always treats you fairly regarding input supply price       
2. You sign the contract base on the reputation of the company in the market.      
3. The contractor always keeps their promise and fulfils the obligation.      
4. We can reduce some uncertain damages to our production process (whether, social 
effectiveness…). 
     
5. We think that company gives you a degree of freedom       
6.2 Relationship commitment  
 
Do you agree with these statements below?                                                                                     
(COMIT) 
Answer 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree
  
Neutral Agree  
Strongly 
agree  
1. We have never faced up with any confusion during contract time      
2.The conflicts never happen       
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3. The disagreement has never happened       
4. We have good communicating relation      
5. We are willing to continue maintaining the long term relationship with contractor in future      
 
6.3 Risk perspectives  
Do you agree with these statements below?                                                                                     
(RISKPERS) 
Answer 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree
  
Neutral Agree  
Strongly 
agree  
1. We do not develop relationships with contractors who are not fair to us      
2.We share the risk of production       
3.We  share the risk of uncertainty with the company       
4.We understand about market risk of contractor in rice export value chains       
 
MODULE7.  NON-CONTRACT SMALLHOLDERS    (mark “x” for selection)                                                                                            NONCFRICE                                                  
7.1 Have you ever heard about contract farming?       [1] Yes; [2] No,  move to Module 8 
7.2 Feedback from non-contract farming participants   
To what extent do you agree with these statements below?                                                              
(FEDNONCF) 
Answer 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree
  
Neutral Agree  
Strongly 
agree 
1.Joining the contract for export rice producing reduces the freedom in making decision        
2. Contract farming is really complicated issue       
3.We are afraid of taking risks joining into the contract because of price and production cost      
4. We got the opportunity to become contract farmers in the past but we refused      
5.We have the intention to participate into contract farming in the near future      
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MODULE 8: SHOCKS               
 SHOCK 
8.1. Experienced shocks faced after contract arrangement that impacted on household income the last 12 months?   
SHOCKS 
Was it 
happen? 
[1]  Yes 
[2]  No, go to 
the next 
shock 
How many 
times does 
shock 
happen per 
year? 
 
How was the 
household 
affected by 
[shock]?  
(Code G) 
SHOCKS 
Was 
it 
happe
n? 
[1]  Yes 
[2]  No, 
go to 
the next 
shock 
How many 
times shock 
happen per 
year? 
Code AC 
 
How was the 
household 
affected by 
[shock]?  
(CodeAD) 
1. Too much rain    6. Strong decrease in outputs price    
2. The higher temperature    7. Contract cancelation    
3. Flooding    8. Low quality product  refusal     
4. Insect disease for rice 
production 
   9. Strong increase in inputs price    
5. Loss of job in non-agriculture    10. Others     
Code  AC:  [1] Never; [2] 1-3 time; [3] 4-6 time; [4]  more than 6; Code AD:[1]extreme  seriously; [2] seriously; [3] slightly [4] not at all; 
8.2. Recovery from these shocks (*Note: Please ask the respondent to answer these items below)       
 REBORN 
Items 
What did you do to recover 
from these shocks?[1] Yes; [2] No 
Items 
What did you do to recover from 
these shocks? [1] Yes; [2] No 
1.Diversification of agricultural 
varieties 
 6. Borrowed finance from 
relatives/friends/neighbors 
 
2. Reduction of production inputs  7. Borrowed from bank/financial funds  
3. Migration for another job  8. Supported from government  
4. Sold livestock (pig, cow)  9. Help from contractor   
5. Sold crop products (maize, rice)  10. Help from relatives/friends/neighbors  
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MODULE 9: HOUSEHOLD ASSETS                                                                                                                                                                            
HHASSET                                                                                                     
9.1. Please list the machinery that household own to use for rice production   
STT Type of asset Quantity  Purchasing price When  Source    code K 
NUM TYPEASS MACHQA COSTASS WHENASS MASOURCE 
1 Combine harvesting machine     
2 Threshing machine     
3 Land processing machine     
4 Water plump      
5 Knapsack sprayer     
6 Dryer     
7 Others      
Code K: [1] family,       [2] contractor     [3] hired  [4] borrowed        [5] FAs     [6]  other    [10] no answer            [99] not applicable  
9.2 Household credit accessibility :  
9.2.1 Do you borrow money from any credit organizer? (CREDIT)? ([1] Yes [0] No, move to part 10)                            
9.2.2 Where do you often borrow money?   (WHELOAN): Code G   
Code G:      [1] Agricultural banl,    [2] Neighbor,      [3] credit agency,    [4] credit organizations,     [5] non-official credit organization,    [6] friend/relatives      [7] contractor,           [8] other 
(specify)  [9] no answer,             [99] Not applicable  
9.2.3 What the aim of your loan   (LOANPUR) ?  
[1] Agricultural production,    [2] non-agricultural production,     [3] Education,      [4] Others (specify) ,      [9] no answer,             [99] Not applicable  
9.2.4 How much money you have to borrow per season?   (LOANPER) 
9.2.5 How much is interest rate?: (INTERA) 
MODULE 10.NON-FARM INCOME (Non-farm activities are all activities not related to agricultural production on your own farm).              NONFARM 
  
10.1. Have any of household members been engaged in non-farm activities during the past 12 months? [1] Yes [2] No, move to 11. 
10.2. Please list all of these activities during the past 12 months 
(if  one member is engaged in more than one activity, use more than one row) 
 
% 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
MBID [member] 
Code A 
[Member 
participated in any 
non-farm activities 
or had an income 
outside farm 
activities) 
Source of non-farm income 
1 Sales 
2 Services 
3 Wage labor 
4 Retired salary and allowance 
5 Remittance  
6 Subsidies 
7 Other (specify) 
10 No answer 
99 Not applicable 
How long? 
1. Under 1 year 
2. 1-3 years 
3. 3-5 years 
4. More than 5 
years 
Where is non-
farm work? 
1. In the 
village 
2. In the 
district 
3. In the 
province 
4. In the big 
city (HCM) 
5. Other 
province 
6. Others 
(specify) 
How many months did [member] 
work a year on average? 
moth 
 
How much did 
[member] get per month 
on average? 
1000 VND 
MBID NONFJOB WSTART WHEWORK MONCOM MONWORK 
      
      
      
      
Code A:  [1] Head; [2] Wife/Husband; [3] Son/Daughter; [4] Son/Daughter in law; [5] Father/Mother; [6] Father/Mother in law; [7] Sister/Brother; [8] Grandchild; [9] Other relatives; [10] No answer; [99] Not 
applicable 
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MODULE 11: COOPERATIVES AND THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR COOPERATIVE PARTICIPATION                       
 WTP 
The purpose of this section is to determine the level of acceptance by farmers who are contracting partners with the enterprise in two cases: (i) the 
willingness to participate in group contract under the management of cooperative between traditional farmer association, the contractors and rice farmers and 
(ii) the willingness to pay for participating in cooperatives. 
11.1 Currently, the company is piloting to sign and conduct contract farming scheme through cooperatives with the aim to improve the quality of existing 
contract farming arrangement. The cooperatives will manage most of the current work that the company is carrying out directly with each household such as 
representatives for seed, fertilizer, pesticides at the original cost and then redistribute to the member the benefit after harvesting season as the shareholder. In 
addition, during the cultivation, the company's technical staff will support the cooperative in terms of quantity of spraying materials and techniques and pest 
control to control the drug residues. By the time of harvesting, the cooperative representative negotiates on price, form of payment, ensuring the best price 
for TV. Are households willing to participate in this form of link or not?  
Please make your choice: [1] Agree; [2] Disagree 
11.2 If you have to pay a fee to participate in this form of cooperatives in the following cases: membership fee per participant when joining the cooperatives 
is 2.000.000VND per household per year, if profits, then dividends will be shared. 
- Please make your choice: [1] Agree; [2] Disagree 
- Please tell us about the above rates: 1] Too low [2] Low [3] Medium [4] High [5] Too high 
- I do not know or have no idea 
If you find that the fee is too high, please provide a number that if you go down then you will be ready to join the cooperatives: .................. .VND 
If you find that the fee is too low, please provide a number that if you go there will be willing to join the cooperatives: .................. .VND 
Please provide the reason why you are not willing to pay for the fee…………………………………………………………………? 
 
Thank you so much for attending this interview! 
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List of Publications and Presentations 
 
Working Papers 
 The role of market information access for contract farming participation of 
smallholder farmers in developing and emerging economies (with T. Ludwig, V. 
Otter);  
 Do smallholders in emerging economies benefit from contract farming? Empirical 
evidence from the Vietnamese export rice sector with T. Ludwig, V. Otter);  
 Contract farming effects on technical efficiency of export-oriented rice production in 
Vietnam (with C. Beber, T. Ludwig, V. Otter). 
 
Conference contributions - Oral presentations 
 30th ICAE 2018, July 27th- August 2nd 2018, Vancouver, Canada, the International 
Association of Agricultural Economists (IAAE): 
https://cslide.ctimeetingtech.com/icae2018/attendee/confcal/session/list?q=Huongand
c=aandr=st~2_1 
 7th EAAE PhD workshop 2017, Nov. 8-10, 2017, the Escola Superior d’Agricultura 
de Barcelona (ESAB), Politechnic University of Catalonia, Spain. 
 IFAMA world conference 2017, Jul. 18 - 22, 2017, Miami, Florida, the USA; 
http://www.ifama.org/resources/Pictures/Logos/2017-Symposium.pdf.  
 Tropentag 2016, Conference on International Research on Food Security, Natural 
Resource Management and Rural Development, Sep. 19 - 21, 2016, Vienna, Austria; 
http://www.tropentag.de/abstract.php?code=dR3EGhnt. In: Book of Abstracts of the 
Tropentag 2016: Solidarity in a competing world-fair use of resources, Freyer, B. and 
E. Tielkes (Eds.) 1. Aufl.- Göttingen: Cuvillier, 2016. (ISBN. 978-3-7369-9341-9). 
 The Student Southeast Asian Conference, Nov. 4-6. 2016, Asia Africa Institute, 
Hamburg, organized by the University of Hamburg, Germany; 
http://www.southeastasiaconference.com/en/abstracts. 
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